Syria and Abkhazia
In September of this year, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in a letter sent to the “Coalition for Change,” confirmed that the European Union will raise the issue of revoking the recognition of Georgia’s occupied territories during its communications with Syria.
Syria’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence is not significant solely because of Damascus’s stance. Syria is part of the Arab world; therefore, it is insightful to analyze the attitudes toward the Georgian conflict not only in Syria, but across Arab countries in general.
We offer an interview on these topics with Giga Gigauri, an Orientalist and holder of a Master’s degree in Conflict Management from Doha University.
Let us begin our discussion about the Arab world with Syria. The Assad regime recognized the independence of Abkhazia in 2018. What influenced this decision?
Giga Gigauri: The Arab world encompasses many countries, and each possesses its own distinct characteristics. The foreign policy of every single one of them is rooted in local interests.
The case of Syria itself is one of the most intriguing. This country belongs to the Arab world, yet to this day it remains the only Arab nation that has recognized the independence of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. At first glance, this decision appeared to be a contemporary Russian-Syrian deal or an agreement between Assad and Putin; however, we must understand the specific nature and history of relations between these two countries.
We cannot say that this decision reflected the interests of the Syrian people. Nevertheless, this step unequivocally reflected the political, economic, and military ties built between Russia and Syria over decades. The relations between these two countries have always been steadfast and strong.
This relationship dates back to the Soviet era, following the Republic of Syria’s independence in the mid-twentieth century. These ties grew even stronger during the Assad dynasty. Soviet military bases first appeared in the region back during the time of Hafez al-Assad. At that time, the construction of Soviet naval logistics in the port of Tartus was also connected to Moscow forgiving a portion of Syria’s debts in exchange.
Nearly the same pattern repeated itself in 2018 with the recognition of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Both states rendered political support to one another. Russia itself was an ally of the Assad dynasty in the Syrian Civil War. It is precisely against the backdrop of such relations that we must view Syria’s 2018 decision. Later, in 2022, Syria went on to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk republics as well.
The descendants of the Muhajirs living in Syria are frequently mentioned. Does this group exercise any influence over Syria’s domestic politics?
Giga Gigauri: In my view, the descendants of the Muhajirs had no significant influence on the 2018 decisions. During Assad’s rule, this group maintained cultural connections with Abkhazians, but they possessed no political leverage over decision-making processes.
The descendants of the Muhajirs do not constitute a distinct political force. They are primarily engaged in economic activities. We should not view this group as either supporters of Assad or fighters against him.
Due to cultural ties, they welcomed the idea of recognizing Abkhazia, and even today they take pride in highlighting that despite changes in regime, the Syrian government did not reverse that decision. Their role is most visible during visits by representatives of the de facto authorities, when the descendants of the Muhajirs host them and preserve cultural links. However, as a political force or actor, this group had and has no influence over either former or current Syrian administrations. They are, in reality, a cultural community.
What is the attitude of other Arab countries, or the level of knowledge in their societies regarding Georgia’s conflicts? In recent years, Arabs have appeared in our region primarily as investors and are not political players. Is our region alien and unfamiliar to them?
Giga Gigauri: In Arab societies, very little is known about the conflicts in Georgia. I am referring even to academic circles, where there is no great interest in this subject. As for the general public, they either have scarce information about Georgia or are entirely unaware of these conflicts. That is why I mentioned at the beginning that the 2018 decision was not one based on the understanding or knowledge of the Syrian public.
I recall a very interesting case. I came across an interview with Mr. Apollon Silagadze, who was Georgia’s first ambassador to Cairo. In the year 2000, an interview with him was published in an Arab newspaper. In it, he had to clarify and explicitly emphasize that the conflict in Abkhazia was not religious in nature. In the 1990s, information had reached parts of the Arab world suggesting that a war was being fought somewhere in Georgia between Muslim Abkhazians and Christian Georgians.
During that period, there was a widespread perception that a Christian majority in Georgia was oppressing a Muslim minority. This is precisely why Apollon Silagadze had to bring this issue forward and provide a clear explanation.
Such were the perceptions 20 to 30 years ago. Today, Syria stands as the sole exception in the Arab world to have paid attention to this topic, and as we have noted, their decision was dictated entirely by relations with Russia rather than an understanding of the conflict or Damascus’s own Caucasian policy.
The passivity of Arab countries cannot be explained solely by non-interference or a lack of knowledge regarding our region. For these countries, the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity is paramount.
Turning directly to our conflict regions—according to your observations, what is the current state of peace policy?
Giga Gigauri: During my Master’s research, I focused on the phenomenon of frozen conflicts. Viewed through this lens, the conflict in Abkhazia today serves as a clear example of where flawed peace policies can lead.
Today, we observe unstable political decisions, unresolved issues, and a situation that is far removed from the concept of peace. While there may be no immediate threat of armed conflict today, this does not rule out a resumption of violence. Nothing rules out a resumption of violence.
In one conversation, Mr. Paata Zakareishvili noted that these frozen conflicts resemble a refrigerator, while international platforms [such as the Geneva format and others] serve as the freezer inside that refrigerator.
Today, no peace process is taking place. There is no talk whatsoever of resolving the conflict. What we are witnessing is a process aimed merely at keeping the conflict managed.
All sides have their own visions and objectives, but they are not talking to one another. They do not or cannot agree on topics that could be of mutual interest and importance.
Thematically, what issues would you highlight where the Georgian and Abkhaz sides could initiate dialogue and cooperation?
Giga Gigauri: Given today’s reality, it may sound utopian, but education could serve as such a topic of shared interest.
A vast divide has opened up between our societies, and we notice that educational systems are widening this chasm even further. We could also talk about healthcare as a field of common interest. I believe the Abkhaz side must also be recognized as a party to the conflict, and we should grant them greater agency.
It is a fundamental necessity that speaking to one another should not present a problem. Such communication should not surprise anyone, let alone cause annoyance. These conversations, meetings, and dialogues must become the norm.
