Constitutional Reform in Abkhazia

The Public Chamber has presented a project for constitutional reforms, proposing a transition to a mixed electoral system for the country’s main legislative body. The project also includes the idea of redistributing some of the president’s powers in favor of the People’s Assembly. By June 1, the Working Group on Constitutional Reform, established under the parliament, is expected to present its own version.

Most of the experts participating in the project share a similar vision on fundamental issues with the project proposed by the Public Chamber. But things are not so straightforward. The editor of Chegemskaya Pravda, Inal Khashig*, discussed influences surrounding the constitutional reform with Tamaz Ketsba, a member of the Public Chamber and simultaneously an expert on the Constitutional Reform Working Group.

Inal Khashig has been included by the Russian Ministry of Justice in the register of foreign agents. Khashig strongly disagrees with this designation and is appealing the decision in court.

Full interview:

Inal Khashig: Hello, this is Chegemskaya Pravda. Today we’re going to talk about constitutional reform. We bring this topic up often, but now there’s finally a new reason to revisit it: the Public Chamber has presented a draft law — its version of reform. And today we’re speaking with someone who has been deeply involved in this issue for a long time. Tamaz Ketsba was the first head of the Constitutional Commission under the President established in 2005. Having gone his own way, he’s back to this, is now a member of the Public Chamber and once again working on a reform we’ve been trying to achieve for 20 years. Good afternoon.

Tamaz Ketsba: Good afternoon. Let me correct you right away: the head of the commission back then was the President, Sergei Vasilyevich Bagapsh. A working group was created under the commission, and I led that group.

Inal Khashig: Right, so you led the group of legal experts who were drafting the reform. Tamaz, let’s briefly outline some things, as many people are not familiar with the project you’ve presented. As I understand it, it includes a shift to a mixed electoral system, an expansion of the size of the parliament, and a redistribution of powers between the president and the legislative branch. Can you summarize the key points?

Tamaz Ketsba: I’ll try. First of all, I want to add a very important point. The entire concept we’re proposing is built around a transformation of the political system. The cornerstone of this reform is the transition to a new, so-called mixed, electoral system. There’s a lot of discussion about it right now. In developing our concept, we took into account the current situation — thirty years of experience, the state of society, the development of institutions, and the level of political culture. We concluded that the most reasonable option is a mixed system in which the majority of mandates are distributed among political parties, and a smaller portion is allocated to deputies elected in majoritarian districts.

We proposed increasing the number of deputies to 45. This generated a lot of interest, although we are not entirely rejecting the existing number of 35. But we believe 45 is preferable because it would allow for the creation of a political body capable not only of passing laws but also of bearing political responsibility for what happens in the country.

Tamaz Ketsba: We are not proposing just a mechanical redistribution of powers between branches of government. Everything must be based on mutual responsibility between the branches themselves and toward society. Without that, no reform will succeed. Party representation in parliament, as international experience shows, can have a real impact on political processes.

Inal Khashig: Now, let’s talk about the system of power redistribution. As I understand, your draft includes provisions for the approval of a Prime Minister and other mechanisms. Tell us more.

Tamaz Ketsba: Let’s get into specifics. But let me once again emphasize: all of this is only possible if the parliament becomes something different from what it is now. Only on that foundation can we talk about increased accountability and redistribution of powers. The essence of what we’re proposing is a move toward a presidential-parliamentary republic.

Currently, the formation of the government is the exclusive prerogative of the president. He consults with no one, doesn’t coordinate the candidacies of either the Prime Minister or cabinet members. We recently witnessed the latest formation of a Cabinet where everything was decided unilaterally. That practice has revealed serious shortcomings — we see no influence from the parliament on government operations.

We propose a different approach. The right of first initiative remains with the president. He submits the candidate for Prime Minister to the parliament. If parliament supports the nomination, then within 20 days, this candidate, along with a proposed cabinet, returns to parliament to receive a vote of confidence.

This vote should be accompanied by a presentation of the government’s key policy directions. For example, one of the current priorities is the energy crisis. It’s been four months and we haven’t heard a word from the government.

Inal Khashig: Yes, we’ve heard nothing about many things.

Tamaz Ketsba: If things continue in this unstable fashion, we’ll again reach autumn, then winter, and once again find ourselves empty-handed. We want to hear from the government what specific measures are being planned, not just live off of rumors and promises.

Inal Khashig: The system of approving the Cabinet through parliament isn’t new. But your draft includes other changes as well — for example, the procedure for electing the speaker, some internal innovations. Tell us about those.

Tamaz Ketsba: That pertains to the internal structure of parliament. If we develop a fully party representation system, and a significant number of mandates go to political parties, then they should become the main actors in the political process. The party that wins the majority would nominate the speaker. The minority party would nominate the deputy speaker. This would ensure balance and protection of minority rights. We’ve tried to formalize this balance institutionally, both in the law on government and in the parliamentary rules of procedure. The same applies to parliamentary committees ⁠— in line with the proportional distribution of seats, the majority party would get more committee chairs, but some committees could be chaired by opposition representatives.

Inal Khashig: So, opposition parties could lead committees?

Tamaz Ketsba: Yes. We’ve gone further, drawing on international experience. We’ve proposed strengthening parliamentary oversight. Currently, neither the Constitution nor the law on the Cabinet requires the Prime Minister to report annually. We propose that parliament annually hear from five key figures: the Prime Minister, the Prosecutor General, the Chairman of the Supreme Court (in the format of a report on the state of the judicial system), the Ombudsman, and the Chair of the Audit Chamber. This shouldn’t be a formal event. The report parameters should be agreed upon with parliament in advance. Committees should prepare and act as counterparts, and then parliament should draw conclusions and pass necessary legislation based on the recommendations.

Additionally, the Constitution already includes an annual presidential address. I would redefine it as an address on the state of the nation; this is the head of state’s perspective, not a report. We must clearly distinguish between the Prime Minister’s report, which outlines what has been done and what is planned, and the President’s speech, which is an evaluation of the country’s condition.

Inal Khashig: In principle, many things are already written into our laws. The same goes for the President’s address — it’s supposed to be annual. But in recent years it’s become a rarity. I think the previous president gave such an address only once; Raul Khajimba (the 4th President of Abkhazia) also skipped it several times. So we have things that seem to be codified in law, but in practice they’re not followed, and there’s no accountability for that. Officially we have a presidential republic, but somehow we handle things differently.

For example, the impeachment mechanism has been talked about for years, but it’s still not clearly defined. Our version of impeachment follows a different scenario — storming the presidential palace and that’s it, powers are terminated. Now your draft stipulates, say, annual reports from the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice, and so on. But what if they don’t present those reports? Is that addressed in the document? What if the government says, “We’re not coming to report,” or the Prosecutor General says, “I won’t do it”?

Tamaz Ketsba: Our concept provides for the possibility of a vote of no confidence in the government. So if there are obvious and serious violations of the Constitution, nothing prevents parliament from applying direct accountability.

Inal Khashig: A vote of no confidence could lead to resignation? In that case, is the president required to dismiss the government if parliament insists?

Tamaz Ketsba: Absolutely.

Inal Khashig: Is that explicitly written?

Tamaz Ketsba: No, it doesn’t even specify that the president has to do it. It’s enough for parliament to vote, and the government is dismissed. That form of accountability is indeed provided for.

Inal Khashig: Here’s something I noticed: on the very first day the draft was published, many civil organizations and political parties responded, mostly those we could loosely call “neutral,” although nowadays it’s hard to be neutral, as you quickly get labeled as belonging to one side or another. But opposition organizations and the press expressed overall approval of the project. Meanwhile, political forces who support the president were silent. No word from the president himself, nor from parties like Amtsakhara or United Abkhazia — no comments, pro or con. Is there any communication at all? I get that public statements in the media are one thing, but are there behind-the-scenes contacts? Did you submit the project to the presidential administration, and was there any feedback — what they liked, what they didn’t?

Tamaz Ketsba: I know that, overall, the proposed changes to the electoral system are supported by the new president. Let’s say, the signals coming from there are positive, but that applies specifically to the electoral system.

Inal Khashig: You mean the shift to a proportional system?

Tamaz Ketsba: Yes. But when it comes to redistributing presidential powers — that’s much more complicated. Parliament, on the contrary, holds the mirror-opposite position: they’re generally open to discussing the redistribution of powers but are strongly opposed to changing the electoral system. I want to stress that one doesn’t work without the other. You can’t just change the electoral system without changing the architecture of power. And vice versa; the current form of parliament simply can’t function effectively.

Inal Khashig: So, each side is rejecting the opposite half of the same project. The executive branch rejects the redistribution of powers, and parliament rejects the electoral reform. By the way, parliament is supposed to present its own draft prepared by the working group created under parliament, correct?

Tamaz Ketsba: Yes, several members of the Public Chamber, including myself, are part of that working group. We’re working on the power redistribution part of the project.

Inal Khashig: From what I’ve heard, the proposals of that working group are nearly identical to yours. Are the differences mostly in the details?

Tamaz Ketsba: The approaches are similar, but of course there are differences.

Inal Khashig: But conceptually, the documents are close?

Tamaz Ketsba: Yes, they’re close.

Inal Khashig: And yet you’re saying that most deputies are in favor of keeping the majoritarian system?

Tamaz Ketsba: As far as I know, yes.

Inal Khashig: And the working group, even though it’s under the parliament, operates independently of the parliament itself?

Tamaz Ketsba: Well, the group was created by parliament, but it includes lawyers and public figures — that is, people from outside the system.

Inal Khashig: But still, is the work being done independently?

Tamaz Ketsba: Formally it operates under the parliament’s umbrella.

Inal Khashig: But the final draft will be considered a parliamentary project?

Tamaz Ketsba: Yes, it will be submitted to parliament, and the latter will decide what to do with it.

Inal Khashig: But here’s the thing: if most deputies support the majoritarian system, will the working group take that into account when preparing the draft?

Tamaz Ketsba: We’ve agreed with the deputies in the working group to start discussing that issue. But there’s a chance the discussion won’t even happen, simply because some deputies in the group may not want to.

Inal Khashig: How many people are in the working group? Are there clear rules, procedures, voting?

Tamaz Ketsba: Yes, there are procedural rules.

Inal Khashig: Is voting included?

Tamaz Ketsba: Yes, at the end of the process there’s a vote on the final version of the document.

Inal Khashig: On what basis? Simple majority? Qualified majority?

Tamaz Ketsba: A simple majority of the working group members is enough for the project to be considered approved.

Inal Khashig: There are already old draft laws on constitutional reform in parliament from Khajimba’s time. Some even passed a first reading. Can they be brought back?

Tamaz Ketsba: Theoretically, yes. A draft law can sit dormant for a long time, but reviving it is a matter of political will. Sometimes deputies simply don’t want to go back to an old draft — either for personal reasons or political considerations. That’s the fate of many initiatives.

Inal Khashig: I remembered this because the project reached parliament then but wasn’t completed. Although procedure requires deadlines between the first and third readings, there was no strict discipline. Does the new project include some understanding that it must be completed? That it will definitely pass the first, second, and third readings?

Tamaz Ketsba: I think that the part we’re working on now, the redistribution of powers, will be brought to some logical conclusion. There are many compromises, of course, but we will finish the job. The question is the internal parliamentary process: how strictly they follow their own rules. Logically, the draft should at least go to a first reading. But deputies treat their internal procedures quite freely, so unfortunately it’s impossible to guarantee anything or speak more definitively.

Inal Khashig: But based on the work done so far, it seems logical — considering the next parliamentary elections are in two years, spring 2027, in March, if I’m not mistaken… Yes, yes… So the timing is tight. If we miss this window again, we’ll end up back at square one.

Tamaz Ketsba: We’ll follow the old pattern.

Inal Khashig: Yes. We’ll have to wait another five years. Then the question arises: if parliament delays consideration, can this be put to a referendum?

Tamaz Ketsba: Theoretically, yes.

Inal Khashig: Is that a real possibility?

Tamaz Ketsba: It is, but it’s difficult to do. You need to collect signatures, have a large group of organizers, and involve a significant number of people.

Inal Khashig: You’re involved both in the parliamentary commission and the Public Chamber. Is this option even being discussed? Or are you still counting on parliament to handle everything?

Tamaz Ketsba: So far we haven’t raised that question. The current task is to complete the issue of redistributing powers locally, to change the political landscape. Of course, among the participating jurists, the majority support the idea that all these processes should happen in parallel. But, as I said, the key players here are the deputies. We cannot force them to continue this work. If they say “stop,” the working group’s job will end. We are outsiders. Unfortunately, despite these problems being discussed for over 20 years, a critical mass is forming very slowly. Although the number of people who are starting to understand this, albeit slowly, is growing.

But this has not yet had a serious impact on the authorities. Mostly, it is representatives of civil society. Of course, we would like to hear arguments against our proposals, we would like public discussions: if you do not accept our proposals — tell us how you see the future? As you said in your last broadcast, we have gone through another crisis, as with every past five years. It is already unclear who you have to be not to realize the system does not work. But the logic of the authorities and those who do not want to change anything boils down to the fact that there was a bad president, then another bad one, a third… But now, they say, we have a successful president — and everything will be fixed. But that’s the talk of the naive. A normal society and a normal government must draw conclusions and learn lessons from what has happened.

Inal Hashig: That’s why we need to change the system — at least move from majoritarian to mixed. I would even introduce a party system. In the last elections the opposition candidate Ardzinba got 42% of the votes. Under the majoritarian system, that means the opposition can get almost half the votes but not elect a single candidate. The same 35 seats may go to people supporting the authorities, but they don’t reflect the entire political spectrum.

In a district, “their guy” might win just by promising water supply or pothole repairs. But he lacks a strategic vision, an understanding of the country’s development path. Meanwhile, the parliament does not reflect the political picture. That’s why they say the president has too much power to himself. But people forget: when the people storm the presidential palace, it happens against the backdrop of a pro-presidential parliament.

Tamaz Ketsba: Or — an ineffective one.

Inal Hashig: Yes. When there’s no balance. For example, on November 15, people came out not against the president, but to pressure parliament — so that it would not ratify the agreement. If people hadn’t come, it would have been quietly approved. Not because the deputies thought so themselves, but because they were dependent on the president. That’s why the parliament must be balanced. We know how the majoritarian system works: someone is nominated, given 5 million rubles — and that person becomes a deputy. That’s it. Their political career starts with a voting card. We have brought the system to absurdity.

We need the political system to be formed like education: school, university, graduate school — not sudden deputies without experience. And it’s important that the parliament reflect real political moods in society. Also, presidential power must share its authority. Because when the president pulls the blanket, he forgets he is only the president, not a king or a god. And it always ends in crisis. We must understand that we have two tools under one roof — the mixed system and redistribution of powers. This is not a “cure,” but a kind of therapy that prevents acute surgical intervention — another coup. It’s a healing process. And it would be strange if we again deprived ourselves of this chance.

Tamaz Ketsba: You said it right — balance. This is very important: there must be a formalized minority in parliament whose opinion will be heard. Then the majority will be forced to look around, engage in discussion, rather than make decisions blindly. Real competition for public support will appear. We are not talking about a coalition government like in some European countries. But what we propose will really balance the situation.

We propose concrete mechanisms to untangle conflict knots. Every time we grant parliament additional powers, it is a step toward resolving possible constitutional contradictions between branches of power. I would like politicians to think precisely about this: how to avoid conflicts and resolve issues constitutionally. It’s impossible to eliminate conflicts completely, but striving for peaceful resolution is necessary. Otherwise it will lead to acute crises.

Inal Hashig: I hope the major work done by the Public Chamber and the parliamentary working group will not be in vain. I hope our deputies, politicians, and political organizations will learn from historical experience and make the necessary adjustments. And do so urgently, since there are fewer than two years left until parliamentary elections. We need to hurry. Many thanks to our guest today.