Georgia’s turn towards Russia

The Georgian crisis is in full swing. Despite significant public opposition, the parliament has nonetheless passed the “Law on the Transparency of Foreign Influence.” Although President Salome Zurabishvili vetoed it, the chances of hindering the process are close to zero.

Simultaneously with the law’s passage, Tbilisi has begun altering its foreign policy course. Officially, the Georgian authorities have not yet renounced the European Union, but it is evident that pro-European rhetoric, if it is still heard, is part of a ritual that cannot be easily abandoned.

At the same time, the notion that “Georgian Dream” took such a risk of pivoting for the sake of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is increasingly taking on real contours. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze promises to peacefully restore the “territorial integrity of the country” by 2030.

Meanwhile, there is growing talk in the expert community about some agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi. According to this agreement, if Georgia becomes a friend of Russia, the Kremlin will assist in creating a confederation of Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.

Inal Khashig, editor of the newspaper “Chegemskaya Pravda,” discussed the Georgian crisis, Tbilisi’s changing course, the confederation project, and how Sukhumi should behave in these new geopolitical circumstances with historian and political scientist Astamur Tania.

Full text version:

Inal Khashig: Hello, and welcome to Chegemskaya Pravda. Today, we will once again discuss the ongoing confrontation in Georgia. Joining us is our regular expert, Astamur Tania.

What is the current balance of power in Georgia? The Georgian Parliament has passed a law on the transparency of foreign influence. President Salome Zurabishvili vetoed this law. Nevertheless, the Parliament will attempt to override this presidential veto in the coming days, and I believe they will succeed.

We have also discussed that the adoption of this law on foreign agents signals a significant political shift with all the ensuing consequences. There is tension between official Tbilisi and Brussels, Washington, and others. Such a change in direction requires special motivation.

We speculated that there might be an agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi that Moscow would support the creation of a sort of confederative state between Abkhazia, Georgia, and possibly South Ossetia.

This discourse has emerged in one way or another. The Georgian expert community is talking about it and finding confirmation through certain actions being taken. Russian expert circles are also discussing it. What are your thoughts on why all of this is happening in Georgia?

Astamur Tania: I said this last time as well. The Georgian Dream party is addressing its political objectives, the main one being to maintain its own power. Frankly, I don’t see the so-called pivot that is constantly mentioned in the information space and by Georgia’s Western partners, as well as from Tbilisi itself.

I believe it is more accurate to call it a freeze in further integration rather than a pivot. It is unlikely that Tbilisi will take any radical steps, such as entering into allied relations with Russia or starting integration processes with Russia. We need to understand the main characteristics here.

It seems to me that the underlying reason is that Georgian society is not ready for European integration. Overall, we see that the integration processes under the aegis of Europe are experiencing some tension. Not a crisis, but tension, including internal tension.

The European Union includes countries with differing political characteristics. We see that there are ideological differences between the old EU members, the so-called old Europe, and the countries of the former Eastern Bloc.

It was evident that there was a lag in the political development of these countries. They were at a different stage of economic and political development after the collapse of Soviet ideology. Nationalist ideology has taken a significant position there.

Of course, it is restrained by the fact that these countries are included in the framework of European integration, which forces them to follow certain rules of behavior developed by the old members. Nevertheless, we observe these excesses.

This is evident in Hungary, Slovakia, and, I think, in Poland as well. This is especially characteristic of post-Soviet states. We see that in post-Soviet countries, the degree of nationalism and particularism is much higher than in European states.

That is to say, they are not ready to part with the national ideology and mythology that have been formed over many years. And this is not easily resolved. A natural process needs to occur here. Even if we look at the comments made by our Georgian viewers about our show, we see that the level of nationalism is quite high in Georgia.

These are all conservative ideas—ideas of some grand Georgian statehood. Similarly, in Armenia, there was the idea of Greater Armenia. These are all myths. They exist in the current political space. Modern European political traditions have not yet become an integral part of the political traditions of Georgia and other post-Soviet countries.

That’s why the process of modernization according to Western principles is stalling there. These are deep-rooted processes. I have seen the comments on your ideas in social media. Some have said that the Georgian authorities are crazy and irrational. No, they know exactly what they want. They have a social base they rely on. They wouldn’t just recklessly rush into adopting this law. They are addressing their political goals and have political allies within Georgian society.

I think this is a topic for a much broader discussion, one that doesn’t fit within our show. It’s a discussion about which political ideas dominate in the post-Soviet space and in Eastern Europe. This is a subject for separate study. Now, let’s take a look at the confederation.

Inal Khashig: Let’s discuss the confederation for now. It’s not just about the unique mental characteristics of the Georgian people that don’t align with European standards There’s also a significant desire involved.

I believe the current geopolitical situation has a strong influence. Georgia hasn’t entirely shifted its focus towards Moscow, or the North, the shift seems to be happening through the East. Georgia seems to be adopting a model closer to what Azerbaijan represents today. Azerbaijan maintains a kind of neutral status, trying to play both sides while focusing on its own interests.

However, Azerbaijan has a strong ally in Turkey. Georgia lacks such a partnership. In this changing geopolitical landscape, Georgia also needs a senior partner or protector to guarantee its chosen path. Currently, Georgia emphasizes its own values and interests, but it’s clear that achieving this is very difficult. This raises the question of how feasible it is to maintain such a position in today’s world, in particular for Georgia.

Astamur Tania: We have touched on domestic political reasons. But given its geography, Georgia cannot ignore the presence of Russia nearby. This is a powerful factor, not only economically but also militarily. Therefore, Georgia cannot afford to be careless in this regard. Countries in our region are small. They cannot ignore Russia’s interests, including its military security interests.

So, it’s difficult to predict the future. I don’t think Western countries will form any military alliances involving Georgia. Overall, I believe Georgia has suffered noticeable reputational losses. It was portrayed as a beacon of democracy in the Caucasus, which was largely a PR image. Now, I think there will be a more realistic view of Georgia.

Of course, the period of disappointment and resentment we see in the media will pass. Eventually, there will be a more balanced perspective. The West cannot guarantee certain things for Georgia if it acts too abruptly. No one wants new lines of armed conflict, especially in peripheral regions like the South Caucasus.

We see that the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is moving towards resolution, albeit slowly. This region, the South Caucasus, will be under mixed influences. Regarding the discourse on confederative relations, it has indeed emerged. However, it should be seen as an informational discourse at this stage.

From a practical standpoint, a confederation involves mutual delegation of sovereignty to central authorities, albeit to a lesser extent than in a federation. Firstly, it involves mutual recognition of sovereignty and the delegation of powers. I think it’s too early to discuss the practical implementation of this model, but I don’t believe the discourse is entirely pointless.

It’s too soon to talk about specific political models because there could be various forms of integration in the South Caucasus, not only involving Abkhazia and Georgia but possibly Armenia and Azerbaijan as well. This is a distant prospect.

Our planning horizons are unfortunately quite short due to our relatively small size, weakness, and limited foreign policy capabilities. Currently, we could discuss restoring the negotiation format where conflict parties are involved and repealing the law on occupied territories.

This would provide a starting point to address practical issues needed by both Abkhazian and Georgian societies, such as trade, freedom of movement, and the rights and mobility of border populations. There are significant familial ties, energy, transportation, and communication issues that could be resolved independently of the so-called status and state-legal relations.

These issues were successfully addressed before 2008 because we had a mediation mechanism under the UN’s auspices, where we undertook certain obligations, and international organizations and mediators monitored their implementation.

This should be our immediate task to ease the situation between Abkhazia and Georgia and address these necessary issues legally. These are the immediate tasks we should focus on, as they are in our mutual interests.

Regarding the confederation, as I said before, I see this issue mainly in the realm of propaganda. However, we know well that propaganda also influences real politics.

Inal Khashig: The influence of this propagandist rhetoric on the development of events is evident. From Abkhazia, Sergei Shamba, the Executive Secretary of the Security Council, is the only official in Abkhazia who comments on these events.

Our president does not typically comment on such matters, and the foreign minister position has seen one departure with the new minister not yet fully in office. Therefore, Sergei Shamba acts as the spokesperson.

Regarding the confederation, he stated that such a situation does not exist in reality. However, he also mentioned that in a rapidly changing world, anything is possible, so to speak.

Renowned Russian political scientist Sergei Markedonov, who was in our studio last month, addressed the topic of confederation talks in his new article. He writes that for Moscow, the issue of Crimea is already completely resolved. However, Georgian-Abkhazian relations are a matter of agreements between Georgians and Abkhazians—a matter of goodwill and mutual agreements.

Markedonov writes that, in essence, Moscow says it will be as you agree. On the other hand, he also notes that if Georgia aligns itself with Moscow, a confederation is possible. He acknowledges that such a pivot has not yet occurred but notes movement in that direction. However, this requires certain guarantees.

Markedonov does not rule out that Moscow, in principle, might agree to such a deal. I’d quote him and immediately add that Moscow has many reasons to normalize relations with Tbilisi. Georgia has always been and remains one of the key points of the Greater Caucasus. It is not coincidental that the residence of the Russian governor was once in Tbilisi.

However, this path will not be traversed faster than it can be. And certainly not at the cost of generous advances without firm guarantees. As I understand it, Sergei Markedonov believes that Georgia must obtain solid guarantees to continue this pivot, which has already begun.

This pivot will reach a point that is convenient for Moscow. That is, for Moscow to engage in this negotiation regarding a confederation. How should our authorities participate in this process, considering that Moscow is discussing relations between Abkhazia and Georgia? On one hand, Moscow is our strategic partner. On the other hand, it is the guarantor of our security, and so on.

What actions should our authorities take in their relations with Moscow?

Astamur Tania: I’m generally not a proponent of sharp assessments like “a turn” or “a shift in the sphere of influence.” At the very least, I don’t think there will be a turn towards Russia in Georgia. On the other hand, Moscow can’t rely on having exclusive influence over Tbilisi. Tbilisi’s policy will be one of maneuvering.

Naturally, this maneuvering policy will include relationships with everyone, including discussions about relations with Abkhazia. In my opinion, our position should be defined by our legislation. We know that Moscow does not dictate Abkhazia’s agenda. This is evident in many ways.

On many issues, the position of Abkhaz leadership and society differs from Moscow’s. This is not about strategic policy, where they are aligned, but about important and sensitive domestic issues in Abkhazia. There is a contradiction here, which is natural because Abkhazia is not a mere appendage of Russia. It is a partner of Russia in the region, albeit a small one with limited capabilities.

Therefore, expecting an order from the Kremlin like “We’ve agreed with Tbilisi, so you must follow suit” is unrealistic. Everyone understands that this won’t happen. There is no mechanism to resolve issues in such a manner.

So, what can Moscow do? It can help create conditions for dialogue. But even Moscow cannot do this alone. There must be participation from the actors represented at the Geneva international platform. Tbilisi is not shifting into an exclusive sphere of Russian influence. Thus, there should be broad international participation in the resolution process. In my opinion, we should clearly advocate for the restoration of the negotiation platform and for the restoration of our status as a party to the conflict.

This was recognized at the UN level and by leading states in the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General, including Russia, the USA, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. They acknowledged Abkhazia as a party to the conflict, albeit an unrecognized state, but a legitimate subject in external policy in this region concerning conflict resolution.

We should strive for the repeal of the law on occupied territories. Because without this, without repealing this law, any negotiation process is, as we understand, impossible. Recognition of Abkhazia as a participant in the negotiation process is impossible without repealing this law.

We must propose a realistic agenda. Yes, it is clear that there is propaganda and a clash of global interests. But when it comes to implementing certain ideas, we should still discuss realistic matters. I believe we should advocate for this approach.

We have a position based on our legislation and our referendum. And there are a number of issues we are ready to address through diplomatic negotiations, through dialogue. We need to create space for this dialogue and implement confidence-building measures to avoid the risk of renewed armed conflict.

These issues can and must be resolved. This is the direction in which our foreign policy activity should develop.

Inal Khashig: So, you are suggesting a more active foreign policy and expanding our efforts beyond the Moscow-Sukhumi relationship, as has been the trend in recent years. We need to return to our previous level of activity and the broader engagement we had before 2008, when we were in dialogue with various international institutions and many key global powers.

At that time, we were very active, but now, essentially, there is none of that. In recent years, we have only been in dialogue with Russia, and not even at the representative level with others. On the other hand, I would like to return to the topic of confederation and discuss the Georgian society.

Previously, the approach was: Georgians are heading to Europe, to the EU, NATO, and necessarily with them are Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Restoration of territorial integrity was part of this package. This was a desire for both, but now, with the discussion of confederation, it’s clear that if this confederation is promised by Moscow, then nothing like this will happen.

We don’t know much. This discussion exists at an expert level. But if there is such a discussion, if this scenario is possible, and if Moscow and Tbilisi agree on something – then what? Georgia will have to forget about NATO, the EU, and so on. Because if Russia offers something, as Sergey Markedonov said, it will need solid guarantees to protect its interests.

Georgia is important. If this happens, Tbilisi will be required to fall within Russia’s sphere of influence and be a security zone for Russia. Naturally, NATO and possibly the EU don’t fit into this context, and further relations with them will end.

On the other hand, there are 30 years of propaganda, ideology, and the entire informational component. When the whole nation and political elite move toward the West, it leaves a mark. I think many, especially the youth participating in endless rallies and protests in Tbilisi, don’t see their future without Europe.

Thus, the situation for the Georgian Dream party could be quite unstable ahead of the parliamentary elections, and everything could change. Could the Georgians start discussing: either we move towards Europe, without our complexes about Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or we forget about Europe and move in this new direction?

Astamur Tania: I don’t think the issue is framed that way. Even if Georgia officially renounced Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it wouldn’t automatically mean joining Europe and NATO. The same dilemma would remain.

Vladislav Grigoryevich (Ardzinba) once said: we look to the West, and to us, Russia is in the West. What is Russia? It’s a major international player. Despite current propaganda, Russia is a European country. Russia long spoke of integrating with European countries, which was part of its official agenda, though that didn’t materialize. Now we see the current situation.

However, this doesn’t mean that in the long term, the US, EU countries, and others won’t consider the Russian factor. They will seek beneficial relations with Russia. Once a balance of power is reached in Ukraine and other areas, they will start negotiating.

Regardless of the situation in Ukraine, Russia remains an important factor due to its geographical and economic position between Europe and the West. Historically, Russia’s relationships with the West have varied. Post-Crimean War, alliances shifted, leading to a coalition with France and England, against whom it had fought.

This is what’s known as the Orchestra of European States. This dynamic continues because of Russia’s significant economic, political, and military mass. Ukraine cannot replace Russia for Europe and the US due to these objective factors. Long-term, we will see negotiations involving Russia.

We need to consider these conditions and shape our policy accordingly. Our priorities should be ьaintaining peace in our region and addressing our economic and social challenges to boost competitiveness.

This is becoming more difficult but is essential. We won’t be a major factor influencing these processes, but we must stay alert and act to avoid being trapped by them. The question of Georgia’s direction is much more complex than just Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It’s a matter of broader strategy.

The South Caucasus is a natural corridor from Central Asia to Europe and will function as such. Our goal should be to ensure that competing actors recognize the benefits of cooperation in the South Caucasus, making all communications work effectively, including those Armenia and Azerbaijan are negotiating.

We need to ensure our communication hub operates smoothly, even with conflicting political positions. How can we organize this? We must focus on these issues, proactively proposing ideas, and promoting them actively. Currently, information and real politics are closely intertwined.

Inal Khashig: One way or another, everything is in motion. Naturally, what is happening in Ukraine will have an impact on our region as well. However, it would be beneficial to have some plans. At the very least, I think it wouldn’t hurt to have our own vision and ideas.

As you said, we might be a small player in this game, but we still need to have our own perspective and scenarios for the future. Even better would be having some proposals. Yes, we could simply say that it’s impossible. That is also a position. But I don’t think it’s the best one for us.

Astamur Tania: First and foremost, we need to address the issue of apartments and the people.

Inal Khashig: From what I understand, this issue ranks somewhere around the thirtieth place for the current Abkhazian authorities, based on their actions and rhetoric. However, I hope they come to understand its importance.

The issues of apartments, energy, and so on are specific concerns. If they manage to resolve these and enact laws accordingly, it will all become devalued if the matter of the country’s sovereignty is lost. I will wrap up our program here. I remind you that today we talked about Georgia and Abkhazia. We discussed possible scenarios for future developments.

Our guest was Astamur Tania. You can watch us on the Chegemskaya Pravda channel. Follow Chegemskaya Pravda on Facebook. You can find us on the Chegemskaya Pravda newspaper website, where you can sometimes read transcripts of our discussions aired during this program.

You can also read my modest comments on the Telegram channel “Inal Khashig, Chegemskaya Pravda.” Goodbye and take care. See you next time.