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Interview with Daut Agrba
Daut Agrba, running in the presidential election alongside Robert Arshba as a vice-presidential candidate, states that the primary, and perhaps the only, reason for their political alliance and participation in the race is for the sake of comprehensive constitutional reform.
This reform intends not only to redistribute powers between the executive and legislative branches, but also to introduce administrative reforms and changes to local self-governance structures. Moreover, each aspect of this program has a defined timeline for implementation.
Interestingly, if the Arshba-Agrba ticket wins, the position of vice president would be abolished in August 2026. According to Daut Agrba, the issue is not about holding office, but about the urgent need for national reforms.
Editor of the newspaper Chegemskaya Pravda, Inal Khashig, spoke with Daut Agrba about his reform plans.
Full text of the interview:
Inal Khashig: Hello! Chegemskaya Pravda here. Today we’re once again discussing the presidential election, especially since we have a special guest in the studio — vice-presidential candidate Daut Agrba. Good evening!
I’ve read your program, and I found it extremely interesting. So, I’ll get straight to the point. Many people, including myself, are curious: how did this “chemistry” between you and Robert Arshba come about? With other candidates, the process of forming alliances is more or less clear. But your team-up seems a bit mysterious. How did it happen?
Daut Agrba: Before explaining how we joined forces, let me first provide some background.
We have been working together in the Public Chamber, specifically within the Commission on State Building and Public Accord. The full name of the commission is quite long, but its purpose is to deal with issues related to the state structure. The idea of constitutional reform actually originated from Erast Agumaa, who chairs this commission. He has been voicing and developing this idea for over a year, though we were often distracted by other matters.
Constitutional reform has been under discussion for a long time. Around June last year, we started working on it more intensely. We analyzed several proposals, including the one submitted to Parliament by the president. But that proposal was more of an administrative reform with some constitutional elements rather than a full-scale constitutional overhaul. We also studied other drafts, such as a 2013 project developed by a group of legal experts, including Alkhas Thagushov. That project was presented at a large-scale conference at Atrium Victoria in Sukhumi.
We chose to organize roundtable discussions, bringing in constitutional law specialists and legal experts who had worked on reforms at different times. Our efforts gained momentum, and we were fortunate that Tamaz Ketsba, a public figure and one of the authors of the first Abkhazian constitution, joined the process.
A vacancy opened up in the Public Chamber, and one of our colleagues who joined our team took that seat. We continued our work actively, having held four or five roundtable discussions so far. But our main question has always been: how do we actually implement the reform?
Tamaz Ketsba also repeatedly asked this question: “We will develop a project, put in the effort, but how do we get it approved by Parliament and signed by the President so that these reforms actually take place?” We answered: “We’ll see. The next elections are ahead. Perhaps by then, something will become clear, and one of the candidates will take this program as a foundation. In the meantime, we will continue our work.” And then in the fall the well-known November events took place [the resignation of Aslan Bzhania as a result of protests] — expected, yet at the same time not.
Despite this, we did not stop and we continued our work, holding roundtables. At some point, it turned out that our ideas had reached Robert Arshba’s team. At that time, we did not yet know that he was planning to run. Some time later, it came out that there was a candidate who wanted to take this reform as a foundation. And it was us who were offered the vice-presidential position. We understand that the regional factor (eastern and western Abkhazia) also plays a certain role.
But it’s not just about that. There are many worthy people on our team. However, it so happened that among the candidates from Abkhazia, from Bzyb Abkhazia, it was only me and Daur Agrba who were considered. In the end, the choice fell on me. We met and talked. The most important question for us was: does Robert Arshba truly want to carry out this reform? We were interested in whether it would be central to his program.
He confirmed his intention. Our program includes an important point — abolition of the vice-presidential position. This is fundamental for us; we are running precisely for the sake of reform. Robert Arshba immediately stated that if implementing the reform requires early resignation and holding new elections under the updated Constitution, he is ready for it.
Inal Khashig: I noticed this point in your program. It states that in August 2026, the vice president would step down and this position be abolished. This highlights that you are not running for the sake of position. But after all, the vice president has certain functions for a year and a half. Have you discussed what you will be doing during this period?
Daut Agrba: To be honest, we have not discussed this in detail because we do not consider it a priority. We have no preconditions.
Inal Khashig: Now let’s move on to the essence of the reform itself. What are its main parameters? There are many different models: presidential, parliamentary, mixed. Some advocate for a purely parliamentary republic. There are indeed many options, so I would like you to outline the key points of your reform.
Daut Agrba: As I mentioned before, we studied several projects. A group of lawyers working on one of them proposed a parliamentary model, which preserved some elements of presidential power. In general, it was a parliamentary republic. But we chose a presidential-parliamentary model. There were different opinions within our team — some supported a parliamentary republic, while others categorically disagreed. In the end, we concluded that the presidential-parliamentary system suits us better.
We’ve been living under presidential power for 30 years, and we know its pros and cons. A sudden shift to a parliamentary system, rebuilding everything from scratch, could bring more problems than benefits. But over time, perhaps through an evolutionary process, the country might eventually transition to a parliamentary model. What does the presidential-parliamentary form of government imply? According to our reform, the president retains the right to form the government. The president nominates a candidate for prime minister, who then selects ministers on their own. The president approves the composition of the government, but then the cabinet must present its development program and secure support from parliament.
This is an important element of the system: the government is not just formed, but undergoes parliamentary consultations so that lawmakers understand the direction in which the country will move. This is a specific procedure. When the government comes to parliament, it must receive a vote of confidence. It is important not to confuse this with a vote of no confidence—these are completely different things. A vote of no confidence arises during the government’s work, whereas initially, the cabinet must go through a parliamentary approval process.
If parliament approves the proposed composition of the government, it is finally confirmed, and the cabinet starts working. But if parliament does not give a vote of confidence, it gets a second chance — the opportunity to propose its own candidate for prime minister. In this case, the prime minister forms their own cabinet, and the president is obligated to approve it. However, if parliament fails to form a government within the established timeframe, the third stage occurs: the president again nominates their candidate, forms the cabinet, and this time parliament must give a vote of confidence.
If parliament refuses, the president has the right to dissolve it. Thus, the first step remains with the president, the second with parliament, and the third, decisive, step is with the president. It is important to understand that the cabinet will be tied to parliamentary elections. When a new parliament is formed, the entire cabinet resigns. However, this does not mean the president cannot re-propose the same candidates; there are no legislative restrictions on this. The mere fact that the government resigns becomes mandatory. Currently, the cabinet is tied to presidential elections, but we propose tying it to parliamentary elections.
Inal Khashig: So, you have clearly defined the timelines for all stages?
Daut Agrba: Yes, all the timelines are worked out. For example, the government is given 20 days to provide its program, and 20 days to present it to parliament as well.
Inal Khashig: I’m talking about the complete cycle of transitioning to the new system.
Daut Agrba: Right now, we’re talking about parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, and executive power. But we also have the reform of parliament itself, as well as make changes to the electoral system. We propose a mixed system because we don’t want a parliament elected through a majoritarian system to be responsible for this process. We believe such a parliament lacks sufficient qualifications, and people have many questions about it. Our goal is to make parliament more competent and state-oriented, so it can effectively oversee key processes.
Inal Khashig: For this it’s necessary to switch to a mixed system, where party representation will increase.
Daut Agrba: If you’ve read the program, you know that within six months we plan to amend the party legislation. We need to tighten the requirements so that parties have programs and are actively involved in politics, rather than just existing on paper.
Inal Khashig: But there’s a problem. Even current party law is ignored. For example, it states that parties must regularly hold congresses, but that doesn’t happen. Membership in parties is not controlled. We have dozens of registered parties, but some have only two or three members. There are parties that exist just because someone has a stamp.
Daut Agrba: We believe that if parties are involved in forming the government, they must be under strict control. The Ministry of Justice should be responsible for ensuring that parties comply with the law. Right now, many parties only appear during elections and then disappear. Some engage in charity work, but that’s not their main task.
That’s why we believe it’s necessary to tighten control over compliance with the law. Even public organizations, which are not allowed to engage in politics, are now involved in political processes. However, the Ministry of Justice does not require them to re-register nor does it impose sanctions. This problem concerns not only parties but also law enforcement in general.
Inal Khashig: Law enforcement in our country is indeed lacking. So you believe that without incentives, parties will remain in their infancy. Right now, many parties resemble amateur hobby clubs — people gather, discuss issues, but without real authority. If a party has no opportunity to engage in professional politics, enter parliament, and form a government, it will remain underdeveloped.
On the other hand, your program is not only about redistributing powers but also about local self-government bodies. I saw that it includes the election of the mayor of Sukhum and giving district assemblies the right to elect their leaders. How will this work? I understand that the Gagra and Gudauta districts already form their budgets from their own revenues, but in eastern Abkhazia, budgets are subsidized by the republican center. How is this factored in?
Daut Agrba: Right. If the head of an administration has no financial resources, they won’t be able to manage a district or a city. This issue must be addressed by the state, specifically the executive branch, which must create conditions for forming local budgets. After the war, we had a three-tiered budget system. Even rural settlements had their own accounts, could collect small taxes, and manage funds without having to go through district centers.
As for eastern Abkhazia, we need to create conditions for local budgets to be replenished. We could set a fixed percentage of subsidies so that local authorities know how much they can count on. But it’s also important to create incentives — for example, introducing tax benefits for the first two years to attract small and medium-sized businesses. We have a vast coastal area, and we expect its potential to be utilized. The key is to start taking action instead of waiting. We constantly hear, “We are not ready.” Let’s start with western Abkhazia, hold mayoral elections, and establish a single voting day to reduce the budgetary burden.
Who, if not local residents, knows best what their city or district needs? We have visited many villages in Eastern Abkhazia and have seen that people struggle even with basic issues. To get anything done, they have to travel to the district center, which means additional expenses. Then they are sent to Sukhum, where they still can’t resolve their issues. This is a simple problem, but it can be solved. Of course, everything comes down to finances. We need to optimize the budget and redistribute budgetary funds.
Inal Khashig: Suppose a rural district elects the head of the local assembly. The majority of the district’s budget consists of subsidies from the republican budget. How can local authorities be encouraged to develop the economy rather than just rely on subsidies? This is a key question. We have become accustomed to receiving subsidies annually, and it has become a tradition. But there should be a reciprocal effort. For example, a subsidy reduction model could be applied. In the first year, the state funds 80% of the district’s budget. After two years, this is reduced to 60%, and the remaining 40% must be earned by the district itself.
Daut Agrba: But along with that, the state must provide mechanisms for development. For example, the Gali and Tkvarcheli districts have fertile land, but their potential is not being utilized. The government can invest in the agricultural sector and support export-oriented projects. Abkhazia can produce environmentally friendly products, which are significantly more expensive than mass-market goods. If a district understands that within 3–5 years it can increase tax revenues, the state can gradually reduce subsidies, freeing up budgetary resources. Russia has provided 10 billion rubles in loans, if I’m not mistaken.
But where are these funds being directed? Again, this is a matter of efficiency. Perhaps these funds are indeed allocated correctly, but maybe they could be used differently. For example, part of them could be directed toward agricultural projects. Today, large agricultural projects are focused on exports, and Russia is a vast market. We need to build proper trade relations so that the same environmentally friendly products that we can produce in Abkhazia are manufactured in larger volumes. Their market price is significantly higher compared to mass-produced goods.
The state should introduce mechanisms that help districts increase their revenue base. For example, within three to five years, tax revenues could grow through local industries. Even if this process takes five years, subsidies can gradually be reduced, and the freed-up funds can be redistributed. As a result, new production will emerge, people will get jobs, and export-oriented products will start generating profits. The state should fully exempt export-oriented goods from all duties and taxes.
We already have a duty-free trade agreement with Russia, but even customs duties, VAT, and other taxes could be eliminated to stimulate agriculture. There is a lot of unused land in Abkhazia. I recently visited some areas for the first time and saw dozens of hectares registered to various companies that do nothing with them. Why are they holding onto this land?
Inal Khashig: This is a matter of resource redistribution. It also raises the question of the division of powers between the executive and legislative branches, as well as the reform of local self-government bodies. One of the biggest problems is the enormous bureaucratic apparatus. Administrative reform is essential. Here’s a simple example: A farmer travels to the district center, only to be sent to republican institutions.
He wastes time and money, and in the end, becomes frustrated and leaves. The system is overloaded with bureaucracy — it’s a cumbersome and inefficient machine. For a small country with a limited economy and a restricted working-age population, such a structure is excessive. In the real economy, there are five to six bureaucrats for every working person. This is an unhealthy balance, and it must be reevaluated. How does your team view this? Simply reducing the number of officials?
Daut Agrba: No, simply cutting staff across the board would be a mistake. Everything depends on the management system. We propose a redistribution of powers within the framework of constitutional reform. Once again, it all comes down to constitutional reform. If we redistribute powers, we essentially establish a government and strengthen its authority. We create a governing body that becomes the main force responsible for both foreign and domestic policy. Naturally, this raises the question of the role of the presidential administration. If we initiate this process from the top, we inevitably encounter a duplication of functions with the Cabinet of Ministers.
By the way, the presidential reform project included the elimination of the Cabinet of Ministers. For some reason, they believed that by removing the collegial body — the Cabinet (and it’s not just about the prime minister, but about the institution itself) and transferring its functions to the president, they would create a balance of power. However, in reality, this would only strengthen the president’s power, leading to its usurpation, as he would take over the Cabinet’s responsibilities. Under the current system, Cabinet resolutions require collective decision-making, but under the proposed model, the president could wake up in the middle of the night, issue a decree, sign it, and allocate land to a particular individual. So what would be the purpose of the reform? It remains unclear.
In our case, on the contrary, we strengthen the Cabinet, making it the main executive body of power. The prime minister becomes the head of the executive branch, while the president remains the head of state. In this case, such an inflated presidential administration is simply not needed. The financial expenses of the state apparatus, according to the 2025 budget: 135 million rubles ($1,387,800) are allocated for the maintenance of the presidential administration, and 70 million rubles ($719,600) for the maintenance of the Cabinet of Ministers. That is, the presidential administration costs the budget almost twice as much as the Cabinet.
General government expenditures amount to more than 2 billion rubles ($20,560,000), which is 250 million rubles ($2,570,000) more than in 2020. In total, 21% of the republican budget is spent on maintaining the state apparatus. Of course, there are budget items that cannot be reduced, but there are also those that can be optimized. For example, government agencies lack targeted programs. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example, a road safety program has been needed for a long time. We are now seeing the installation of photo and video surveillance cameras, but this is not enough.
Inal Khashig: There are many traffic lights in the city. One of the busiest intersections is the crossing of Leon and Ardzinba streets. When the power goes out, the traffic light continues to work on a battery for a while, but then it shuts off, and chaos ensues at the intersection. Why can’t they simply assign a traffic officer at that moment? This intersection is extremely accident-prone. Today, I witnessed two near-accidents just while I was stuck in traffic. The solution is simple — put a traffic officer there. Especially as the city’s traffic police headquarters is just 50 meters from the intersection.
Daut Agrba: Maybe it would actually be cheaper to install a solar-powered traffic light. That would be even more effective.
Inal Khashig: But what do we see instead? Bureaucratic showmanship. As soon as a new head of the traffic police is appointed, they start conducting large-scale raids, stationing 150 officers in one place to catch violators. But they could simply assign someone to direct traffic when the traffic light is out.
Daut Agrba: Why is reform important? Because reform creates mutual accountability between branches of power. If the president performs poorly, he can be removed through impeachment. If parliament fails in its duties, it can be dissolved. If the Cabinet of Ministers does a poor job, it receives a vote of no confidence and is dismissed. When there is accountability at the highest level, it also appears at the local level. But today, there is no one to hold accountable. The president does not answer for the decisions he makes.
Even when he is told that something shouldn’t be done, he pushes ahead with his decision anyway. When he is given arguments explaining why it shouldn’t be done, he still proceeds because he has made certain commitments to someone. He simply disregards everyone and tries to push through his decisions. In the end, it all results in what one person said during a village meeting: “Everyone enters through the front door, but somehow they all leave through the back.”
They can’t even properly transfer power to a newly elected president — they fail at even that. So what can we expect when it comes to basic everyday issues that could be solved so easily? And this is a serious problem. Although the law states that the president can be removed through impeachment, there is no actual mechanism to implement it. Impeachment is provided for in the Constitution, but in reality, it is impossible because there is no corresponding law. And this law should have been initiated either by the president himself through his legislative initiative power or by parliament.
But here arises a problem — the president must have the will to act. Unfortunately, none of our presidents have had such will. I’m not talking about Vladislav Ardzinba, but ever since we started discussing reforms and the need for changes in our Constitution, 20 years have passed. Twenty years we’ve been talking about the same thing. And even today, there are people who oppose us, who run for president, yet say nothing about reforms. They believe the problem isn’t in the system but in the individual.
According to them, if a “decent guy” comes to power, everything will change. But that’s simply not true. The system crushes anyone who enters it because it was created by certain people, certain forces, or groups (call them what you will) to function exactly as it does. And they don’t look ahead for four years. I am even convinced that if we elect a president under the current system who refuses to change anything, then a situation like the one on November 15 could arise much sooner.
Inal Khashig: Thank you for the engaging discussion! Today our guest was vice-presidential candidate Daut Agrba, Robert Arshba’s running mate. We discussed significant transformations in the country, constitutional reform, and issues within the state apparatus. Until next time!
Daut Agrba. Thank you for the interesting questions, it was a pleasure!
