Inal Khashig’s epilogue on the parliamentary elections in Georgia

In the past, people in Abkhazia were generally indifferent to who would come to power in Georgia, as all Georgian politicians and political forces were more or less the same when it came to resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. So, what difference did it make which party won, if they all looked at Abkhazia with hostility?

Nevertheless, the names of Georgian leaders — whether Eduard Shevardnadze or his successor Mikheil Saakashvili — were well-known in Abkhazia (in a sharply negative context), and for understandable reasons, Abkhaz society was interested in what was happening in Georgia.

The memory of the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-93 and the threat of revenge from Georgia hung over the unrecognized republic like Chekhov’s gun, which, once introduced, must eventually fire.

And it did, in 2008. Though this happened in South Ossetia, after which Russia recognized the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, assuming responsibility for their security.

From that moment, the conflict was “frozen,” Abkhazians ceased to fear a resumption of war, and their interest in Georgian politics gradually waned.

However, with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the situation changed again. Talks began about the possibility of Georgia opening a second front against Russia, which would once again endanger Abkhazia’s security.

Over the past two-plus years, the ruling party “Georgian Dream” has occasionally claimed that external forces are pressuring it to “unfreeze” conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As the parliamentary elections approached, the slogan “If ‘Dream’ loses, there will be war with Russia” became central in the party’s campaign rhetoric.

In Russia itself, as well as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this sentiment was echoed: yes, peace and stability in the region depend on the choice Georgians make in the October 26, 2024 elections.

Thus, for the first time, the Abkhaz government expressed a clear preference in terms of Georgian politics. The prevailing opinion was that if “Georgian Dream” won the election, Abkhazia could breathe easier—there would be no war in the near future.

And so, the “Dream” came true. In other words, it won. However, Abkhazia does not share the Kremlin’s unconditional satisfaction with this victory.

The increasingly warm relations between Moscow and Tbilisi are a cause of concern for Abkhaz society.

While the authorities do not voice this publicly, they fear that the warming of Russian-Georgian relations could reach a “temperature” that threatens Abkhazia’s sovereignty. Simply put, there is a concern that Russia, riding this wave of improved relations, might “hand over” Abkhazia to Georgia.

Especially since “restoring territorial integrity” is one of Georgian Dream’s main arguments for improving relations with Russia and a key election promise.

Inal Khashig’s epilogue on the parliamentary elections in Georgia