Georgian Dream and Confederation

The Georgian Dream party states that it needs a constitutional majority in the new parliament in order to introduce necessary changes to the Georgian constitution regarding the territorial arrangement. Naturally, this means Abkhazia.

So, the party claims that without these changes, “territorial integrity” cannot be restored. This is a rather strange statement because the current Georgian constitution already defines Abkhazia’s status as an autonomous republic. In other words, the existing legal framework is sufficient to align with the principle of “territorial integrity.”

Which means it’s about something else ⁠— and that is confederation, a union, the creation of which is impossible without mutual recognition. That is, Georgia must first recognize Abkhazia’s statehood, and only after that can confederation be achieved. There’s no other way.

The editor of Chegemskaya Pravda, Inal Khashig, discussed the new wave of talks about confederation and what the reaction from Sukhum should be with historian and political scientist Astamur Tania.

Inal Khashig: Hello, this is Chegemskaya Pravda. Today we will discuss the election in Georgia, which involves Abkhazia. This issue is becoming increasingly relevant on the political agenda. Our guest is the chief political expert, Astamur Tania. Astamur, hello. The Georgian Dream party and Bidzina Ivanishvili have talked about the need for a constitutional majority in parliament.

They are seeking voter support to amend the Constitution, including restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity. Amendments to the country’s administrative structure are expected. Opinions on this matter are divided. Many of Georgian Dream’s opponents claim this is a bluff. I have a different opinion, but I would like to hear yours first.

Astamur Tania: Hello. Right now, it is difficult to give a precise answer to this question. First, even sincere intentions are not always realizable. Second, we must not forget that political forces often resort to populism during elections. Nonetheless, I partly agree with you. One of the key developments was the Georgian authorities’ statement blaming Saakashvili and the United National Movement for the events of 2008. This is a serious statement that will not go without consequences. Of course, Georgian Dream may be accused of supporting pro-Russian narratives, but it is important to consider the events in the context of 2008, while also looking through the lens of today’s sentiments.

The international commission led by Heidi Tagliavini concluded that Georgia was responsible for starting the military actions in 2008. This is crucial to keep in mind when discussing issues like the relevance of the Law on Occupied Territories. Of course, this may not lead to immediate changes, but it will likely result in a dialogue, in which the participation of the Abkhaz side is absolutely necessary. Without Abkhaz representatives, it is difficult to talk about progress in resolving the conflict. I also believe that acknowledging the facts of 2008 is a step towards changing the political context. I think the next logical step should be recognizing responsibility for the start of the conflict in 1992.

This is hardly discussed in Georgian society. Although for example even Shevardnadze, after leaving office, admitted that the Georgian side bore responsibility for the start of hostilities in 1992, placing the blame on Tengiz Kitovani. Also interesting is an interview with Karkarashvili, where he acknowledges that the actions of the Georgian military provoked massive outrage in Abkhazia. Acknowledging responsibility is a crucial step toward changing the political landscape and creating conditions for dialogue. If Georgian Dream continues in this direction, it may be possible to change the context surrounding the conflict.

Inal Khashig: The logic of the actions of Georgian Dream and Ivanishvili is, in principle, clear. They are striving to restore relations with Russia and resolve internal issues, including those related to territorial integrity. Their intentions are becoming clearer now: they need constitutional changes to alter Georgia’s territorial arrangement. In the Georgian Constitution, Abkhazia is defined as an autonomous republic, and if they are saying this is insufficient, it suggests that they are talking about confederation.

Astamur Tania: That logic has its place, but it’s not the only possibility.

Inal Khashig: True, but I think the main focus will be on restoring relations with Russia. However, this will be impossible without re-examining the events of 2008, when Russia allegedly “occupied” Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Law on Occupied Territories plays a key role in this process. Without repealing it, any efforts to restore relations with Russia seem pointless. It’s quite possible that this involves a comprehensive approach, including reconsidering Georgia’s stance toward NATO.

Astamur Tania: You’re talking about the need to resolve legal issues.

Inal Khashig: It’s not just legal problems, but also ideological.

Astamur Tania: Yes, and that’s even more complicated.

Inal Khashig: Of course, but as long as the law on occupation exists, it will hinder any progress in this direction. I think Georgia will soon begin to move away from the narrative of occupied territories. There are many aspects that need to be considered together, and repealing this law is one of them. Georgian Dream may also be planning to remove the constitutional aspiration for NATO membership.

Astamur Tania: They have already made statements in the context of potential changes in relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But it’s important to remember that in the Georgian Constitution, the status of South Ossetia differs from that of Abkhazia. This distinction is significant.

Besides Abkhazia, there is also South Ossetia. In the current Georgian constitution, South Ossetia does not have the same status as Abkhazia. The Law on Occupied Territories was adopted at a time when Georgia had no other means of responding to Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This law was more of a propaganda tool aimed at the domestic audience. It destroyed the platform for dialogue, which had previously existed and worked effectively. As a result, the situation reached a deadlock, and the new generation of Georgians and Abkhazians no longer remembers that there were once negotiations with Abkhazia.

So the repeal of this law is important not only for Russia, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia, but also for Georgia itself. As for changes to the Constitution, I don’t see any prospect for creating a confederation because constitutional changes in Georgia cannot propose a confederation, as this would be a unilateral act within the framework of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Even if Georgia has the will to establish federal relations with Abkhazia, we also have our own Constitution. We too have our own Constitution. So, we shouldn’t create new deadlock situations by replacing one dead end with another.

In my opinion, both the Georgian and Abkhaz sides could change the overall climate and context, as politics is always dependent on the context. Foreign policy, in particular, is a reaction to what is happening around you. If you change the context, then the foreign policies of both sides will also change. This is important to understand. What could be done to achieve this? Above all, stop the enforcement of the Law on Occupied Territories or soften articles that hinder dialogue with the Abkhaz side.

A negotiation format should be created to address issues that concern both sides, especially the populations of border areas. These include economic and humanitarian issues, human rights, and confidence-building measures. These steps will help create a favorable climate, which will later allow for the discussion of more complex issues. We must act cautiously here.

Inal Khashig: When you talk about context, is this what you mean?

Astamur Tania: Yes, right now it’s impossible to resolve global political problems or issues of legal relations at the state level. It’s difficult. But we can address simpler, yet no less important, issues, as I’ve already mentioned. If we manage to create a permanent negotiation platform for resolving economic, humanitarian, transportation, and trade issues, it will be an important step. When we have a mechanism for solving such problems, over time we can move on to more complex topics.

The situation in the South Caucasus may change, and we cannot predict what will happen, just as with the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the configuration of external actors. We know of historical examples when there was an, albeit short-lived, Transcaucasian Federation. It may seem far-fetched now, but in the future, supranational bodies could emerge in the South Caucasus that facilitate cooperation on transit and customs issues. We cannot rule out such changes, especially given that far more significant transformations in the world order have happened in our time.

Inal Khashig: I’m basing this on what’s happening in Georgia. We don’t know for certain, but I get the feeling that there is close contact between Moscow and Tbilisi. Otherwise we wouldn’t be seeing these developments.

Astamur Tania: But that’s nothing new. There are Swiss representations that act as the embassies of Russia in Georgia and Georgia in Russia de facto. They’ve been operating for a long time, so the contact is there.

Inal Khashig: That’s not what I mean.

Astamur Tania: Are you referring to a different level of communication?

Inal Khashig: Yes, I’m not talking about consular functions. I’m talking about a serious political dialogue, and it seems that Abkhazia is not involved in it at all. There are concerns that the Georgians might think…

Astamur Tania: Where do you get that idea?

Inal Khashig: It’s just a feeling. I’m talking about my impressions. We can’t speak of anything as fact. I’m merely making assumptions based on what I observe. This picture may not reflect reality.

Astamur Tania: You mentioned that you connect the adoption of the law on foreign agents in Georgia with Moscow’s influence?

Inal Khashig: Yes, that’s one thing.

Astamur Tania: I doubt it. Moscow understands perfectly well that there’s a broadly, to put it mildly, unfavorable attitude toward Russia in Georgia. This was the case even before 2008. Imagine, this was already present before 2008, so there’s nothing new about it. Georgian society is, to put it mildly, wary of Russia. Even if we assume there is a government in Tbilisi willing to take Russia’s interests into account, it wouldn’t make sense for Moscow to give them orders to demonstrate loyalty, which could undermine their position.

That wouldn’t make sense. Besides, the experience of interactions between Russian representatives, even with Abkhaz representatives, shows that they don’t behave harshly. So, the reasons for adopting this law are more likely related to the internal interests of the Georgian elite rather than Russian influence.

Inal Khashig: It’s clear that Georgian society as a whole has a negative attitude towards Russia, and a law won’t change that. But we need to understand that over the last 30 years, the Georgian propaganda machine has been working to create the narrative that Georgia should move toward the West and that the Soviet Union, and later Russia, were to blame for their problems. This opinion won’t change instantly. It will take time to shift perspectives on Moscow.

Astamur Tania: May I add something?

The law on foreign agents could also signal a shift in direction: Georgia might reduce its emphasis on EU integration while maintaining rhetoric about joining.

Inal Khashig: Of course. I agree that Georgian Dream has its own interests, which may align with Russia’s interests in the context of the foreign agents law. Georgian Dream might aim to control political organizations, the media, and other sectors. The law on foreign agents could serve as a signal of a change in development direction: Georgia might reduce its focus on EU integration while still talking about it. In reality, internal laws and policies might not align with European standards, which could lead to a rollback of their Euro-integration efforts.

Astamur Tania: I remember Vladislav Grigoryevich Ardzinba once joked, “We are oriented towards the West, but in the West, we have Russia.” The situation is similar in Georgia—between the West and Georgia stands Russia. The problem is that propaganda alone won’t improve relations with Russia; it’s essential to understand the real situation in the region. NATO integration remains a distant prospect for Georgia, especially considering the upcoming challenges with Ukraine’s integration into the EU. After the conflict in Ukraine is resolved, the issue of Ukraine joining the EU will become a serious problem, tied to security and material costs.

So Georgia, which is far from the EU’s borders, is unlikely to be a priority for EU expansion. At the same time, Europe, the US, and Turkey will not ignore Georgia and will continue to seek its integration according to their standards. Georgia will have to maneuver between major players, which will affect its Euro-integration ambitions and slow down the process. We should not forget the influence of Turkey, which plays a significant role in Georgia in economic, political, and security terms, despite its own challenges with EU integration.

Like other post-Soviet countries, Georgia faces issues of nationalism and nation-building. The events that have taken place in Georgia over the past few decades have shown that Georgia is far from the idealized image that its authorities have promoted to demonstrate closeness to European values. Therefore when Georgian politicians talk about resolving relations with Abkhazia, they need to recognize that the Abkhaz people are not just an ethnic group, but a nation, and the existence of the Abkhaz nation must be acknowledged.

Inal Khashig: So we’re talking about recognizing Abkhaz authority, right?

Astamur Tania: Yes, the Abkhaz nation with all its attributes—ideology, political institutions, borders, views on its place, history, and historical mission. In this sense, we and the Georgians are at a similar stage of development, the stage of nation-building. We’ve made significant progress, but society is not yet ready to give up its national characteristics.

This is one of the biggest challenges. By the way, I notice that Georgian commentators, both those who support Georgian Dream and those who oppose it, do not recognize the existence of the Abkhaz nation. However, during Soviet times, the existence of the Abkhaz nation was recognized.

If you open the Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary, you’ll see that the Abkhazians were designated as a Soviet nation. In Soviet historiography, nations were divided into capitalist and socialist. It’s important to remember that the conflict began when Georgia unilaterally began dismantling the political institutions that ensured the functioning of the Abkhaz nation.

This should be taken into account when searching for ways to resolve the relationship between the parties. Yes, both sides are interested in resolving the conflict. We can’t remain in a state of conflict forever and expect some kind of external intervention. Georgian Dream has taken some correct steps, and we’ll see what happens after the elections.

Inal Khashig: I’d like to return to the topic of Abkhazia, as it currently appears to be more of an observer in this process. There are serious changes happening within Georgia, discussions, and so on. There’s also suspicion of contacts between Moscow and Tbilisi, possibly involving discussions about Abkhazia. We are still in the role of observers and aren’t reacting much to the statements from Georgian authorities.

Inal Khashig: However, the observer position doesn’t offer many advantages. It seems we’re starting to realize this. The new head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Mironovich Shamba, has returned to office and made statements indicating that Abkhazia wants to introduce new dynamics, including in the Geneva negotiations. How should we proceed? Should our position be more active, or should we wait for what’s offered us?

Astamur Tania: First, reality is always more complex than the proposed solutions. Even if something is offered to us, it would just be the beginning of discussions. The Abkhaz side is clearly interested in security and in guaranteeing the preservation of our nation, and consequently, our state. It’s essential that international guarantees ensure the security system and prevent the use of force against Abkhazia. We must change the climate in our relations with Georgia and between our societies. Serious ideological work is needed to de-escalate tensions.

Real actions, including symbolic declarations, are also important. For example, no Georgian government has made a statement acknowledging its mistakes, including attempts at a military solution. Such symbolic steps would be a stimulus for initiating dialogue. I think much will become clearer after the results of the election in Georgia, although I don’t consider this parliamentary election to be crucial for Georgia. Even if Georgian Dream leaves the political scene, it could be replaced by political forces that will base their actions on current realities and aim for Georgia’s prosperity.

In any case, we must take into account that there are two nations with their own interests, and these interests need to be reconciled. Our experience in negotiations shows that various agendas were proposed, including Russian models that envisaged hierarchical relations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. None of these models were accepted. The document of April 4, 1994, and the subsequent report of May 3, 1994, spoke of the possibility of delegating powers to newly created authorities, and this was the maximum Abkhazia was willing to agree to. We see that Abkhazia has only been willing to consider confederative models.

Inal Khashig: In that case, it feels like we might be talking about a confederation.

Astamur Tania: For now, that’s too hypothetical a topic. At this moment, it’s more important to address practical issues: trade, transport, communication, the movement of people, the protection of human rights, and other contacts between scholars, intellectuals, and historians. These issues need to be discussed without political overtones. Confidence-building measures can be strengthened even under current conditions, without the need to immediately resolve key issues.

Inal Khashig: You mentioned that the upcoming parliamentary election in Georgia won’t be crucial? Although I don’t like the term, it seems that it is significant because two major ideological platforms are being defined. Previously, Georgian political forces were mostly aligned in their ambitions for Euro-integration and other matters. Now we see two forces emerging: one focused on European integration, the other on traditionalism and internal values, as with Ivanishvili.

Astamur Tania: Yes, one group is conservative, the other is liberal.

Inal Khashig: Yes, conservatives and liberals. But if we talk about Georgia’s future, the “dreamers” might not see a future in that. They aim for closer ties with Russia. Ivanishvili, on the other hand, presents Georgia as something akin to Azerbaijan, which maintains independence and balances within the region. This allows Azerbaijan to reap the benefits of its balanced position.

Azerbaijan and Turkey indeed have a lot in common. But in Georgia, two platforms are forming, although they are not fully defined yet. In the context of Abkhazia, do our authorities see Georgian Dream as a more understandable, constructive, and peaceful partner for negotiations?

Astamur Tania: Why not praise those who behave positively?

Inal Khashig: So, Georgian Dream is perceived as a more suitable partner for potential dialogue, considering its constructive approach.

Astamur Tania: Yes, in the current context, that’s the case. Georgian Dream has taken steps that have been positively received by Abkhaz society, such as halting sabotage actions in Abkhazia, which was a significant problem in the past, especially towards the end of Saakashvili’s rule. There’s also the medical program that residents of Abkhazia have benefited from. These actions have contributed to a more favorable attitude towards Georgian Dream.

Inal Khashig: Yes, that’s important.

Astamur Tania: Besides discussions, we see specific positive examples of Georgian Dream’s actions. This is likely why Abkhaz political elites are inclined to see Georgian Dream as a potential partner for dialogue. A change of power brings many uncertainties, and while I don’t think there will be catastrophic shifts, subjective factors can affect the situation. Rational policies could be undermined by personal sentiments.

Thus, the Abkhaz side might consider Georgian Dream a more suitable partner. This isn’t necessarily because Moscow strongly supports Georgian Dream. Rather, Moscow is choosing between two lesser evils, given the deeply ingrained cautious attitude of the Georgian public towards Russia, which won’t change quickly. Political forces in Georgia, regardless of who holds power, will have to navigate between various interests. In this context, the Abkhaz side has an opportunity to pursue its interests and build constructive relations with Georgia.

Inal Khashig: I think we can wrap up our talk here. We discussed political processes in Georgia ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for late October and its impact on Abkhaz issues. Reminder: you can watch us on the Chegemskaya Pravda channel, as well as on the Chegemskaya Pravda Facebook page and website. You can find my comments on the Telegram channel “Инал Хашиг. Чегемская правда”. Subscribe and stay updated. Astamur, thank you for the conversation. Goodbye.

Georgian Dream and Confederation