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Elections in Abkhazia
Article originally published on the “Echo of the Caucasus” website. Text and terminology presented without changes. All rights belong to “Echo of the Caucasus.”
Publication date: January 6, 2025.
Author: Izida Chania
Election fever has begun in Abkhazia. Eight candidates are running in the presidential race, most of whom have been nominated by initiative groups. Only one candidate represents a party — Shamil Adzynba, the chairman of the People’s Party of Abkhazia (NPA). Let’s start with him.
Shamil Adzynba has a rich political biography. A former deputy prime minister, a veteran of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, and a Hero of Abkhazia, he’s not new to the election circuit. In 2011 he participated in a presidential campaign as a vice-presidential candidate alongside the current Foreign Minister, Sergey Shamba. In 2019, Adzynba ran independently and received just over 4% of the vote.
A year ago he took over as head of the NPA, which, following the resignation of the president and prime minister at the end of last year, proposed postponing the election for a year and implementing reforms. Adzynba called the early election a “political trap” and predicted another political crisis. Nevertheless, the party nominated him as its candidate.
Another potential candidate, Oleg Bartsits, was the first to announce his intention to run, even before the election process began. He positioned himself as a “third force” — an independent candidate — which was met with skepticism, even after he was dismissed from his position as Abkhazia’s trade representative. Bartsits is not a war hero, has lived in Moscow, has not taken part in the socio-political life of the country, and rarely voiced his positions — and only to Sputnik News.
The latter insists on his neutrality, but “the North remembers” that in 2019, he was a vice-presidential candidate alongside Alexander Ankvab’s protégé, Oleg Arshba. The Arshba-Bartsits ticket secured over 20% of the vote, mainly from family-based electorates.
In this election, Bartsits reinforced his unclear, non-military past by choosing war veteran Adgur Kakoba as his vice-presidential running mate. This team has a chance not only to take votes away from the opposition candidate, but also to make it to the second round. However, it is more likely that Oleg Bartsits is playing the role of a backup in case the official government candidate, Badri Gunba, fails. Yet there is also a possibility that he could overtake Gunba. After all, elections are unpredictable.
Robert Arshba is another “family candidate” backed by the authorities. Born in Tkuarchal, he is a war veteran who previously served as Minister of Labor and Social Development and headed the Audit Chamber. Like Bartsits, Robert Arshba has not been actively involved in the country’s political life, but he represents a prominent family. His campaign is likely being funded by Russian State Duma deputy and senior member of United Russia, Otari Arshba, whose assets are located in Georgia.
Former Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania awarded Otari Arshba the “Akhdz-Apsha” Order as soon as he came to power. The country’s highest order was presented to him by Vice President Badri Gunba at a picnic in Pitsunda. So there is no doubt that Robert Arshba is yet another pro-government backup candidate, whose role is to siphon votes away from the opposition.
Two initiative groups have nominated Adgur Khurkhumal and Beslan Kvitsinia as presidential candidates. These candidates perfectly fit the description of “good guys.” They are not widely known to the public — Khurkhumal is the chairman of the Black Sea Development Bank, while Kvitsinia lives in Sochi and works in construction. While Kvitsinia’s candidacy can be explained by his large family network, the motives behind Khurkhumal’s nomination remain a mystery.
One way or another, these “family” candidates are meant to serve as backups for the main government nominee, Badri Gunba, who undoubtedly has a strong chance of winning. Gunba became vice president as a protégé of Alexander Ankvab and has proven his loyalty to the complex power structure of the former president and ex-prime minister. He controls state resources and is running alongside an official who, like him, is a successor to “Bzhania’s cause” — Beslan Bigvava, the head of the Ochamchira district administration. In essence, Gunba is now the main guarantor for Russian business groups that are “developing” the country.
Moreover, Badri Gunba has his own assets in Abkhazia that require protection. His official assets are declared, while the unofficial are registered under proxies. According to independent sources, Gunba is one of the largest owners of cryptocurrency farms. During a severe energy crisis, he used his official position to personally persuade parliament members not to vote for a law banning mining — despite it being the main cause of the energy shortage. He also secured preferential Russian loans intended for Abkhaz entrepreneurs.
Gunba is a supporter of apartment development projects and the investment agreement that played a key role in the removal of Aslan Bzhania and Alexander Ankvab from office. He relies on government officials, the Armenian electorate of Abkhazia, and the dormant Armenian electorate in the Krasnodar region, which Aslan Bzhania “awakened” during the 2020 elections. Another significant pillar of his support is a “club” of corrupt officials, an influential electoral force. Given these factors, the chances of the Ankvab-Bzhania team regaining power through Badri Gunba are quite real.
Now the counterbalance: two opposition candidates are participating in the election.
Kan Kvarchia is a war veteran, a recipient of the Order of Lion, and has been awarded the Medal of Bravery. He has served as a deputy in the capital’s city council, was the mayor of Sukhumi, and is currently a member of the Abkhazian parliament. He also leads the radical opposition socio-political organization “Aidgylara.” In the 2020 elections, while serving as mayor of Sukhumi, Kan Kvarchia initially ran for office but withdrew his candidacy at the last moment before registration, opting out of the race.
Kan Kvarchia is known for the 33 questions he posed to the president over five years. He accused Aslan Bzhania of using the myth of his own poisoning during the 2020 election campaign and demanded that the prosecutor’s office investigate the alleged poisoning. Kvarchia opposed the construction of apartment complexes, the fence around parliament, the sale of real estate to foreigners, the legalization of cryptocurrency mining, and other unpopular government initiatives. His associates, who were “rocking the boat” of political stability, were arrested after the opposition rally in December 2022. His name was also mentioned in the Kozak-Bzhania protocol regarding the revocation of Russian citizenship. And it was he whom his parliamentary colleague Adgur Kharazia shot at in parliament on December 19.
A serious rivalry exists between the two opposition groups: Aidgylara, led by Kan Kvarchia, and the Abkhazian People’s Movement (AND), led by Adgur Ardzinba. Over the past five years, these two major opposition forces have had fundamental disagreements in both strategy and tactics, only uniting during periods of extreme national tension.
The leader of the AND, Adgur Ardzinba, is a former Minister of Economy and Vice Prime Minister in the Khajimba government. He ran in the 2020 elections, securing 35% of the vote. After the election, he founded the AND as a socio-political movement, advocating for constructive cooperation, reforms, and a roadmap for energy sector recovery.
Adgur Ardzinba has opposed key government initiatives, including the construction of apartments, the transfer of Pitsunda’s state dacha to Russia’s FSO, the sale of the energy system, the Abkhaz-Russian investment agreement, and electricity price hikes. However, until recently, he has rejected the forcible overthrow of the government. His speeches focus on holding the current administration accountable for the country’s decline, promising to launch criminal investigations into corruption. He has been fighting in court for three years against the prosecutor’s office, which has been stalling an investigation into embezzlement during the construction of the Achguara high-voltage power line.
The events leading to the removal of President Bzhania and Prime Minister Ankvab on November 15, 2024, were set in motion by the detention and beating of Adgur Ardzinba’s supporters by special forces after they attended a gathering in Gudauta. This crackdown became the catalyst of the early election now taking place.
The leader of AND is Badri Gunba’s main competitor in the 2025 elections. He is running alongside Alkhas Dzhindzhal, a doctor and a deputy of the sixth convocation of parliament, and it is against this ticket that the authorities have directed their main efforts. It is no surprise, then, that he has become the primary target of anonymous, government-funded media resources.
These eight candidates (so far only three have gathered enough signatures to qualify) are vying for the highest office in the country. Perhaps one of them will present a serious plan to overcome the deep crisis, fight corruption, and restore the economy. Perhaps one of them will be honest with the voters. But the question remains: is the electorate ready to listen, analyze, believe, and vote?
Since the 2020 elections, public distrust of the government has reached a high level. There is a strong chance that most of the protest electorate will refuse to participate in this campaign —one that already resembles a farce— thereby leaving the choice in the hands of those with a vested interest in corruption and the continued plundering of the country.
