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Analysis of the peacebuilding initiatives in Georgia
This is a shortened version of the report authored by Larissa Sotieva and Juliet Schofield, and published by Independent Peace Associates (Indie Peace) in 2021. For the full version, please visit this link.
The idea for this review of dialogue and conflict transformation initiatives in the Georgian Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian contexts had been brewing for some time. It arose through a process of regular reflection and the need to understand and acknowledge the current state of peacebuilding in the region today and to explore future possibilities.
Background / Introduction
The discourse on peacebuilding processes is not unambiguous. One often hears complaints of lack of progress, and there is a sense of exhaustion after years of trying to bring about tangible change in terms of conflict resolution. Peace initiatives appeared to be more defined by their limitations than their vision. Peace actors from all sides and from within the international community appeared to acknowledge that civil peace processes had become stuck, with earlier achievements feeling increasingly distant.
There was a sense that something different was needed, but apart from ‘new ideas’, or ‘more/different people’, these peace actors struggled to articulate what. There was also a distinct feeling that with the passing of time, the first-generation peace actors should give way to the younger generations.
However, neither group seem prepared for this at present. At the same time, institutional memory of peacebuilding seemed to be fading, along with an understanding of what peacebuilding involves. It was becoming harder to advocate the need for dialogue and articulate its benefits to an increasingly sceptical public. The narrative is that ‘peace’ had not been built, however that was interpreted.
A reflection on past peacebuilding processes, going back to the early 1990s, felt necessary to enable people to take a step back, assess achievements, reflect on missed opportunities, understand what resources exist today, and better understand the conflict dynamics in order to identify strategic ways forward. It was also felt that such a reflection would help unlock new ideas, and inject energy, values and momentum into cross-divide dialogue.
In this respect, both the process of reflecting on past dialogue and other peacebuilding initiatives was as important as the findings, which are presented here in analytical form and offer an opportunity for further dialogue and discussion on recommendations.
Early Initiatives in South Ossetia
Experts on South Ossetia noted that the late 1980s was a period of active political debate, with Ossetian fears of a nationalist Georgia compounded by memories of the 1920 event when Georgia quashed an Ossetian uprising. As Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist movement gained momentum, inter-ethnic tensions resurfaced. The Ossetian national movement, ‘Adamon Nykhaz’, led by Alan Chochiev, attempted to meet with Gamsakhurdia, but these efforts were rebuffed. A mixed Ossetian/Georgian delegation visited Tbilisi in November 1989 to urge against a mass march on Tskhinvali, but their request was refused.
In the post-war period, international civil sector initiatives emerged around 1995. Two major initiatives focused on political dialogue: one by VERTIC between 1995 and 1998, and another through OSCE contacts inviting Harvard professor Roger Fisher to facilitate dialogues between 1996 and 1998. These efforts contributed to a shift in tone and fostered confidence-building proposals. However, international focus was more on humanitarian recovery and repatriation, with less emphasis on civil society and dialogue processes compared to Abkhazia.
Initially, civil society and authorities in South Ossetia worked together to rebuild society after the war, welcoming civil initiatives and seeking international assistance. By 1999, however, second-track initiatives faced challenges, with Georgia seeking to centralize peace efforts and South Ossetia increasingly channeling communications through Moscow. The most significant civil initiatives after 2008 emerged after the OSCE’s departure, such as the George Mason University Point of View process, the Pax-supported Georgian-Ossetian Civil Forum, and the Pax/Berghof young professionals programme.
Early Initiatives in Abkhazia
Even before hostilities broke out, the Abkhaz intelligentsia took measures to prevent conflict, similar to the Ossetians. For instance, during the Georgian nationalist movement, a group of Abkhazians tried to meet with Gamsakhurdia through their Georgian contacts, but only met some of his circle, leading to a realization that war might be inevitable. During the war, both the Georgian and Abkhaz intelligentsia sought ways to prevent escalation, including a meeting in Moscow after the burning of the Abkhaz Archive in 1992. Some were impressed by poet Bulat Okudzhava’s peacebuilding message, while others accused the Abkhazians of burning their own archive to hide their lack of a distinct national identity.
After the war, the first dialogues between Georgians and Abkhazians focused on humanitarian issues and missing persons, with key meetings in Yerevan in 1995. The first international-facilitated conference took place in Moscow in February 1995, followed by a regional conference in Pyatigorsk later that year. Various platforms under UNHCR/IOM, such as the 1996 CIS Conference, also fostered cooperation among civil society representatives from Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.
The first significant bilateral process was facilitated by the University of California, Irvine, and led by Paula Garb, focusing on environmental issues before expanding into a series of conferences from 1997 to 2009. UCI worked with other international peacebuilding actors, including Conciliation Resources, International Alert, and the Heinrich Boell Foundation. The Schlaining Track 1.5 process, initiated by Conciliation Resources and the Berghof Foundation, ran from 2000 to 2007 and built on earlier meetings.
Between 1998 and 2005, the Caucasus Forum, facilitated by International Alert, brought together civil society from across the region in a mission focused on peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution. Over seven years, it became a key peacebuilding network, offering mediation, dialogue facilitation, and early warning mechanisms. Most subsequent initiatives, such as the Caucasus Forum, Schlaining process, and UCI conferences, were complementary and informed one another, fostering interaction between international facilitators.
Immediate, accumulated, and delayed impacts
We began by asking interviewees to identify the most impactful initiatives from the early 1990s to the present. Most ‘first generation’ interviewees highlighted early initiatives as the most impactful, with current initiatives valued only later. This is unsurprising, as post-war efforts felt urgent, starting from zero, while today there is less anticipation of breakthroughs despite more expertise.
Some reflections were unquantifiable, such as ‘things would have been worse without these initiatives.’ Early initiatives paved the way for later efforts, accumulating impact over time. However, expectations have grown without appreciating how hard it was to build the foundation, especially in South Ossetia, where civil society faced setbacks due to military escalations. As one respondent said, “How many times can we start from square one?”
Others noted that impact is hard to identify or measure immediately, with some seeing results years later. For example, one respondent facilitated a dialogue seven years after first participating. Such delayed impacts are often overlooked in short-term evaluations. This frustration with stagnation led to this study, which acknowledges the need for a broader perspective and rejects the false dichotomy between ‘quick impact’ and ‘expertise.’
We structured the types of impact according to Lederach’s dimensions, recognizing they are interrelated:
The influence of civil society dialogue processes on policy
Two key dialogue processes aimed at engaging both officials and civil society experts were the Schlaining process (in the Georgian-Abkhaz context) and the 2005 process initiated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in South Ossetia. The latter mirrored Schlaining, involving politicians and civil experts from Georgia, South Ossetia, and North Ossetia.
These processes were highly valued by interviewees for their facilitation methods and participant engagement. They were credited with prompting significant changes, such as politicians acknowledging shifts in their perspectives. While tangible policy changes weren’t immediately visible and meeting details were confidential, the ability for politicians to meet in a non-politicized setting was seen as impactful, though its effect would have been stronger if the political context were different.
International facilitators noted how ideas from the Schlaining process indirectly influenced the official sphere, even if they were somewhat altered. A notable example is the Georgian concept note on constitutional options, which was tested with Abkhaz participants and the Georgian public. Though it wasn’t adopted, elements of it appeared in Saakashvili’s 2008 peace plan. This illustrates a dilemma for civil processes entering the policy arena—how much influence they want to have and whether they are willing to accept the distortion of their ideas as they evolve.
In South Ossetia, the Point of View process helped open communication channels and supported officials and co-chairs of the Geneva International Discussions (GID) on issues like prisoner release and Zonkari Dam repairs. The involvement of international mediators in an informal capacity facilitated information sharing and engagement with official processes. Civil society, though not represented in official talks, organized conferences and roundtables attended by international policymakers, fostering valuable analysis-sharing, particularly for Abkhaz participants without representation in international institutions.
Preventing more serious violent escalations
The August 2008 outbreak of hostilities was a catastrophe for diplomacy, peacebuilding, and the war’s victims. Interviewees highlighted the failure of international institutions to prevent Saakashvili’s attack on Tskhinval/i. Some, including Georgians, blamed the US for its unconditional support, which they argued emboldened Saakashvili.
South Ossetian society revised its view of international organizations, particularly criticizing the OSCE for its perceived bias and failure to heed warnings. The 2008 escalation was predicted, with international peacebuilding events attended by NATO and other institutions discussing the risks, such as a June 2007 event on Georgia’s NATO entry.
Diplomatic efforts in 2008 focused on the Abkhaz context, shifting the potential war from Abkhazia to South Ossetia. If South Ossetian civil society had been as strong as in Abkhazia, war might have been prevented. While cooperation existed between Georgian and Ossetian civil society, ties were weaker.
Civil society found ways to prevent escalations. The Caucasus Forum organized joint investigation missions, like one in 2001 to Kodor/i Gorge during rising tensions, which made a difference. During the August 2008 war, civil society leaders influenced events to prevent the opening of a second front on the Georgian-Abkhaz dividing line.
Human rights and the humanitarian situation
One of the most valued confidence-building initiatives is the Georgian government’s health access programme. Although Abkhaz assert that this doesn’t influence their political aspirations, medical programs tackling HIV, hepatitis, and drug harm are valued for their humanitarian and non-politicized nature, as well as the tangible benefits they provide. Civil society organizations have supported these programs, including transport and accommodation for patients.
The Caucasus Business and Development Network, stemming from the Caucasus Forum, was particularly valued in South Ossetia, offering support like agricultural machinery. Human rights and addressing human security needs are also key for confidence-building, especially regarding sensitive issues like Gal/i and Akhalgori/Leningor populations.
Abkhaz civil society worked across all of Abkhazia, while Gal/i issues were lobbied by Sukhum/i organizations. Peacebuilding organizations helped strengthen internal relationships, fostering trust between local civil society and authorities. A major success was the appointment of a civil society figure to the Abkhaz ombudsperson’s office, with severe criticism of Abkhaz policy on the Gal/i district in their first report.
This was seen as the culmination of years of peacebuilding facilitated by international civil society organizations. The ombudsperson, Asida Shakryl, previously coordinated public advice and human rights projects supported by International Alert. These efforts contributed significantly to human rights advancements on both individual and institutional levels.
Public and political discourse
Civil peacebuilding initiatives impacted public and political discourse, though not as much as needed. Some Georgian interviewees credited peace dialogues with helping to ‘de-taboo’ the Abkhaz issue in Georgian society. They acknowledged that participants shaped public discourse through media appearances, publishing articles, and engaging on social media. In Abkhazia, veteran peacebuilders are often public opinion shapers, frequently appearing on television and other platforms. Journalists in the dialogue community understand their influence and strive for conflict-sensitive reporting, resisting bias and negative narratives.
Dialogue-produced publications, such as those by International Alert, the UCI process, and Conciliation Resources, were highly valued for creating an institutional memory. While their immediate policy impact was limited, these publications remain important analytical resources used by students and authorities today. As one Abkhaz interviewee noted, “Everyone read the analytical reports in detail, so what we did wasn’t in vain.”
Experts also found the process of analysis valuable, as it forced them to explore issues deeply and understand different perspectives. Many suggested revisiting these publications today to enrich current analysis, with one Abkhaz interviewee stating, “It was the only systemic analytical resource… it broadened perceptions and made young people less ideologized.” Many interviewees lamented the lack of analysis and discussion today.
Conclusion
The study revealed concerns about a decline in civil peacebuilding efforts, with many initiatives seen as having lost momentum. Interviewees reflected on the state of the peacebuilding sector, identifying a generational divide and an overemphasis on innovative ideas at the expense of tried-and-tested approaches. There was a need for intergenerational collaboration, focusing on developing the next generation’s skills while preserving institutional memory.
There were also concerns about the technical nature of monitoring and evaluation, which prioritized form over substance. Moreover, competition within the peacebuilding sector mirrored the conflict, hampering effective cooperation. The study emphasized the importance of synergy between different sectors—dialogue, trauma recovery, and human rights—and the need for improved communication, cooperation, and expectation management.
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