Interview with Paata Zakareishvili

The article was originally published on the “Echo of the Caucasus” website. The text and terminology of the article are presented unchanged. All rights belong to “Echo of the Caucasus.” Publication date: August 31, 2024

The crisis in relations between Abkhazia and Russia is deepening, and may even be coming to a head after reports on Abkhazian Telegram channels of a proposal by the president of the self-proclaimed republic, Aslan Bzhania, to strip those who criticize the law on parliamentary apartments of citizenship, as well as Moscow’s intention to stop funding Abkhazia if Bzhania’s promises are not fulfilled. The reasons and possible developments of these events are discussed with our guest of the week — former Georgian State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, Paata Zakareishvili.

The long-simmering conflict between Moscow and Sukhum seems close to boiling over, at least judging by what Abkhazian Telegram channels are saying: Moscow is threatening to cut off funding, and Aslan Bzhania is proposing to strip Russian citizenship from deputies who oppose the law on apartments. Are things about to boil over, or is it just the usual matter of leaks and behind-the-scenes wrangling?

I still think it’s the latter, because there is an upcoming election in Abkhazia in March, for the de facto president of Abkhazia, and his actions aren’t endearing to anyone — neither Abkhazian society nor Moscow. Consequently, everyone is pulling Aslan Bzhania in their direction, trying to make him act in accordance with various interests. He exhibits weakness by constantly trying to shift responsibility onto civil society, the opposition, and the deputies, always making excuses — on the one hand.

On the other hand, he wants to stay in power, and Moscow is using this to pressure Bzhania to at least fulfill all the commitments he made to Moscow back in 2020, when they signed the agreement or memorandum to harmonize Abkhazia’s legislation with that of the Russian Federation. It seems to me that this is a temporary phenomenon, a sort of test of Bzhania’s resolve to see if he is willing to do whatever it takes to remain in power.

What is Bzhania’s logic, if we track it from 2020 onwards? He made commitments, but after four years, nothing has been done. 

And things could have continued like this, but now the election is approaching. Moscow waited to raise these issues just before. It may even be blackmailing Bzhania, threatening that if he does not fulfill his commitments, Moscow could find another, more compliant person who would more effectively carry out these agreements.

But still Moscow wants, since Bzhania signed the text on harmonizing legislation, that he should fulfill all of it. Perhaps it hopes he will talk to the public and convince them that it is better to go along with this rather than forcing Moscow to take unpopular steps, such as limiting funding, for example.

But if Moscow goes down that path, I think it won’t gain anything. Abkhazian society might turn even more against Moscow, and the chance that Abkhazia will seek support elsewhere, in Europe perhaps, may increase, which I believe Moscow fears. Therefore, it’s more likely that Moscow is merely blackmailing Abkhazia and is not prepared to take decisive action; it wants to force society to accept Russian policies by threats alone.

And in Abkhazia, it’s likely that this is understood. Bzhania probably realizes that Abkhazia is as much needed by Russia as Russia needs Abkhazia. Whether this is the correct formula is another question, but losing Abkhazia would prevent Russia from achieving its geopolitical goals in the Black Sea for a long time, and might even result in losing Abkhazian sympathies, which would shift to other countries, such as Turkey, the European Union, and so on. I think Moscow is starting a game it does not want to play and is pushing things to the point of twisting Abkhazian arms.

What can Moscow do? Probably it can’t stop funding; everything mentioned in these leaks is likely not very realistic and seems more like blackmail. But what are the real levers of pressure — perhaps political rather than economic?

Well, the only somewhat effective lever is a change in leadership. That is, influencing the election, and Russia knows how to do this, not only in Abkhazia but even intervening in elections in quite serious, large countries…

But with little success.

There are various options and differing opinions. In any case, I think Russia is certainly not interested in reducing support. It can reduce support, and changing the leadership is something Moscow can do quite freely. It is likely that Moscow’s strength lies in the fact that these issues have started to come up right before the elections. They could have raised these issues a year earlier, but they didn’t; although such discussions always took place. 

Instead, it’s more likely that Moscow is sending a clear signal to Bzhania that he will not remain in his position — Moscow is likely using this to speculate and exert pressure. Abkhazian society does not like Bzhania, and they would gladly, so to speak, hand him over. Bzhania is between a rock and a hard place ⁠— Moscow and Abkhazian public opinion.

But anyone who comes after Bzhania will have to consider Bzhania’s experience. And who would Moscow back in that situation?

It’s hard to say at the moment, although some names could be mentioned, but I wouldn’t want that to come from Tbilisi. However, I think there are people in Abkhazia who would be willing to start everything afresh, especially among the opposition. Those who are in the opposition today were once in power, and they likely understand how to maneuver.

But it’s very difficult to imagine who might be willing to make concessions to Moscow, as that would be unacceptable in Abkhazia. The main thing is that someone needs to work with Abkhazian society who has some respect and, let’s say, trust.

The fact that such an important figure as [Sergey] Shamba was appointed Foreign Minister is not without reason. He has very good relations in Moscow, and he has authority and reputation in Abkhazia — I think his appointment before the election indicates… The position of Foreign Minister had been vacant for a long time, and I think there might be some consolidation or movement around Shamba.

He is unlikely to run for president, but perhaps he will become a leading figure in implementing some policies from Moscow. When he was a member of parliament, he was very clearly in favor of Russia and its support, even sometimes standing alone, meaning he was the most vocal pro-Russian voice in the parliament. I think a movement around Shamba could create a center that would satisfy Russia’s interests.

Nevertheless, if I understand you correctly, none of the potential alternative leaders in Abkhazia would agree to what even Bzhania ultimately did not — the law on apartments. Has Moscow already recognized the limits of its pressure on Sukhum? And if it has, what exactly is its goal if not the apartments?

Certainly the apartments are very important to Russia, but it is more crucial for Russia to keep Abkhazia under its influence, ensuring that Abkhazia does not stray too far. Thus the apartments would be an important bonus for Russia, but Russia controls Abkhazia not because of apartments but for reasons — security, strategic and geopolitical contexts, the Black Sea, NATO, relations with Georgia, and so on. So while apartments are an important issue, they are not decisive for Russia, much like Pitsunda and other matters.

In these strategic issues, Bzhania also does not fully satisfy Moscow?

Yes, of course. So I don’t think Moscow has an easy task at the moment. It needs to find someone who can address these issues or, if they cannot be resolved, find common ground with society so that the latter does not turn its back on Moscow — similar to what is happening now in Armenia, for example. Anti-Russian sentiments might also start to emerge in Abkhazian society.

Bzhania no longer has such resources; he is no longer trusted by Abkhazian society. A new person must be able to maintain Abkhazian trust in Russia. So it’s possible that Russia might pause at some point if it fails to advance the apartment issue, as long as Abkhazian society’s sympathies toward Russia are preserved. In my opinion, this is more important to Russia.

How significant are the risks for Moscow regarding a potential shift or estrangement of Abkhazia that you mention?

In reality, these risks are not as great as they might seem, but they do exist. Estrangement is already a risk. I don’t think the loss of Abkhazia is a real possibility, but losing trust within society would significantly damage Russia’s authority, as Russia is already losing influence in the Caucasus. Although we recently saw a meeting between Putin and Aliyev, I don’t think Azerbaijan is a pro-Russian state.

Azerbaijan is more pro-Turkish than pro-Russian, and with strong support from Turkey, Azerbaijan allows itself more flexibility in its relations with Russia. In Armenia there is unrest, and in Georgia, even though the Georgian Dream clearly shows some loyalty to Moscow, society, based on this loyalty, is becoming even more embittered against Russia. So Russia does not have a clear foothold in the Caucasus. If Abkhazia adds to this, it would be a problem.

And Moscow’s maneuvers with the Georgian Dream are also part of this Abkhazian game?

Yes, of course. It is a temporary maneuver. There will be an election in Georgia in October, so after October, Russia’s stance will likely change. But before the election, Russia will try to avoid giving the opposition any more reasons to intensify anti-Russian sentiment and criticism of Georgian Dream. Yes, this is part of Russia’s strategy towards the Caucasus, including Georgia, to avoid irritating Georgia. There is a popular view that Georgia is not irritating Moscow, but right now we are dealing with the fact that Moscow is trying not to irritate Georgia and ensure that the election will go as favorably as possible for Georgian Dream.

This is not necessarily to resolve the issue of Abkhazia — there is such an opinion in Tbilisi and Sukhum — but to maintain a government in Georgia that is more or less loyal to Russia. It may not be pro-Russian, but it is definitely anti-Western. If Georgia remains outside the European sphere, it will be easier for Moscow to build relationships with Georgia and Abkhazia, creating myths, illusions, and offering various incentives…

These issues will not be resolved fundamentally. Some say there might be a confederative arrangement — no, Moscow might ease its stance a bit, open some Georgian schools, or open some checkpoints, thus creating a myth that Moscow is helping Georgia find common ground with the Abkhaz and Ossetians. Through soft power, Moscow could win over, so to speak, the hearts of Georgians if the Georgian Dream remains in power.

In other words, the Abkhazian and Georgian issues have, in a way, aligned and resonated with Moscow in this situation?

Yes, they have aligned. The Abkhaz are very afraid that friendship between Tbilisi and Moscow might turn against them, that Moscow might start compromising on Abkhazia. It is unlikely that Moscow will start giving up on Abkhazia, but it might ask Sukhum to make some concessions towards Georgia. For example, more rights for the residents of the Gali district, opening some checkpoints to allow the population to move more safely and freely, and providing better protection for the Georgian language in the Gali district… As for threats that Moscow might start compromising on Abkhazia, I don’t believe it. This is a very important territory for Russia; it is a key part of the geopolitical context.

And the Abkhaz people will not tolerate that; in fact, it would lead to a confrontation with Russia. If it is imposed that “now you will carefully start moving towards Georgia,” I don’t think anyone in Abkhazia would appreciate that. It won’t be the apartments or the Pitsunda dacha that triggers this, but rather movement or pressure towards Georgia.

This is something Abkhazia will most likely not tolerate. They might find common ground with Georgia on their own if they wished, but certainly not with Russia’s help. And Russia won’t be able to pressure Abkhazia over Georgia. Russia might still pressure Abkhazia over the apartments or Pitsunda, but not over Georgia.

And the theme of Russia betraying Abkhazia is just as much a political ploy as the idea of returning Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia is in Tbilisi…

Yes, it’s all speculation.

Returning to the beginning of our conversation, we agreed that the threats voiced by Abkhazian Telegram channels are more about internal maneuvering and election tactics, and that punitive measures are likely a form of blackmail. However, we see that South Ossetia is stripping Russian citizenship from deputies, and there is open economic pressure on Tskhinvali. Why can’t Moscow do the same with Sukhum?

That’s a very serious question. I think South Ossetia doesn’t have, let’s say, a significant protest drive. Most of the intellectual forces in South Ossetia have left for Russia, at least definitely for North Ossetia, and they are pursuing their plans there.

In Abkhazia, all the Abkhazian national projects are confined to a single space, within the territory of Abkhazia, and there are quite strong protest actions there. I think Russia is afraid of what it does not fear in South Ossetia. In South Ossetia, there is no one to go out onto the streets or to oppose Russia; there are only internal disputes, with no visible anti-Russian sentiment — they are only fighting among themselves, and Russia does not act as a party in the conflict. Russia will act as a mediator, able to separate them in a critical moment.