Russia’s New Policy in the South Caucasus
The full-scale war that began in Ukraine has forced Moscow to review the mechanisms for maintaining its own influence in the post-Soviet space, particularly in the South Caucasus. In an author’s article, Paata Zakareishvili analyzes the Kremlin’s new strategy – a strategy of “controlled uncertainty,” as well as those institutional changes that point to a fundamental transformation of Russia’s policy in the region.
Main Theses:
Since February 2022, the entire system of international relations has entered a stage of deep and irreversible changes.
Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has not only changed the European security architecture but has also forced Moscow to review the mechanisms for maintaining its place in the post-Soviet space.
This novelty has manifested itself most clearly in the South Caucasus – a region where Russia for decades maintained leading military-political positions.
After the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Moscow created a system of relations in the region that functioned stably for a long period. Furthermore, Russia was able to provide security and financial assistance to the de facto authorities of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, while international non-recognition made these territories completely dependent on the Kremlin.
In the case of Georgia, such a model allowed Russia to simultaneously control the situation on the ground, limit Tbilisi’s foreign policy choices, and remain an indispensable participant in negotiations at all levels herself.
Today, it is precisely this model that is consistently losing its effectiveness.
The change in the balance of power in the region was driven by several important factors:
In this new political environment, the old mechanisms of “managing” conflicts are no longer as effective for Moscow as they were just recently. Accordingly, Russia is forced to form a new model of its presence in the region.
In expert circles, the opinion is widely held that the ultimate goal of Russia’s strategy is the complete annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the Kremlin’s recent steps demonstrate a more complex picture.
One can say that the Russian geopolitical airplane has long been circling over airport “Annexation,” but it still does not intend to go for a direct landing. It is precisely within this context that the Kremlin’s recent personnel decisions should be evaluated.
The appointment of a high-ranking federal official, Marat Kambolov, to a leadership position in Tskhinvali and the sending of the former governor of Belgorod, Vyacheslav Gladkov, as Russia’s ambassador to Abkhazia can hardly be considered ordinary personnel movements.
The political scale of both figures clearly exceeds the needs of the current administrative management of two small territories.
Moscow, both in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia, has traditionally relied on local elites. Accordingly, for day-to-day administration and management of the Tskhinvali region, it would have been completely sufficient to dispatch any Russian official of a regional level.
Nor has there ever been a need in Abkhazia to appoint a person possessing federal political weight as ambassador.
The synchronicity of these two decisions indicates that we are dealing not with isolated appointments, but with a revision of Russia’s institutional model.
It is noteworthy that such active involvement of the center is occurring simultaneously in two completely different political systems.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia significantly differ from each other both by the degree of internal political competition and by the form of their relationship with Russia and the level of autonomy of local institutions.
Accordingly, the new appointments are driven not by the internal specifics of the regions, but by a change in the overall strategy of Russia herself.
If Moscow’s sole purpose were annexation, then the most logical path would be to maintain the old model: the local authorities themselves would initiate another “referendum,” while Moscow would merely “take into account the will of the population” and maintain political distance.
The direct appointment of representatives of a federal level points to a completely different logic.
The appointment of Kambolov and Gladkov means that Russia at this stage is in no hurry to formalize the final status of the territories. On the contrary, it is trying to expand its own political capabilities.
Circling over airport “Annexation” is not a manifestation of indecisiveness. It is a conscious strategy of controlled uncertainty, which at this stage creates the most advantageous political position for Moscow in the South Caucasus.
Blackmail with annexation exerts pressure simultaneously on several actors:
The final annexation of one territory or another would reduce the space for political maneuver for Moscow herself as well, since they would turn into internal subjects of Russia.
Instead, the Kremlin, by my assumption, is trying to pursue a completely new policy in relations with Georgia.
For years, Moscow claimed that it was not itself a party to the conflict, and positioned itself exclusively as a guarantor of security between Tbilisi, Sukhumi, and Tskhinvali. Today, the beginning of a direct political dialogue with Georgia means the destruction of this many-year legal architecture.
In the new model, the de facto authorities, who are completely dependent on Moscow, may turn into formal communication channels. Formally, contact can be carried out between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali or Tbilisi and Sukhumi, but in reality, directly behind this process stands Moscow, which manages no longer just individual conflicts, but the entire Georgian political space, based on its own geopolitical interests.
The majority of contemporary studies focus attention only on the confrontation between Russia and the West or on Georgian-Russian relations. As a result, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are often perceived merely as instruments of Russia’s foreign policy.
This is an extremely simplified perception of reality.
Despite the international legal status, life in these societies continues. Generations are growing and forming there that have never lived in a single state together with Georgians. Their own elites, internal political processes, social expectations, and interests exist.
Their agency is limited and significantly depends on Russia, but it has not completely disappeared.
In this regard, an interesting paradox is created: Moscow formally recognizes their statehood, but in practice consistently reduces their real autonomy and implements all important decisions through federal institutions. Tbilisi, on the other hand, firmly defends the territorial integrity of Georgia, yet often ignores the internal reality of these societies and views the problem exclusively through the prism of occupation.
The paradox lies in the fact that Moscow recognizes statehood but destroys agency, while Tbilisi defends territory but often displaces from the discourse the interests and fears of the people living on these territories.
Thus, Georgia unwittingly accepts the framework created by Russia and places several conflicts that differ from one another into a single Georgian-Russian confrontation.
If in the future Russia’s influence weakens, this does not automatically mean that trust toward Georgia will return to the Abkhazians and Ossetians.
History shows that a change in the geopolitical environment does not in itself restore trust. Without direct communication between societies, any political agreement will remain merely a fragile construct created from the outside.
Based on this, today’s geopolitical transformation requires Georgia to review its entire de-occupation strategy.
For many years, Tbilisi absolutely justly relied on the principles of international law. However, if the model of Russia’s behavior changes, Georgia’s response must not remain exclusively reactive.
Tbilisi must form its own independent strategy, which will rely on two parallel directions:
De-occupation is not only the return of territories. This, first and foremost, means the restoration of human relations, trust, economic cooperation, and cultural ties.
While Moscow is tightening administrative management, Tbilisi can offer Sukhumi and Tskhinvali what Russia can never offer:
In today’s reality, Russia continues to build a system of rigid dependence and again flies in circles over airport “Annexation.” However, this flight cannot continue indefinitely.
Under the conditions of a prolonged war in Ukraine, Russia’s political and economic “fuel” is gradually depleting.
Georgia under these conditions can strengthen the attractiveness of its own development model and offer an alternative based on trust, security, and the perspective of a shared European future.
