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Historian Beka Kobakhidze discusses ongoing geopolitical changes in the world and how they affect the Caucasus region. What is Trump changing in the world, and what is Georgia’s place therein?
The historian reflects on how the current negotiations on Ukraine may affect our own conflicts, and touches on Russia’s policy in occupied Abkhazia.
He discusses Moscow’s increasing pressure on Sukhumi and notes that the Abkhazian resistance resources are dwindling. Beka Kobakhidze also talks about his widely-discussed blog on the history of Abkhazia, which got significant attention in Georgian, Abkhazian, and international circles.
According to Kobakhidze, the historian’s task is to rethink existing narratives.
Full text of the interview:
Badri Belkania: Hello, friends. Go Group Media and the analytical platform “Georgian-Abkhazian Context” continue our series of interviews. Today our guest is historian Beka Kobakhidze.
Hello, Beka. Thank you very much for accepting our invitation. I don’t know if you’ve seen some of our previous interviews. Usually we conduct a series of interviews focused on narrow topics related to conflicts. Although conflicts are our main focus, we live in an era of geopolitical shifts, and so much is happening in the world that it’s impossible to talk about our internal affairs and conflicts without referring to global events.
One of the major issues on everyone’s mind recently concerns events in Ukraine. Specifically, Trump’s peace initiative, aimed at somehow halting the war in Ukraine, even if only temporarily. How would you assess everything happening in the world right now? What does it mean for us, as one of the actors, as one of the countries?
Beka Kobakhidze: Trump is not among those American politicians who believe in liberal internationalism and in the idea that America should be the guardian and defender of democracy, the principles of sovereignty, and the inviolability of territorial integrity. On the contrary, take his statement about Greenland, for example. It’s unclear whether any action will follow, but at least on a verbal level—when he talks about Greenland, Panama, or Canada—he essentially echoes what Putin says about his neighbors, including Georgia and the territories of Ukraine. This fundamentally changes international relations.
On the other hand, Europe sees Ukraine as the defender of its security, and until Russia leaves Ukraine, both the European Union as an institution and NATO as an institution remain protected. Therefore it’s crucial for the European Union that Russia doesn’t swallow Ukraine, but achieving this without America is difficult—even though America wants the war to end.
It’s still unclear whether the US wants to end the war at any cost or if there are red lines it won’t allow Russia to cross, but this will soon become evident. The worst-case scenario for Georgia would be if a division occurred along a Korean model—say, around Pokrovsk, on the border of Luhansk and Kharkiv regions. In that case, eastern Ukraine would be ruled by a Eurasian autocracy and totalitarian regime, while the western side of Ukraine would become part of Europe. Geography dictates that Georgia, unfortunately, would remain on the dark side and become part of the darkness.
Looking at recent events in Georgia, one can say that authoritarianism is already a reality. There’s already talk of banning and eliminating political parties, which is a rapid step toward dictatorship, driven by the existing geopolitical situation. Georgian Dream is deliberately and purposefully creating an environment similar to the one Georgia might find itself in if a ceasefire is reached in the Russia-Ukraine war. I believe that answers both parts of your question.
Badri Belkania: It’s interesting to consider how all of this will directly affect our own conflicts. You could say Trump is promoting the principle of “peace on Earth”—it was part of his campaign rhetoric, and one of the first things he did after the election was to establish contacts with Ukraine and Russia in an attempt to end the war. One of the conflicts where Russia is directly involved, having occupied Georgian territories, is ours. It’s inevitable that this wave will affect them too. What do you think might happen from this perspective?
Beka Kobakhidze: The South Caucasus region is moving toward the 3+3 format. This means that the West has effectively been expelled from the region. After Trump came to power in the U.S., Aliyev eradicated the last remnants of formal Western presence in Azerbaijan—be it the Red Cross, USAID, or other organizations. They were uprooted from Azerbaijan. Certain similar trends are visible in Georgia too. Georgian Dream not only refuses to engage with anyone but has even started talking about introducing national plastic banking cards in case Georgia is cut off from the SWIFT system. I saw something similar in the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics before 2022, where they introduced plastic cards that didn’t work anywhere except Luhansk and Donetsk. In doing so, Georgian Dream is signaling that it’s prepared for this kind of outcome.
The only country that has decided to join the EU and is trying to move Westward—against the odds, as they say in English—is Armenia. That’s the general picture in the region.
There is also the ongoing process of dictatorship being established in Turkey. Then there’s Iran. And, of course, Russia, which in the long run is becoming a sort of large-scale North Korea. With the West and international law expelled from the region, Turkey, Iran, and Russia are the dominant regional players in the South Caucasus.
Our occupied regions—Abkhazia and Tskhinvali—have essentially always been Russia’s exclusive domains, and even more so now. The leaders of Georgian Dream nurture hopes that rapprochement with Russia will bring about a peaceful reintegration of these regions. Whether they truly believe in these hopes or they’re simply saying so to the public is unclear. Still, I believe these hopes are false and deceitful, because Russia has a very specific historical vision.
From Russia’s perspective, it acquired these territories historically—it built Abkhazia, fought in Tskhinvali in 2008, and it won’t give up what it gained in war. In the 1990s, Russians used to say that Abkhazia and South Ossetia could only exist in a single state, as part of Russia. If you’re a satellite state, it’s highly unlikely you’ll be given anything back, though theoretically it’s possible.
Badri Belkania: So you think that even if Georgia becomes a Russian satellite, Russia still wouldn’t support Georgia’s territorial integrity?
Beka Kobakhidze: Of course not. That’s out of the question. Why would they? What would be the point? You’re already subordinate, so what else could you possibly offer Russia in exchange for those territories? What do you have to bargain with? Absolutely nothing.
Now, just like under the Saakashvili government, after every round of the Geneva negotiations, there’s pressure to begin work on delimitation and demarcation of the “borders” with the Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia, and to sign agreements with the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides on non-resumption of hostilities.
In that regard, nothing has changed. After Bzhania’s resignation, documents by Inal Ardzinba became available, suggesting that the Russians allegedly asked the Abkhaz to make formal concessions to the Georgians during the pre-election period, so that Georgian Dream could present this to the Georgian public as a sign of positive progress, supposedly resulting from its policies. But the Abkhaz refused.
What does it mean that “the Abkhaz refused”? If the Russians had really applied pressure to the Abkhaz and Ossetians, who would dare resist? We’ve seen this before. For example, there was a time when the Georgian Patriarch personally asked the Russians for permission to visit Abkhazia, because the Patriarch of Georgia is also technically the Metropolitan of Bichvinta (though the Russian Orthodox Church does not recognize him as such). The Russians asked the Abkhaz to allow the Patriarch in, saying that the Georgians had requested it. The Abkhaz refused, and the Russians relayed the answer to the Georgian Patriarchate …
— When did this happen?
— If I’m not mistaken, this was during the Saakashvili government—probably around 15 years ago. So, occasionally, such false illusions might be created, but as for restoring territorial integrity, that’s very unlikely. If we imagine that tomorrow Georgia became a member of NATO and the EU, and Russia couldn’t stop it, then maybe Russia would consider some form of confederation—using confederative entities to block Georgia’s integration into European space. But Georgia is already blocked because Georgian Dream is in power. The current government in Tbilisi has openly sabotaged the Euro-Atlantic path. The Russians don’t need to invent new strategies. We already have a “perfect” status quo.
—Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, some interesting things happened in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The Tskhinvali region was probably affected less, although statistics show many fighters left from there—reflected in the number of casualties, even if official data is lacking. As for the Abkhaz, it’s safe to say they participated less in the war in Ukraine aside from one or two groups like the “Pyatnashka” unit and the followers of Akhra Avidzba, who have been fighting in Donbas since 2014.
In the context of the Ukraine war, Russia has realigned its geopolitical priorities and become more aggressive toward the Caucasus, including Abkhazia. In Abkhazia there were attempts to pass several laws, which society actively resisted. We also saw some economic sanctions from Russia. Yet it seems Russia, while applying pressure to Abkhazia, is not fully using all the tools and levers it has. Abkhazia is already fully dependent on Russia economically, politically, and militarily. Still, Russia seems to be leaving the Abkhaz with some degree of autonomy, while simultaneously trying to take it away—not directly or harshly, but through other means like pressuring civil society or labeling Abkhaz journalists as so-called foreign agents, which is now happening. How would you comment on this kind of policy? What is Russia doing in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in the context of the Ukraine war?
—It’s not surprising that Russia is unhappy with the status quo. To begin with, Russia is an empire. What it’s doing in the Caucasus is colonialism. Russia wants to colonize Abkhazia, which is supposed to become something like a Riviera…
—It used to be called that quite often—the Soviet Riviera…
—Yes, the status of Riviera must be restored to Abkhazia. Russian investors are supposed to develop it. The issue of the Bichvinta dachas isn’t just some random matter.
—Just like the apartment issue…
—Historical memory is crucial here. Bichvinta truly is a beautiful place, a real gem. Their goal is to take Bichvinta, to colonize the Black Sea coastline—to buy it all with money. To achieve that, they need to overcome one barrier: Abkhaz legislation, which is essentially based on ethno-nationalism. That legislation doesn’t comply with any international standards—not of the 21st century, nor even of the 20th—but it is what it is. And this so-called legislation prohibits land sales. Russia is acting slowly, step by step. It doesn’t want to appear to the Abkhaz in the same light as the Georgians once did. First, why use brute force when the same result can be achieved more softly? And second, it’s not only about the Abkhaz. If Russia were to storm into Abkhazia with fire and sword, start building, colonizing the land, resettling Russians, and installing a police regime, people across the North Caucasus and beyond would see that, and nobody would like it. Russia, no matter how dictatorial, must take into account the views of the peoples within its federation, whether it wants to or not. The Abkhaz situation can only be described as hopeless. When around 60% of your state budget depends directly on subsidies from another country, when all your citizens receive pensions and social assistance from a foreign state, when even with the Inguri hydroelectric plant you don’t have energy independence…
—Passportization and the ability to travel are also major factors…
—Of course. They have nothing in their hands. As Trump recently told Zelensky—you have no cards. Well, the Abkhaz have no cards. Their patriotic feelings and nationalism are understandable. They want, or believe they want, to preserve some elements of sovereignty, but that’s not how sovereignty works. Sovereignty is reinforced by tangible economic and military capabilities. And when everything depends on Russia, even the slightest tightening of the noose forces the Abkhaz leadership and population to make concessions.
As for the foreign agents law… Interestingly, the “Russian law” was introduced in Abkhazia before Georgia, but its enforcement was accelerated around the same time. It was fast-tracked simultaneously in occupied Abkhazia, in Georgia, in Kyrgyzstan, and in Republika Srpska—in April 2024. Why is this law important? Because in the face of Russian pressure, the first to raise the alarm are the media and organizations not on the Kremlin payroll. The aim of the law is to eliminate those voices, to silence them. And it must be said—the Abkhaz version of the law is even harsher. It doesn’t just apply to organizations and legal entities, but also to individuals…
—That version was proposed from the beginning there. Here, it gradually became stricter…
—Right. It targets physical individuals. They’re banned from participating in elections, from teaching in schools and universities. In essence, this is a mechanism for eliminating and eradicating all avenues of resistance. If the law passes, who will organize resistance? If everyone is forced to accept a Russian handout, there’ll be no one left to push back. It’s a strategy of slow suffocation.
—If I understand correctly, you’re saying that there are different views on this. Some think the resistance can last a while, others believe it will end very soon, and some think at some point Russia will dramatically change course, and the Abkhaz will deliver an ultimatum to Moscow. Am I right in assuming you belong to the group that thinks they don’t have the resources for sustained resistance?
—That depends on how hard Russia clamps down on the Abkhaz. They have very few resources for resistance. What brought Bzhania down? It was precisely these issues…
—The topic of investments, for example. By the way, it’s interesting that while other issues concerned people, partly because civil activists, journalists, and experts were actively working to inform the public, explaining why a certain law was harmful to Abkhazia and the local population, the topic of investments especially worried local businesses, who might not have been very interested in politics, but feared that the new law would put Russian businesses in a privileged position.
—Understandably.
—That would mean, for example, that if an Abkhaz businessman opens a restaurant and a Russian businessman opens one next to him, because the Russian doesn’t pay taxes, according to basic principles of the free market, the Abkhaz business would go bankrupt. They feared such a development, and that also played a role.
—Yes, and there are many such issues—apartments, land, business. In the end all these issues, taken together, serve colonization. The endgame—the Abkhazian coastline, this Riviera—must end up in the hands of the Russian elite, among whom there might also be some fully Russified Abkhaz, while the rest will be serving staff. How many people are we talking about in total? Roughly one hundred thousand ethnic Abkhaz, a little more or a little less. Yes, some claim the figure is 120,000, but whether it’s 100, 120, or 90, it doesn’t really make a difference in this case. As a historian, when reading about the policy of Tsarist Russia and its attitude towards Abkhazia, I see that even back then, it didn’t occur to them that Abkhazia was part of Georgia. They believe Abkhazia was never part of Georgia. In this respect, both the Russians and the Abkhaz basically say the same thing, only the Russians add something else. If the Abkhaz say this is their land, for the Russians, it’s a colony won by blood, where they built and created infrastructure, so they have legitimate rights to it.
—You’ve already, in fact, switched to your main profession—let’s return to you as a historian. Until now, we’ve mostly been discussing political evaluations. Meanwhile, one of the loudest stories about Abkhazia connected to your name is the post you published on your Facebook—this was about a year ago, right?
—Perhaps even more than a year ago…
—At that time, we wanted to invite you, but unfortunately you weren’t in Georgia, and since the topic caused a lot of stir, we discussed it with other guests. The post was about the estrangement of Abkhazia and the Abkhaz people from Georgia. Perhaps as historical analysis the text was short, but for Facebook the post was quite detailed. It traced, epoch by epoch, what happened, when it happened, and how the process unfolded. I think the post, on the one hand, would probably not have been liked by the Abkhaz, since it didn’t contain pro-Abkhaz elements, and on the other hand it contradicted some of the narratives prevalent in Georgian historiography. I have two questions in this regard. First, what prompted you to write it? Why did you think that a discussion on this topic was timely? And second, how do you comment on the responses that historians, journalists, and commentators left in the following weeks? People forgot their personal party preferences. To put it simply, both the pro-Georgian Dream and the opposition were on the same side. In general, the story caused quite a commotion. Why do you think this issue is still sensitive for Georgians?
—We Georgians have a large, so-called narrative of our history that most, or at least the majority, believe in. It’s tied to identity. I must say that such narratives were not created during the times of Parnavaz or David the Builder, but largely during the Soviet period. Let’s take “The History of Georgia,” which is ironically called “History in Captivity.” It was written in 1943 by the late Ivan Dzhavakhishvili, Simon Janashia, and Niko Berdzenishvili. The book was called “The History of Georgia from Ancient Times to the 19th Century”. By the way, it was edited personally by Stalin—that’s a confirmed fact. So, if we read this book and compare it to regular history textbooks written by modern historians, we see a complete correlation between the two.
The authors deliberately avoided touching the 19th and 20th centuries because the 20th century is the Soviet era, and in the 19th century, Russia appears and different narratives emerge, but the established narratives before the 19th century were reinforced during the Soviet years. In principle, professional historiography in Georgia developed significantly during the Soviet Union, although it originated earlier. Until 1921, professional historiography in Georgia was in its embryonic stage. When we ask why this topic is so sensitive, we must consider the Soviet national policy, its dynamics, and its development. In the 1920s a policy of indigenization was carried out towards peoples. It was based on a return to roots, to nationalities, and nationalization…
—Which Lenin supported…
—Yes, this policy was created by Lenin. Then, in the 1930s, Stalin abolished it.
—At one point he was even against it. And it seemed like there was a disagreement between them on this issue?
—Exactly. Then a policy of titular nations was implemented, the essence of which was that there was a dominant nation, and the rest of the nationalities were guests. And this was not only in Georgia but throughout the entire Soviet empire. Another characteristic feature was the nationality field in the passport. This didn’t mean the modern understanding of nationality, which today is expressed by the word “nationality,” but rather ethnic affiliation. So people were divided along ethnic lines. Later, there was the policy that Beria and Stalin implemented in Abkhazia. After, during Khrushchev’s period, there was an attempt for a revenge of sorts by the Abkhaz.
Bruno Coppieters has an article in which he writes that during this period, a pro-Georgian direction was created among the intelligentsia, especially among philologists, historians, archaeologists, and on the other hand, in Abkhazia, figures like Dzidzaria appeared. The battle for exclusivity began. One side reinforced its position with Ingorokva’s theory, according to which the autochthons of the area were the Georgians, and the Abkhaz were latecomers. The Abkhaz had the opposite view, claiming that the Abkhaz were the indigenous people, and the Georgians were secondary…
—Colonizers…
—Yes, colonizers. It’s as if the territory should belong to one side or the other. The discussion about this is anti-historical, the reasoning is unscientific from both sides. On both sides—soldiers with pens in their hands, who, so to speak, under the guise of patriotism, close their eyes to facts and sources, substitute them, and do everything to protect their national narrative. Where is the history in this? Where is the science? What does all of this have to do with science? I’m not a politician. If I were a politician, I wouldn’t have written this blog at all. I’m a historian. I wrote what I believe to be the truth, I wrote this history as I see it. I don’t have any political responsibility in this case, and I didn’t specifically pick a time to coincide with something.
This post wasn’t attached to anything. It was just that so much madness had accumulated around the wars of historians—sometimes it reaches the absurd, to ridiculous cases—that someone had to express a sound thought. I noticed the reaction of people raised on nationalist historiography in Georgia—they were extremely outraged. By the way, these are the same people who are not at all bothered, for example, by the establishment of a dictatorship in Georgia. They have no problem with Lavrov praising us. They don’t have any issues at all, but that Beka Kobakhidze wrote something about Abkhazia—that’s a problem, as if it could change the world. As for the Abkhaz, as far as I know, their main reaction was silence. From what I know, many there read the post but refrained from commenting.
—The post was translated into Russian and English, as far as I know…
—Yes. They didn’t comment on it, because, as you noted, it wasn’t a pro-Abkhaz blog. And since the text was translated into English, many responses came from Western colleagues—both historians and non-historians. The content of the comments mostly boiled down to the fact that finally someone wrote a reasonable opinion. But when the conflict is in its acute phase, the common sense that you try to express doesn’t interest anyone, no one cares about the truth. Both sides care about whose Abkhazia it is, not history and not what actually happened there.
After that, nationalists tried to focus on minor details from the post, giving them exaggerated importance—for example, whether Georgiy Sharvashidze knew the Georgian language or not, as if that were the main point of the text and determined its content. It’s clear that a historian and scholar should not be afraid to tell the truth. I’m not claiming that my truth is the only truth, like the Ten Commandments revealed by God that cannot be changed. No, but I guarantee that I wrote what I’m one hundred percent sincere about. I didn’t align myself with any particular situation, I used my knowledge and professional skills without any attachment to any agenda, not hiding the truth, nor avoiding it.
—Do you plan to write a monograph on this topic, since it caused such a stir?
—No, I don’t plan to write a separate monograph on Abkhazia, but there will be a large episode about Abkhazia in my next book.
—It wasn’t a surprise that society was not ready for such a discussion. First, from a historical point of view, the conflict happened relatively recently. There are still people alive who suffered from it. The conflict is unresolved and daily creates security problems. There are many reasons why society is still not ready to discuss this topic, but in healthy societies, the impetus for discussion on such painful issues generally comes from the academic circles. It is they who raise topics that are accepted by society but not discussed, topics that have gathered dust and become entrenched in the narrative. Constant rethinking is one of the principles of a scientific approach. As we can see, Georgian historiography, Georgian academic science is lagging in this regard. I think the reaction to your post was a manifestation of this symptom. And the final question for today. Perhaps now is not the best time to talk about this, because we face more important issues, but still, what should be changed in Georgian historiography, in Georgian academic science, so that people can finally talk about these topics without fear?
—We don’t need to reinvent the wheel or discover a new America. Let’s start with the question—what’s wrong with Georgian historiography? As we’ve already mentioned, Georgian professional scientific historiography was created during the Soviet era. Soviet historiography had a Manichaean approach, according to which everything is either black or white. In such history there is no process, no social aspects, no geopolitical factors, and so on. None of this makes an appearance. It’s a battle of good versus evil.
—Heroes and villains…
—Yes, there are heroes and villains, good and bad. We are always the victims, someone is constantly oppressing us. And this is not caused by social, geopolitical, migration, or other factors, but by some evil people who are fighting against good. The whole process is the battle between Christ and Judas. During the Soviet era, there were just two groups: the good people and the bad people. The good were worker, peasant, party, or an absolute monarch in earlier periods. The bad — West, capitalists, Muslims, feudal lords…
The struggle between them was our entire historiography. As for the post-Soviet period… Good and bad people continued to simmer in their own pots, only in the good pot, instead of the worker, peasant, party, and tsar, nationalism took their place. Nationalism is good. The more radical, the better. All others, who didn’t fall under nationalism, ended up in the other pot. I often remember dissertations written in the early 90s, which I personally saw. The first 30 pages are filled with praise for Ilya Chavchavadze, and out of context—these dissertations were on entirely different subjects. Why did this happen?
Because five years earlier, instead of Ilya Chavchavadze, there was Marxism-Leninism. That is, we had to praise something, immerse it in the ideological sea, and then, based on this, attack the invader. This inertia still persists among Georgian historians. What needs to be done to change this? After the collapse of the Soviet Union, modernization took place in some areas of life, many fields started to open up. For example, doctors now read not only Russian but also European and American medical guidelines, Western equipment was introduced, new technologies are used in construction…
—Other standards emerged…
—Exactly. Now let’s imagine that our medicine never opened the door to anything new and stayed where it was during the Soviet era. Where would we be now? The same applies to construction or any other field. But Georgian historiography is still closed. It still operates on the inertia of the Soviet period. Back then, there were workers and peasants, today nationalism has replaced them, but history doesn’t show any process. There are only names, surnames, and dates. Contemporary Western historiography, however, is necessarily multidisciplinary. There is no historian who only knows history and doesn’t understand some other field. A historian should know at least two areas and be proficient in several languages to write works of the appropriate level because history is the history of everything. Now, for example, we’ll talk, and when we leave this room, our conversation will become history. I, for instance, will never be a historian of medicine because I don’t understand medicine at all.
—It’s the same situation with journalists…
—Exactly. There should be no separate category of journalist. To cover the economy you need to understand economics; to cover politics, you need to understand politics. You need to have the appropriate education. The same goes for historians. Unfortunately, we don’t have that. This is exactly what needs to change. In general, Georgian historiography should undergo internationalization. For example, I’m looking at the shelf in this room right now. We don’t have enough high-quality books on the history of Georgia, written in quality English or German, to fill a single shelf. 80-90 percent of what we have was written by foreign authors. The result is predictable. When you close yourself off in your shell, you don’t develop.
