Why is there so little faith in the fight against corruption in Abkhazia? Why is the adoption of the foreign agent law not only an opportunity to meet the Kremlin halfway but also a chance for the current authorities to maintain their positions? The Moscow-Tbilisi-Sukhumi triangle in the context of a noticeable warming in Russian-Georgian relations. Editor of the newspaper Chegemskaya Pravda, Inal Khashig, discussed these topics with publicist and director Tengiz Djopua.

Full text of the discussion:

Inal Khashig: Hello, this is Chegemskaya Pravda. I’ve long wanted to invite one of the most popular Abkhaz bloggers to the studio. Currently, he’s not only a blogger but also an excellent journalist – Tengiz Djopua. Tengiz, good afternoon.

Tengiz Jopua: Hello.

Inal Khashig: I’ll probably start with the topic of Achaguara. We’ve been dealing with this case for a year and a half now, and we still can’t figure out whether it’s a criminal offense or not. The prosecutor’s office can’t determine if it was committed. A huge amount of money has disappeared, not matching the quality of the work done on the Achaguara LP.

At least society believes that, based on figures presented by the opposition, there is indeed a significant gap between the funds that were allocated and what was actually spent. Why does this happen? Corruption cases always seem to disappear like water into sand, and there is no reckoning.

Tengiz Jopua: There’s none because when we talk about corruption in society, we’re primarily thinking of some legal crime. In fact, corruption in our country and society is a broader concept. It has permeated all areas of our lives to the point where everyone is involved, absolutely everyone, not just the authorities but every citizen of the country. Corruption here is like an institution that regulates our relationships. Sometimes I even think that if these corrupt schemes miraculously disappeared, it’s quite possible that our system of governance would simply collapse.

When you don’t build normal state institutions, they begin to be replaced by these distorted, deformed relationships, such as corruption. Of course, corruption exists almost everywhere, and when we help our friends get jobs, when we place our children in schools, kindergartens, universities – all areas of state life, from law enforcement, from maternity wards to cemeteries, our entire lives are accompanied by corruption. How did this happen? Our civic consciousness has remained at a rudimentary level; it’s insufficiently developed.

The civil institutions of society have turned out to be insufficiently developed. No one from the authorities explained this to us, and in general, the authorities themselves had no desire to create a civil society, because it is impossible to defeat corruption without one. What is happening with Achaguara right now does not surprise me at all. People are fighting not because they dream of building some facility, but because they can get a kickback.

This kickback system has always existed and, apparently, will continue to exist. In some cases, the kickback can be as much as half of the allocated funds. When you take some of that money, you need to deliver the project, resorting to any means possible, inventing something, adding something, buying lower-quality building materials.

Achaguara came to the surface because it’s part of the grid, and its breakdown immediately became socially significant. Let’s look at the facilities that were repaired under comprehensive plans, such as libraries and schools. In what condition are their roofs? How were they built? What condition are the walls in? Everywhere things are leaking or not functioning, or functioning improperly. Our water pipelines were handed over in poor condition everywhere, and they constantly needed to be redone. This happens everywhere with us. But Achaguara is critical because half of Abkhazia’s electricity supply depends on it.

Inal Khashig: If a cultural center is built in some village, I don’t know, in a district center, people from other areas won’t be able to visit it. I doubt that the locals visit that cultural center often. Maybe they’ll come once a year or every two years, not more. But electricity is something that affects our daily lives. We feel it immediately. If there’s no light – we notice it at once. These power outage schedules have become the norm for us. But despite that, time and again, we’ve elected presidents, and the fight against corruption has always been a topic.

Now it feels like they’re not even talking about corruption anymore. Less than a year remains until the presidential election, and I doubt anyone will focus on the need to fight corruption in their campaign. It has become a constant element of our daily lives, and you can’t escape it.

We understand that power exists to enable someone to become wealthy. I’m not talking about clerks at the lower levels, who live paycheck to paycheck. But those in positions controlling resources are quite wealthy, and I don’t think we can change this situation, especially given the same electoral process. For example, Inar Gitsba resigned because, I believe, someone criticized him: “I funded your campaign, and now you’re playing your own game.” How do we break this system? We have large-scale corruption, even in the electoral process.

We don’t know where the money comes from to finance presidential candidates, parliamentary candidates, even district assembly members. Substantial sums are spent. Why doesn’t this civic activity translate into some groundwork to clean up the dark corners we have?

Tengiz Djopua: Corruption took shape gradually here and has created a comfort zone. In this zone the government itself resides, representing elite corruption, and society represents grassroots corruption. Without corruption, today’s authorities wouldn’t get into power. If we were to remove corruption from the electoral process, there would be no point in seeking power.

The motivation disappears if you can’t steal. Why pursue it then? Secondly, they simply wouldn’t let you get there. So all these talks about fighting corruption, which were part of presidential and parliamentary candidate rhetoric for some time, have now become laughable. Even the word “corruption” has become toxic to society. The authorities will keep maintaining this system because they have no reason to hold power without it. They are the first to defend it from any changes.

The problem for society is that it has gotten used to this way of life. People don’t even understand how things could be different. When you explain to them that you can come to a government office and get a certificate without paying, or use a one-stop system, they don’t believe it. For them it’s a given that you pay to get government services. When you express surprise, people are surprised that you’re surprised. That’s how deeply it’s embedded in society. How do you remove it?

Honestly, these institutions are so deeply ingrained in society that it’s hard to remove them. Either they need to be dismantled harshly, through some revolutionary decisions, or society itself must gradually transform. People’s level of awareness should grow, and they need to understand that the current state is abnormal. Alternatively, a very severe crisis must occur, because crises, whether economic or social, force society to reconsider the causes and choose a new path.

But this is all tied to time. At this moment, I don’t see any grounds for change, no conditions either from society or the authorities. Even discussions about political reform happen only because it’s fashionable in politics. Politicians sometimes mention it, but outside of public discourse, no one wants or plans to carry out any reforms. Why would they need to? Society isn’t particularly interested either because reforms are intangible, they take time, and most people are content with the way things are now. Sure, there’s no electricity, but people tend to get used to everything over time.

Inal Khashig: Well, I’d like to talk about this habit in the context of corruption. In a small society like ours, it’s hard to effectively combat corruption. Everyone knows each other, and no matter the president’s name, people always have some personal access to him. This makes it challenging. You might hold out for a while, but eventually you give in, whether to a relative, a friend, or an acquaintance. You think, “I might as well take the money if I’m going to be pressured anyway.”

In Abkhaz society, there’s an understanding that it’s hard to punish someone you know. It’s not like they’ve killed someone, people say. However, during times of political upheaval, despite the animosity between opposing sides, there’s always a push to avoid bloodshed or violence. Abkhazia is a small society, and we have this unspoken rule of protecting each other. Even in chaotic times, there’s a sense of harmony, a mutual care for how things will look afterward.

But now we’re seeing a different trend. When discussing issues like the foreign agent law, there’s this sense that we’re standing guard against the “Wild West.” When our officials speak, it feels like we’re already on the front line, as if NATO forces are about to invade.

I hear this, and at the same time, anyone who questions this vaguely constructed narrative is suddenly labeled a foreign agent. Recently, I read an interview with President Aslan Bzhania in the Russian outlet Argumenty i Fakty, where he accused the opposition of being influenced by foreign intelligence services. Why are we suddenly talking about this, which hasn’t been characteristic of our society in 30 years of independence?

Tengiz Djopua: All of these problems have existed, but with the new government, the situation is changing. The people in power now are mentally distant from our society. They are Abkhaz, but the Abkhaz mentality has faded away from them. They view events in Abkhazia from the perspective of a Moscow bureaucrat sitting in an office. They defend their power more aggressively, without red lines, and are ready to cross any boundary to stay in power.

The foreign agents law is part of the Russian agenda, one of those notorious 45 points, and this law is one of them. Why is it needed in this context? It’s likely important for Russia because they want to further integrate Abkhazia into their sphere and shield themselves from any Western influence, reinforcing their ideological dominance in Abkhazia. But why does our government find it appealing? It helps them suppress opposition, dissent, and those who express themselves more freely and openly.

In essence, this law serves the same purpose in Russia. What does the foreign agents law do? It places a marker on members of society in order to isolate them. Once isolated, economic, social, and political restrictions are imposed, making it hard for the individual to exist in society, which begins to reject them. It’s like the time of King Herod when houses with infants were marked, or like during Hitler’s regime when the Star of David was placed on Jewish shops and businesses.

This law serves to mark and push individuals out of society. Recently, in Russia, foreign agents were banned from advertising, companies stopped working with them, and their financial opportunities diminished. They are being squeezed from all sides. That’s what this law is for. It is mentally foreign to the Abkhaz people, who, unlike Russian society, are less atomized and maintain closer ties.

I can’t see how this law would work in our society, where we hold differing political views. We may fight at protests but the next day we’ll be embracing each other at weddings. How can we accuse our neighbor, friend, or relative of being an enemy? I don’t understand it. It doesn’t work here; it’s not characteristic of Abkhaz society. But the people pushing this law forward simply don’t get it. They don’t understand because the Abkhaz mentality has faded away from them, it’s gone, that’s all.

Inal Khashig: Well, I don’t quite agree that they don’t understand. I think they do understand, at least to some extent. I haven’t heard a single argument from them on why this law is necessary, other than the fact that Russia finds it useful. How does this benefit Abkhaz society? The argument that some young people might lose their way is, in my view, not convincing.

There are no real arguments. Since 2004, when we first saw political competition emerge, we’ve tried everything — fighting corruption, reforming local governance. We’ve talked about it all, but nothing has changed. It’s like a blank page that we’ve been staring at since the fierce political battles of 2004. Sergey Vasilyevich Bagapsh said we should start with a clean slate … and we still have that clean slate today.

Every president has set up constitutional commissions, but everything always ends up back in the trash. Society is apathetic; it no longer trusts any political force. Everyone understands that no single political force has a controlling share of trust or votes — some are fragmented, some support one group, others support another.

There is no strong political force today. Even if you win an election with 53%, most of those people are just hoping you’ll make a difference. In reality, nothing changes. Maybe 15-20% offer some real support, but even then, it’s not fanatical support. The mechanism for staying in power needs a new approach.

The current government, for example, Aslan Bzhania, came to power positioning himself as a reformer. Now he no longer talks about reforms but presents himself as Russia’s closest and only friend. Every political force in Abkhazia understands the importance of friendship with Russia, our sole ally and partner. There has never been an anti-Russian political force here. But now, anyone who disagrees on issues like apartments or the foreign agents law is easily labeled anti-Russian. The foreign agents law allows the government to frame the entire political spectrum as outcasts that people will naturally avoid.

When the rest of the political mass is artificially or genuinely labeled anti-Russian, the only force left standing is the current government, supposedly the defenders of Russian interests. But there are major issues we’re not discussing. Today’s world is rapidly changing, and borders are shifting due to global crises. You read various Telegram channels, including pro-Kremlin ones, and some suggest, “Why not make Abkhazia part of Russia?” So, what would we do then?

I sense that our government isn’t clinging too tightly to sovereignty. They repeatedly say, “It’s fine, let’s build apartments, new citizens will settle here,” or, “Let’s give away this or that.” Do we have any real mechanisms to prevent such processes? I’m not talking about legal mechanisms; we have plenty of laws. We even have criminal liability for actions or calls that undermine sovereignty. But are there any real mechanisms to stop these trends?

Tengiz Djopua: Look at the situation we’re in. All political forces in Abkhazia are, of course, pro-Russian, and no one is planning to revise this political direction. However, it’s not that Aslan Georgievich Bzhania is the most pro-Russian; rather, he is the most unprincipled among the political figures in Abkhazia. Every country has its own interests  — Russia has its interests, and we have ours. There are areas where our interests align, and others where they don’t, which is perfectly normal.

Out of the 45 issues where there’s mutual understanding, disagreements have arisen on only a few. At most, there are five points where we feel things should be handled differently. In about 40 cases, we are in agreement with the Russian side. This is a normal process — sitting down and negotiating. The Russians put forward their proposals, we put forward ours, but Bzhania just agrees to everything.

His “pro-Russian” stance is really about having no principles of his own. His rhetoric doesn’t reflect the interests of the Abkhaz people; maybe his own personal interests or those of a certain group, but I don’t see the interests of the Abkhaz people in what he says.

As for society, I believe we do have mechanisms. The Abkhaz have learned to navigate politics in a very interesting way. We are aware of our economic dependence and generally maintain a loyal attitude, but there’s always a line with the Abkhaz, a boundary that we will not cross or allow others to cross.

Inal Khashig: I don’t believe that if the question of joining something arises, the Abkhaz people would eagerly agree. Because there’s still an element of historical memory. Our republic is very small, and our main problems stem from entering into various unions — first, there were issues with the Georgians, before them with the Russian Empire, and then again with the Georgians. It’s a repeated issue; we keep stepping on the same rakes. Although history teaches nothing, I hope some internal restraint mechanisms still exist deep within our society.

We might accept certain compromises, as Bzhania says, perhaps even giving up part of our sovereignty. Society might reluctantly agree to that, but to completely surrender all sovereignty? I don’t think so. Or maybe I just want to believe that. But I still think some mechanisms are in place, although the danger remains. There’s definitely a risk, especially considering how quickly borders are changing around the world.

For example, Russia might propose such a solution, as South Ossetia is actively supporting the idea of joining the Russian Federation. I think Transnistria wouldn’t oppose this either, but it’s in a different logistical situation, and we don’t know what will happen tomorrow.

Inal Khashig: At the same time, Moscow is actively developing economic relations with Georgia, even though there are no diplomatic ties. I think there’s a political moment happening now as well. Despite Georgia’s public push for EU membership, it feels like the current leaders of the Georgian Dream party have no real interest in joining the EU. They are reintroducing the law on foreign agents into parliament for the second time, which also seems to be running parallel both in Georgia and here.

While we aren’t negotiating much with the Georgians, many people are now talking about projects like the Union State, and it feels like we’re being prepped for some kind of arrangement where Moscow and Georgia could strike a deal that might lead to some form of union state, with Abkhazia being part of it in some way. I’ve read in Georgian media that there are suggestions of Abkhazia becoming a confederation with Georgia, somehow fitting into this union state model — there are many options.

However, I don’t see any deep discussions about these possibilities on our side. There’s nothing in the official political discourse. All we talk about is the idea of joining the Union State of the Russian Federation and Belarus. I don’t understand how we can join a union where one of the member states (Belarus) hasn’t even recognized us. There are many questions around this. Why is this idea repeated so often when it’s clear that we don’t really have any prospects in the Russian-Belarusian context?

Tengiz Djopua: I think it’s just an attempt to pass off wishful thinking as reality. I seriously doubt there’s any real prospect of this Union State. Belarus’s position is cautious — Lukashenko cooperates closely with the Russian Federation, but at any moment, he could take a step forward and then unexpectedly take two steps back. There isn’t a solid roadmap for moving towards a union state.

Even in Russia, the position is unclear. As for what’s happening in Georgia, the current government is trying to establish relations with Russia, and economically this is benefiting Georgia because, due to sanctions, Russia has serious import issues. A significant amount of parallel imports goes through Georgia, generating considerable income for them. However, I wouldn’t call this government pro-Russian; I think they are simply pragmatic people looking to maximize economic and financial gains in the current situation.

The law on foreign agents they are pushing in Georgia also seems to be part of this game. It’s a signal to Russia, showing that they are trying to pass this law through parliament. But later, the opposition will likely become active, and the law will be withdrawn again. Public politics, I believe, is about 80% performance. Most of what really matters happens behind closed doors, and we have no insight into those discussions. So, I find it hard to say that Georgia will suddenly pivot towards Russia.

Georgia is deeply integrated into the Western sphere, so deeply that there are ties that the Georgians will hardly be able to break. I don’t know, maybe something extraordinary will happen there — a crisis, a war, or something else. But right now, it is very profitable to work with the Russians; there is a window for parallel imports through which a large amount of goods and services can be brought in, and one can make a lot of money on this. Plus, the party led by Bidzina Ivanishvili has its internal political contradictions, and they need Russia for support as well: “Look, we are with you, and they are categorically against you.” So Russia is used as an element of internal political struggle.

But I don’t think there will be such a sharp turn towards the creation of even a union state. Most Georgian society is so integrated into Europe — almost half of the population has already left, they constantly migrate, work, and return. Many of them no longer even know the Russian language. The youth there have no concept of the Russian language, Russian culture, or Russian history at all.

They see the Soviet past as a part of history marked by occupation, and they have no thoughts of returning to anything close to that. The older generation is passing away, and, moreover, such sentiments are hardly present now. It’s just some kind of political game of the times. You can discuss anything you want, but in reality, nothing is being done. That’s what I think.

Inal Khashig: I also believe that they are playing a more pragmatic game when the world is in such a turbulent situation. They are trying not only to survive but also to profit. On the other hand, I think there is an understanding that this candidacy for the European Union, which they received, with the internal philosophy of Georgian Dream, is quite incompatible for making the next leap — to become an EU member. Ivanishvili and some representatives of Georgian Dream, who are in the top leadership of the country, including judges, are already appearing on the EU’s sanctions lists.

The prospect of moving toward the European Union while also potentially facing some restrictions on their activities is probably not something they desire. They have the opportunity to develop their relations with both sides — Russia, which gives them some hope, saying, “We are with you,” and on the other hand, the European Union, “We are also with you.” And under this idea, economically, Georgia could become more substantial. I understand that they are hoping, through this movement towards Russia, to somehow latch onto the Abkhaz issue, which has been eternally troubling Georgian society and political elites, and perhaps, little by little, bring Abkhazia closer to them. Don’t you get that impression?

Tengiz Djopua: They probably have that desire, without a doubt, to resolve the Abkhaz and Ossetian issues. But the overall policy they are pursuing is very pragmatic. In my opinion, it’s quite right, and they are now doing what Ukraine was unable to do at that time. They are distancing themselves from some and getting closer to others. They have defined a corridor for their policy. They try not to lean too much in one direction or the other.

At the same time, they are gathering the margins of these relationships, taking something from here and something from there, economically. They are fulfilling the main task of a state, which is security and well-being. They are achieving the second task related to well-being economically, as Georgia is actively developing.

Will this help resolve the Abkhaz issue now? If you are on good terms with everyone, and everyone wants to pull you to their side, then to some extent, you can leverage that in addressing this issue. If the return of Abkhazia is a top priority, I don’t think it is for them; there is probably already a sentiment and understanding that it will be very difficult to get Abkhazia back. To get it back, you would need to some extent to wrest it from Russia’s influence.

This also needs to be understood. There are also active nationalist sentiments within Abkhazia. What to do about that? Well, for instance, you could agree with Russia on relations regarding Abkhazia, but what about the Abkhaz national-patriotic elements? They will definitely say that the main issue is the Abkhaz idea and the Abkhaz question, and they would be right, and conflict would start again.

Inal Khashig: Maybe that’s why the law on foreign agents is being adopted — to suppress that active element that thinks about preserving their identity. The adoption of this law on foreign agents could effectively combat such groups. If this law is adopted and starts to work effectively in 10-15 years, the question of what to do with the Abkhaz nationalists might resolve itself, considering the degree of repression that this law on foreign agents carries.

Tengiz Djopua: We went through this in the 19th century when part of the population disagreed, and they were simply expelled from the country to Turkey. There was a period during Stalin’s time when the Abkhaz elite, who were trying to speak out, were exiled to Siberia. And now we are probably going through a new stage. This law is aimed at that. But how this law will be applied in practice is uncertain. The patience of society is also not limitless. In the framework of Abkhaz law, upheavals could occur, and if people with weapons come out of control, who knows what will happen.

This law could lead to unpredictable outcomes. It shifts political struggle from the public sphere to the personal. And personal relationships in Abkhazia are a completely different situation. There are no boundaries. It doesn’t matter if one is a president or a minister; relatives will gather and talk not as with a president or minister, but as with a person, as with an Abkhaz. I think we still have traditions and culture, though globalization is affecting that; but for now, they still exist.

Inal Khashig: I will conclude our program on this optimistic note. We discussed today’s problems and attempts to survive in this global world with Tengiz Djopua. I remind you that you can watch us on the “Abaza” channel, subscribe and watch on the YouTube channel “Chegemskaya Pravda” and on the “Chegemskaya Pravda” page on Facebook, as well as chegem.su. Goodbye, good luck to everyone, all the best!