Interview with Sergey Markedonov

In an interview with renowned Russian political scientist Sergey Markedonov, host Inal Khashig discussed the most pressing issues of the post-Soviet space and the Caucasus, including Russian-Abkhaz relations and Georgia’s “foreign agents” law.

Is the idea of Abkhazia joining the Union State a myth or reality? Why did Georgian Dream need a foreign agents law? These questions, along with the alignment of interests among major players in the South Caucasus, were the main topics of discussion.

Text of interview:

Inal Khashig: Hello, welcome to Chegemskaya Pravda. It’s been a while since we’ve talked about geopolitics, and now we have a great opportunity to discuss this topic more specifically, deeply, and professionally. Today we have with us renowned Russian expert Sergey Markedonov, who is probably one of the best specialists on the post-Soviet space. I’ve known him for a long time ⁠— twenty years ago we started publishing Sergey’s articles in our newspaper, Chegemskaya Pravda. Sergey, hello.

Sergey Markedonov: Hello.

“Without Russian investments and globalization through Russia, Abkhazia will remain stuck in this state.”

Inal Khashig: Sergey, I understand that it’s evening for you. I’ll start right away. In recent years, in Abkhazia’s domestic political rhetoric, the topic of Russian-Abkhaz relations has practically overshadowed everything else. In other words, there’s not much talk about reforms or fighting corruption anymore. These usual topics are now more about Russia, agreements like the transfer of the Pitsunda estate, the adoption of apartment laws, and the draft law on foreign agents.

There are many discussions, disputes, and accusations, including de-nationalization of the energy sector. And all this, of course, is very painful. These issues are also very painful for us. How important is it for Moscow that issues here are resolved?

Sergey Markedonov: Since you have been reading me, as you said, for twenty years, not just reading but familiarizing yourself, and we discuss many things in real time, these arguments probably won’t be a revelation for you. But, many listeners and viewers don’t follow what I write and say so closely. They might find it interesting. If you remember, back in 2000, when Moscow recognized Abkhazia’s independence on August 26th. In principle, soon we will observe another anniversary of this date. I wrote and said that the agenda in Abkhazia would change.

The Abkhazia that we knew from the ‘90s, even from the late ‘80s — an Abkhazia fighting for self-determination from Georgia, not just abstract self-determination but specifically national self-determination outside the Georgian national project — that Abkhazia will change. The old agenda will fade away, new things will appear, including those related to Russia. Because the old problems, conflicts, including deaths during the period of hostilities, will become part of history, they will be remembered. And undoubtedly, this will be an important element of Abkhaz identity.

But the Russian factor is fundamental. Russia will play the role of a guarantor in terms of security. I hope the word isn’t offensive. When I speak of Russia as a security guarantor or patron, from a security standpoint, it’s not meant offensively. Many countries, many states with far more recognitions or UN memberships employ such a model, starting from Georgia and NATO. Other examples can be cited. Thus, Russia is also a country that helps and ensures the restoration of Abkhazia. Much has been done during this time, which ensures a certain social level, one way or another, through pensions and so on.

And of course, certain questions arise here, they cannot but arise. I immediately want to invite everyone to such a, you know, calm, objective understanding of the problem. I know that in Abkhazia people are very passionate — both those who support the government and those in opposition. There are many interesting points here, I would say, interesting for researchers. First of all, there’s asymmetry in perception. Just as you rightly mentioned, we view Russia in a certain way. Many things for us are tied to Russia.

It’s our ally, our, so to speak, guarantor, and so on. And our lives depend on many aspects of it. Of course, in Russia, Abkhazia is perceived differently. Abkhazia is not the top priority on Russia’s agenda. Even, I would say, in the Caucasus agenda, it’s not the top priority, because there are certain complexities now. As you know, on the Armenian front, there’s a somewhat paused situation with Georgia ahead of parliamentary elections, and so on. And Abkhazia is generally considered a loyal republic.

Moscow does not see significant threats here, perhaps. And in the face of major threats, the confrontation with the West, which continues and even intensifies, the Ukrainian conflict is undoubtedly paramount. There are issues of external policy diversification, the search for new partners due to sanctions, and so on. Of course, the Abkhaz issue is not first or second, or even fifth. Again, this is not to offend; this is a statement of fact. So many issues that arise in Abkhazia, especially on the internal agenda, are of interest primarily to specialists.

These are either experts who deal with this topic, or diplomats who oversee one direction or another. They are directly or indirectly involved in these processes. The issues you mentioned related to legislative initiatives and property problems are systemic in nature. They concern the broader path of Abkhazia. The goal was set after recognition, after, so to speak, confirmation by a limited number of independence recognitions. The goal was to be outside the Georgian project. It has been achieved. What next? And this is not an easy question.

So here, Abkhaz elites have become owners of quite important assets. Here, 225 kilometers of coastline. This is such an important strategic segment of the Black Sea. The Black Sea region has always attracted the attention of people from all over. You can delve into antiquity, or confine yourself to the 19th century. Russia, Ottoman Empire, Britain, naturally. Then, with the Soviet Union, there was some political modernization, but with its collapse, different countries again began to look at this area.

And here arises the question — will we hold onto this, build such a river model?[1]  But this is hardly possible, because Abkhaz society is politicized. Besides Abkhaz, there are Armenians, Russians… How to harmonize all this? But there is also the environment. Abkhazia is not in a vacuum. If the issue of status with Georgia is not resolved, yes, there is no open conflict, but there is no significant diplomatic progress. What format do we have? Geneva consultations. Everyone criticizes them.

From my point of view, they have a certain utility. But as Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko said, it’s better to negotiate for ten years than to have one year of war, it’s better to negotiate. At least experienced diplomats can extract understanding in any round of consultations from the opposite side.

But overall, there is no full-fledged communication with Georgia or economic contacts there. What can be recalled there about cross-border trade? But this is a gray area. So Russia remains as the most important outlet, right? And, naturally, the question arises about the need for more, perhaps, active participation of Russia in investment. Because initial capital accumulation is needed, whether welcome or not—since Marx’s time, few have come up with anything else. Either it’s subsidies, or it’s investments. Subsidies are what is needed to eat.

It’s when you are given fish, but it’s better to have a fishing rod, investment presence. And old wounds, old phobias arise. Perhaps in Moscow, they may seem insignificant. Well, of course, with investments, projects, Russia is not going to colonize anyone there, impose the spirit of the white man, or whatever. What seems obvious in Moscow, yes, we are not going to do that. Playing the role of imperialists in a society that suffered from war, from a heavy war.

We often, again, talk about the wars of the 90s, sometimes it seems to us that we should close this topic, but it doesn’t go away because Abkhazia lost 3% of its population, a lot for a small nation. When I spoke to American audiences, I say — imagine, the losses of the Abkhaz are roughly comparable to the losses that the States suffered in the Civil War. And in all the wars that Americans fought, they lost less than in one civil war.

In Russia there are also ethnic Georgians, and they also have Russian passports. We cannot say that citizen Chivadze has fewer rights than citizen Ivanov, we cannot — equal rights and so on. What if there is Georgianization through the Russian vector? A moment associated with whether we will be a majority or not—called in your literature a curse of 17 percent, people understand what I’m talking about.

In Abkhazia they understand, in Russia they don’t understand, again, because only a limited number of people understand. Asymmetry of perception, I repeat, is a systemic problem. Russia absolutely has what is called “its reasons” and its own truth. When we talk about allocating funds, if we provide subsidies, loans, investments, then we must also claim something in return ⁠— this is like an alphabet, it’s not Russia, it’s not Bush’s invention. Any other example would roughly be constructed this way. There is a different logic. And there are its reasons and its own truth.

There are some ethnic features, there are our historical features. We want maximum transparency, we want maximum accuracy in this, even our phobias taken into account, they need to be worked with somehow. It seems to me that if it is possible to find these approaches and harmonize these approaches, the need for Russia’s involvement and the need for investments, if convenient a certain globalization, through Russia again, because without it this will not work. Without this, Abkhazia will be stuck.

In many countries there is a struggle of geopolitical vectors. There is my colleague, now he is a big man in the Moldovan government, now we do not communicate so much. He said we have competition not of political parties, but of geopolitical parties. There is a certain reason for this. Part of the party says we need to go with the West, part says we need to go with Russia. In Abkhazia this is not the case.

I understand that sometimes the term “anti-Russian forces” is used for instrumental purposes. But in reality, if we listen to any representative of power, it’s clear they will support Russia. But the opposition too. I have also talked with oppositionists and so on. They say without Russia where would we be, we would not have been able to get by without Russia.

And here’s another important feature that I want to mention. Abkhazia is a republic with a very high level, with a high level of competitive politics. Many recognized countries may envy the level of democratization in Abkhazia. There is no great distance between the authorities and ordinary people. It’s quite easy to enter the reception of the top officials here in principle.

“Those who protested against the document between Abkhazia and Russia in 2014 are now effectively in power.”

Sergey Markedonov: Here power is very close, it is accessible and here it happens. I call this the turnover of power and opposition in nature, in Abkhazia, more precisely, when many people who are now in opposition, when they were in power and promoted; you can recall, for example, the document of interaction and partnership between Abkhazia and Russia. Even terminologically it differs from a similar document in South Ossetia, and its adoption was more difficult. And there were moments of protests.

Now those people who protested back then are effectively in power today. They talk about the need to resolve property issues, so to speak, taking into account Russia’s special interest, right? And those people who were in power are now in opposition today, they criticize the authorities for the same thing in principle. You can recall another story, a famous story, a long-playing story in Abkhazian politics – the Gal district. How should the Georgian population, or as they call it, the Mingrelian population, vote? What rights in terms of citizenship and so on. The level of integration…

If there weren’t maybe 1000 people there. It’s a significant problem again. Again a lot. What if there’s an imbalance? What if it’s the curse of 17%? Often when authorities advocate solving the integration issue, the opposition says no, categorically. Then they change places, and in general, the same rhetoric. Yesterday’s opposition now in power says we must. And those who yesterday said we must, now say we mustn’t.

Inal Khashig: Sergey, I would like to discuss another aspect now. The thesis of a union state is quite often expressed in the rhetoric of our politicians. It has become more relevant in the last two and a half years, with events in Ukraine and so on. But, in general, there is no further development beyond a certain point. Russian politicians also periodically mentioned this thesis before, it was present before. Let’s include Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and so on, in the union state. But that was, so to speak, perhaps before the Ukrainian events. Now, in general, there’s none of that. To what extent does this idea exist, let’s say, in the Kremlin offices?

Sergey Markedonov: Well, I completely agree right away with the thesis that the Ukrainian situation, the transformation, let’s say, of the Ukrainian military-political crisis into a CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Because I don’t believe it all started in 2022, the situation is much earlier, not even April 2014, when the so-called ATO [Anti-Terrorist Operation] was declared by Ukrainians in Donbass, but the events of Euromaidan… This is a systemic thing. That is, the crisis that evolved into a CIS has influenced many strategies.

In particular, I would note that Russian policy and Western policy have also become more holistic. It has become less about nuance. Earlier, we had a mechanism of Western, let’s call it competitive cooperation. That is, it did not align with Abkhazia. Moreover, there was a time when the US Congress, in 2011, with a decision by Republicans and Democrats, recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as occupied territories. And, for example, on the Karabakh settlement, the OSCE Minsk Group worked, despite 2014.

Now Westerners are already forgetting that, for example, the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020 was also supported by Western countries. This no longer looks like science fiction. But when the Brussels format of negotiations on the Karabakh settlement was launched twice, I followed it, and Macron and Michel called Putin and tried to harness Russian participation with the Brussels format. Now there is no such selective competitive partnership, you know. There is an understanding of the threat. They say that Russia is a threat to Europe. We say that the West is a threat to overall Russian strategy, to Russian existence.

The desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia is simply an open challenge, and Moscow is resisting this in every way. So issues are now perceived, perhaps, with more emotion, with more suspicion. If earlier they tried to delve into these nuances, now perhaps they delve into them less. This is neither good nor bad. I’m not implying that I’m ready to accuse anyone of anything right now.

“The union state depends on Belarus, not only on Russia.”

As an expert, these are the realities one has to act within, to work within. Yes, the intensity of these emotions here is greater, it’s higher. Regarding the Union State, well, much depends not just on Moscow. It’s the union state of Russia and Belarus.

From time to time, there have been discussions about expanding this platform. Here again, I recall Moldova in the year 2000, when Vladimir Voronin came to power, and openly they said that Moldova would become the third country. Now this is very far from reality. Over twenty years, too much has changed. This is not the reality. Much depends on the leadership of Belarus. Speaking of Belarus, among the countries not just in the CIS, but even in the CSTO, Belarus probably behaved the most pro-Russian. That is, territory was provided, including for military infrastructure, and support for Russia on the foreign policy vector is being given, and sanctions are imposed on both Russians and Belarussians.

And this, by the way, is also reinforcement of a negative basis of identity. Sanctions are imposed together. And indeed, the idea may arise that Russia and Belarus have come closer, closer than ever. And perhaps now a window of opportunity will open for Abkhazia or South Ossetia. But Minsk is not in a hurry. Yes, we know such a tactic, very cautious of Alexander Grigorievich [Lukashenko]. Again, his relations with Abkhazia have seriously improved and progressed. Well, it wasn’t like that before, correct me if I’m wrong. For him to come to Abkhazia personally, not to send some parliamentary delegation there, but to come himself.

The same goes for representatives from Abkhazia. As far as I understand, Aslan Georgievich was also in Minsk, and they met. He neither signs nor pronounces and preserves a certain maneuvering space. This is indeed a political equilibrium of the highest class, but nonetheless, it is happening. Why again? There are quite pragmatic reasons here as well. Having come to Abkhazia, he made sure to state that this does not mean I am not friends with Georgia. This reservation was made immediately.

Georgia is an important partner in terms of trade; Belarusian products are exported thither. It’s a specific business and so on. There’s nothing personal here. The desire to preserve some maneuvering space, to raise one’s own capitalization, and so on. But the idea of a union state itself, not as a state like the Soviet Union was a state, but rather a confederative formation ⁠— as far as I know, it is popular in Abkhazia, they talk about this idea.

Of course, there are those who say not a bit of sovereignty. And did not fight for it and so on, and so forth. But emphasizing that even those who advocate, well, conditionally, a national-patriotic position, they said that the Russian vector is not needed for us. Again, I repeat, there is no struggle of geopolitical vectors here. Well, you might say okay, maybe in five years. We’ll talk about it then. Yes, it will be a subject for discussion. But for now, I see an attempt, so to speak, to fight for the Russian vector. Because the same opposition group People and Portraits of Putin support and vote. And there were calls to vote specifically for the current president. So, I don’t see such anti-Russian sentiment here.

Inal Khashig : Touching upon this topic of the post-Soviet space, of course, it concerns us greatly. Lukashenko mentioned that he doesn’t want to have excellent relations with Georgia. That is, he also invisibly sets his own flags there, in general, in relations with Abkhazia. We are establishing cultural relations. But as for recognition, in general, he implies we shouldn’t expect it yet.

But meanwhile, relations with Georgia. This vector of improving relations, it has been evident for the past two or three years for sure. And now, when Tbilisi positions itself as such, its neutral position on the issue, on the problem that is happening now between Russia and the West, Ukraine, and so on, as much as possible. And in Abkhaz society, of course, questions arise. Moscow’s relations with Tbilisi are all very good. That is, the vector is moving normally.

And there’s always a suspicion that they may negotiate behind our backs. Especially since our position has become less active in the negotiating process. At the Geneva discussions, we were quiet, and they were already limp, and now there is such a feeling that the authorities are trying too hard to conserve all this, all this process. And, naturally, there are some thoughts we, we are a small society, we have a lot of everything. And now the law on foreign agents passed in Tbilisi. It’s called something else, but nonetheless, it doesn’t change the essence, a law on the transparency of foreign influence.

Moreover, everything happens very dramatically and this is not a surprise for Georgian Dream, nor for Ivanishvili in particular. They have parliamentary elections there in the fall, and the opposition is fragmented. And now protests, huge protest rallies and it’s not very clear why.

I know many Georgian experts, and they themselves are also surprised. I mean, the motivations behind launching this bill now, it will be in the first reading in late April, in the second and in mid-May the third reading. A prolonged destabilization of the situation is actually guaranteed. And now these rallies are taking place, and I also somehow think why? And there are a lot of various conversations, secretive ones, where something about confederation is leaked and so on.

That is, again, including how it was leaked recently, a month ago, when there was a vice premier, vice speaker Volsky meeting with a Russian businessman of Georgian origin, Khidasheli. Where he talked about how some consultations, some negotiations are going on. Including the confederation. That is, too many components are there which almost directly hint that, in principle, all these maneuvers. All these problems, in general, are connected with what they promised us about Abkhazia. These are my thoughts.

“Georgian society is very polarized.”

Sergey Markedonov: Well, not just your thoughts. I’ll start from afar, then I’ll focus on this Georgian knot of problems. Yesterday I spoke at Abkhaz State University. A joint project is being launched between ASU and MGIMO, my university. Soon, I hope, our rector Anatoly Vasilyevich Torkunov will be here, and today they should record his address on this matter. The hall was full, and a large part of the republic’s leadership attended the lecture, along with a full hall of students.

And there was one girl who asked a question similar to how you formulated it just now. Well, not as detailed, of course, very briefly. She asked, “If Russia and Georgia reconcile, or if there’s a process of increasing cooperation, will it be bad for Abkhazia?” I said, “You know, if someone does reconcile, it’s unlikely to be bad. If Russia and Georgia find some common ground, I don’t think Abkhazia will be among the losers. It’s more of a zero-sum thought. But we need to move away from this, otherwise I’m afraid we won’t achieve any reconciliation on a broader scale.”

But a few important theses that you outlined. First, I would argue that everything is fine, you see, everything is fine. For Tbilisi and Moscow, the normalization process that was launched, it was launched with the advent, quite rightly, of Georgian Dream. And not yesterday, nor today, after in 2012 Ivanishvili and then a conglomerate of different opposition forces won the elections, displaced the United National Movement, normalization began. It was called Normalization. I apologize. The Georgian side talked about it. With red lines, red lines were marked – these were the statuses of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

NATO is also something that generally doesn’t sit well with Russia. To say that this process is progressing linearly, no, it can’t be said. One can recall the events of 2019, the so-called Gavrilov’s Night. What is the danger of the current situation? The fact that there are oppositional sentiments. Georgia is, in general, a rebellious country. Speaking of post-Soviet Georgia, it began with protests. We can recall April 9, 1989, and so on. All these protests were initially for Gamsakhurdia, then against his overthrow, then against Shevardnadze, and later against Shevardnadze himself. There was even a civil war within Georgia.

So, society is very polarized. It’s not for nothing that April 22 is the birthday of the leader of the world proletariat. Vladimir Ilyich once said that the main thing is not numerical superiority in general, but numerical superiority in the capitals. In the capitals it’s mainly the youth, the youth who may not even be associated with the United National Movement. It’s a new generation, which we might like or not, but it’s a post-Soviet generation, little connected with the Soviet Union in general.

Because the older generation, when I arrived in Tbilisi, there was always a story from the taxi driver that he had definitely served in the Moscow suburbs, and he had had a Russian girlfriend. Almost nine out of ten served in the Moscow suburbs. “You guys are cool. Of course, it would be good to give Abkhazia away, but otherwise everything is great.” This new generation doesn’t reason like that anymore. You could say their minds have been manipulated. This is partly true.

Inal Khashig: By the way, he hardly speaks Russian at all.

Sergey Markedonov: But that’s absolutely right. And it’s something Russia isn’t happy with either. To say that this process is proceeding linearly, no, you can’t. We can recall the events of 2019, the so-called Gavrilov’s Night. What is the danger of the current situation? The fact that there are oppositional sentiments. Georgia is generally a rebellious country. Speaking of post-Soviet Georgia, it all began with protests. We can recall April 9, 1989, and so on. All these protests were initially for Gamsakhurdia, then against his overthrow, then against Shevardnadze, and later, against Shevardnadze himself. There was even a civil war within Georgia.

In other words, society is very polarized. It’s not for nothing that April 22 is the birthday of the leader of the world proletariat. Vladimir Ilyich once said that the main thing is not the numerical superiority in general, but the numerical superiority in the capitals. In the capitals, it’s mainly the youth, the youth who may not even be associated with the United National Movement. It’s a new generation, which we might like or not, but it’s a post-Soviet generation, little connected with the Soviet Union in general.

Because the older generation, when I arrived in Tbilisi, there was always a story from the taxi driver that he had definitely served in the Moscow suburbs, and he had a Russian girlfriend. Almost nine out of ten served in the Moscow suburbs. “You guys are cool. Of course, it would be good to give Abkhazia away, but otherwise everything is great.” This new generation doesn’t reason like that anymore. You could say their minds have been manipulated. This is partly true.

Inal Khashig: And they hardly speak Russian, by the way.

Sergey Markedonov: Absolutely right. And they don’t understand Russia. You see? Like Givi, who drove me around there twenty years ago, he served there somewhere, I don’t know, in Fryazino or somewhere else, I don’t know, near Abramtsevo, he remembers something – for them, Fryazino, Abramtsevo, it’s something incomprehensible. A few years ago, there was a program along the lines of the Gorchakov Foundation, Russian-Georgian dialogue. I saw young Georgians myself who were afraid to enter the metro. For some reason, they believe that someone will be beaten immediately in Moscow, that there are gangs with knives there, bears with gypsies. I don’t know what, but there was a certain fear when they went down into the metro. They said, “Wow, this is so cool!”

It turns out, you have good public transport, infrastructure, and overall it’s great. And they took someone to Suzdal, they opened Russia up for themselves. Given that there is a certain vector, a givenness, and familiarity with a certain information space, Russia is perceived more with a negative undertone. The law you mentioned, the law on transparency of foreign influence or external influence, it’s translated differently. After all, it’s not a calque of the Russian law. To be precise, in Russia they always tend to catch up with the Americans in everything. The Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1938 does not exist here.

In 2018, there was a law in Australia called the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme. That is, a transparency scheme pertaining to foreign influence. It is assumed that a company or non-governmental organization receiving some foreign funding must register. This doesn’t mean political stigmatization, that they are enemies, but it’s an obligation to show their sources. Open your pockets, why are you doing this? This is politics. Do you have political intentions or intentions in the humanitarian sphere? Well, show us – why does Georgian Dream do this? Is it logical or not?

One must understand Ivanishvili’s logic. Ivanishvili, who fought against Saakashvili for a whole month, a whole year, I apologize. And there were various difficulties. Ivanishvili had his own source of financing, he came to power, not very dependent on government finance. He was sort of on the opposite side. They even wanted to strip him of Georgian citizenship. All these things happened. And as I imagine in the logic of such a businessman, he wants to eliminate competition, immediately monopolize the space, create a cartel conspiracy.

To say that everything is simple in relations with Moscow, I won’t say, because well, have NATO or European priorities been removed? Officially, no. I’ll go further to say that the second attempt was made in the promotion of the bill, the first was last year. By the way, Georgian Dream didn’t introduce it first. There is a movement called the Power of the People, it split from Georgian Dream. These are the same dreamers, but they could criticize the US ambassador more, not Ivanishvili.

They could criticize the West more. They introduced this bill, it was blocked, the first reading passed, then there were rallies and it was removed. In December, the European Union decided to grant Georgia candidate status. And we know that admitting mistakes is not the best quality for the European Union. The well-known British political scientist Richard Sakwa talks about such democratization. There was scientific communism, there is such scientific democratization in Western countries, in the EU.

“The Georgian Dream, through this law, solves its tasks – prolonging its stay in power, minimizing and discrediting the opposition.”

They’ve supposedly accepted that it was our mistake, so now it turns out that Russia is the beneficiary, and that can’t be. I’ve said that this holistic approach of theirs has increased. Catching onto this drive, look, we already have candidate status, we are progressing. But let’s try to solve the internal problem first and foremost.

Because the law on foreign influence isn’t about Ivanishvili and company’s love for Russia, or their love for Putin. That’s not the issue. They are purely solving their own tasks – prolonging their stay in power, minimizing and discrediting the opposition, demonstrating that without Western support, the opposition is nothing. In reality no one stands behind it, and nothing stands behind it, no one supports it.

That’s essentially the set of tasks. Now, let’s take the scenario where protesting dies down. Interestingly, the people who protest and criticize in Tbilisi often aren’t even connected to the National Movement. It’s just a new generation. They have a lot of grievances against it. Those who see the situation somewhat differently. And by the way, a couple of days ago, it was interesting to hear the statement from the leader of the Georgian Dream party and former Prime Minister in the recent past, Irakli Garibashvili, who said that the youth, in their heartfelt way, are speaking out, we understand this dissatisfaction. Whereas all these party members are professionals, a sort of collective Saakashvili, so to speak, ready with their truncheons if needed.

They didn’t say it outright. They hinted that if you violate the law, politicize all these things, there will be repercussions. Such a more than transparent hint was made. In other words, an attempt to somehow divide things in a certain way. If we look at the first wave of normalization, there was Borjomi, wine, citrus fruits sent to the Russian market, our tourists traveled, there was air traffic, and everything seemed to be going fine. What did the Night of Gavrilov lead to?

The opposition started saying that the pro-Russian authorities, in order to say no, look, we are actually patriots, began spinning the patriotic wheel, allowing themselves Russophobic statements, and rolled everything back. Yes, air traffic was suspended, now it’s been restored. Last year, Georgia was removed from the list of unfriendly countries. Georgia began stating that it’s not ready to support all sanctions against Russia, that it doesn’t want to open a second front, and so on.

“To quote Putin ⁠—  ‘If Abkhazian leaders and Georgians ever agree on something, then maybe…’ “

And we say yes, take Abkhazia, right? We invested in it, strengthened it, developed it. But now, when it’s not necessary. That is, we won’t achieve any priorities there either, so to speak, we won’t achieve any privileges. And here already the people who believed it, it turns out, we’ll push them away. So I don’t think such constructions have any grounds. To quote Putin, he said, “If Abkhazian leaders and Georgians ever agree on something, then maybe.”

If the issue of Crimea is closed from Moscow’s point of view, this topic is no longer discussed in public. So here such variability is offered. But for this, at the very least, there must be a desire on the Georgian side to talk to the Abkhaz and Ossetians not as Moscow’s puppets, not as occupied subordinate figures, but as real negotiating partners, for one. Second: some serious, at least minimal corrections in Georgia’s foreign policy, not just normalization. We have red lines, that’s one. And then, sorry, this parliamentary battle still needs to be won. This is another puzzle that is not completely finished.

Inal Khashig: Okay, let’s move from Georgia to the broader topic of the South Caucasus. And this started not two years ago, but a little earlier. It’s been almost four years. Events in Karabakh, the Second Karabakh War, and the picture in the South Caucasus have changed significantly over this period. And the degree of influence of various players there, including Russia, has undergone significant change. Russian peacekeepers are currently being withdrawn from the territory of Karabakh, and the Russian peacekeeping contingent is being withdrawn. Yerevan is openly taking a course towards the West, towards the European Union.

It feels like there are very difficult relations with Yerevan. And Azerbaijan too. While everything seems to be fine with Russia, and it is clearly visible that, in general, Turkey is a friend and partner. That is, the picture has changed very much in the South Caucasus, at least in this eastern part.

To what extent is this trend already nearing another stage, and now everything is stabilizing? According to this balance of forces, that is, Turkey, Russia has slipped, Turkish influence, Iran, as it were, remained, again with its own, but also, I think, its influence has decreased a little. Earlier, it seemed to have more influence. The European Union shifted a little at the beginning of the Karabakh war, and now it’s trying to make up for it, no? To what extent can this picture change? Or is it still, this situation is already starting to take on some boundaries?

“We get distracted by geopolitics while generations change, new people appear.”

Sergey Markedonov: Well, I won’t start the analysis from the times of King Leon, Bagrat, or Queen Tamar. I’ll look at the last thirty years. So, if we take the last thirty years, from the late Soviet period to the collapse of the USSR, it’s been a constant transformation. If we look at the ‘90s, Azerbaijan was the main figure for Moscow, not Georgia. In fact, there were joint blockade actions against Abkhazia with Georgia. Yes, we remember that. But then the position changes. Georgia becomes the main problematic player for Russia, to the extent that military actions… What was unthinkable in ’96 happened in 2008.

Like when Russian troops left, that Azerbaijan was lost for Russia forever. But why was Ilham Aliyev in Moscow on April 22, when he said that Russia is one of the main powers in the Caucasus? Of course, we adjust this for diplomacy, political correctness. It’s no coincidence that Ilham Aliyev worked at MGIMO in his time. A diplomat of a high level. He can use beautiful words, so to speak. But moving on to Georgia, in 2006, troops were withdrawn from Akhalkalaki, effectively eliminating the group of Russian forces in the South Caucasus. That was it, Russia had left Georgia forever. But today, what are we discussing?

Did Russia become less or more significant for Georgia in 2008? Paradoxical, right? We need to think about this. Russia significantly weakened its positions in Armenia. And you can say that from ’89 to ’91, Armenia was probably the main headache with the Karabakh movement for Moscow, the main irritant. In ’97 they signed a major agreement that determined the strategic landscape in the Caucasus up to today, up to the recent years. Today we can again say that Armenia is almost the main partner. Because if we talk about the number of statements, Armenia will probably be criticized more.

Azerbaijan was criticized a bit for its cooperation with Ukraine, that aspect was criticized. Georgia has been somewhat removed from the critical field now. It’s not like it was at least three or four years ago and so on. But for the sake of objectivity, Armenian speakers, both by position and not only, Speaker Simonyan speaks, yes, they also allow themselves some not fully thought out things, etc.

There is indeed a change in the agenda. Why is this happening? There are several factors. First, it’s really not fully appreciated. We get so distracted by geopolitics, while generations change, new people come in. Again, this is neither good nor bad. How old was Pashinyan at the time of the collapse of the USSR? Seventeen. How old was Armen Grigoryan, one of the main proponents of pro-Western ideas? Eleven. The current mayor of Yerevan was two years old at the time of the collapse of the USSR. These are people who perceive Karabakh and everything else a bit differently.

Is Turkey pro-Western or not? Well, it seems so, by many parameters – it’s a NATO member, a major ally of the USA, it’s not going anywhere, right? Erdogan’s three grandchildren have American passports.

But at the same time, Turkey is conducting an independent game along some lines. This concerns not only the Caucasus but also Syria, Libya. Turkish policy, which gradually began to revise Ataturk’s principles, which said that any involvement in the affairs of former Ottoman territories is backwardness, the conservation of archaism, a burden. But now they are ready to take up this burden. And we see how the situation changes, Turkey in the Middle East thirty years ago, and what a force it was, it wasn’t even considered within the framework of the Middle East, for the most part.

Turkey in the Caucasus thirty years ago, well, something more like speculation. But now these are real things. Turkey signed the Shusha Declaration with Azerbaijan in 2021. Turkey became the first non-post-Soviet republic to provoke force here, in the post-Soviet space, in the Caucasus, both soft power and hard power, diplomatic and economic. Take Georgia’s dependence on Turkey – infrastructure projects, transport investments, and so on, this is also significant. Energy and other things.

The role of Azerbaijan as a kind of middle power. There are claims, of course, and players. What about Iran? Certainly not pro-Western, but calling it pro-Russian is not entirely accurate either. You said it reduced its influence there. But when it opened a consulate in Kapan, Armenia, this was recently, it’s part of the new agenda. Iran is afraid of this Pan-Turkism openly, as they say, yes? And they are very actively pursuing this agenda.

This is one of the elements. Middle Eastern countries, by the way, some of them would not like a very strong reinforcement of Turkey. This concerns Egypt and so on. We see how countries that fifteen years ago were just mentioned in a Caucasian context, just for the sake of decency, to slightly inflate the importance of the Caucasus region.

Well, today, for example, India is the most important partner for Armenia. And from the point of view of weapons, India’s arms market is actively developing, understanding that the Turkic alliance is also a partner of Islamabad, and countermeasures need to be taken. China and Georgia – the third partner of Georgia is China, for a moment, a country that lifted visa restrictions. After all, One Belt, One Road cannot be built without the Caucasus.

Inal Khashig: “The Great Silk Road.”

“Chinese diplomacy is turning more actively towards the Caucasus – we see changes both within the region itself and increased activity from external players.”

Sergey Markedonov: Of course, it’s unrealistic without the Caucasus. And, of course, Chinese diplomacy is turning more actively towards the Caucasus. Not as intensely as in Central Asia, where China has already firmly established itself. But nevertheless, ten years ago, Chinese influence was much smaller. So the Caucasus is becoming a rather complex puzzle. And by the way, regarding the West. I remember many of my colleagues, I won’t argue with anyone in absentia for ethical reasons, it can be done face to face, but in 2020, during the second Karabakh war when Russia and Turkey emerged as the main beneficiaries, many said that now only Eurasian powers will decide everything, the West is in total decline. Is France or Armenia in total decline?

The West is trying to advance its own positions quite successfully. In my opinion, again, not because my passport is red. I say this because I don’t see how the West will become a more reliable partner for Armenia than Russia. Because, first, Armenia is diversifying. They say we are not only with the West, we will have some with India, and a little with Iran.

While Iran doesn’t want Western influence to increase. So Yerevan, which is trying to build a system to avoid conflicts, still attracts them. Because relations with Europe, strengthening European ties is also a monitoring mission on the border, this is a negotiating format, and so on. It also causes heartburn for Iran. It does not only cause heartburn for Russia. India resolves its issues with Pakistan. France. And what is France? Will the French company Total stop buying Azerbaijani oil tomorrow?

And Greece, seen as a partner, what will it do with Turkey, stop the process of normalization that started a year ago very actively? No, it won’t. The general conclusion is that we live in a situation where the puzzle has become more difficult, more challenging. For Russia, many new opportunities and challenges have emerged. The same thing we see within the region itself, changes and external players have become more active. This is an important point.

Inal Khashig: In this context, in the context of broad interest. Not just for the sake of checks, but for other players who, generally speaking, were not really present before, but now actively promote their interests and in the context of a changing, significantly changing situation in the South Caucasus. How much is the perspective of Abkhazia seen to participate in this cooperation?

At least for now, Abkhazia appears as Abkhazia, as a certain detached element, closer to Russia, no more. There its own autonomous relationship between Russia and Abkhazia is developing, but it is generally excluded from this South Caucasian space. Given that, again, there are plenty of players, who seemingly had no relation to the region, but are now starting to converge. There are many promising projects, ideas, interests, and so on. But again, right now, everything is changing a lot. But Abkhazia is not visible here yet. Is there any perspective in this and will there be any prospects?

“For Abkhazia, the Russian vector will be the only option. The problem lies in how to make this vector more effective.”

Sergey Markedonov – Well, first of all, I’d like to outline my first thesis. I don’t think that change for the sake of change is important owing to fetishization of change. Of course, absolute stability doesn’t exist. That only happens in the cemetery.

So I don’t think just any change is wonderful. If you say Abkhazia is somewhat aside from certain routes of geopolitical conflicts, thank God. If it becomes a focal point of these conflicts, it won’t seem good to anyone, generally speaking. And I don’t see, frankly, any alternative option economically, except for Russia. Again, historically, it’s just how it turned out in this situation.

I know that some, especially the younger ones, talk about Turkey. Turkey recognizes us, but Turkey has been involved in tourism for decades, and it has established connections there in that sense. And to create a competitor with our own hands?… Because if everything is recognized, if, so to speak, some issues with gray schemes are resolved and so on, well, then Abkhazia can still offer a lot as an important resort hub and so on. I’m not sure Turkey really needs that. Abkhazia is extremely important for Russia in terms of both geopolitical issues around the Black Sea and economically. It’s a niche where people can rest. And it’s an important cultural niche. These aren’t just words. This is an important matter because the small contribution of this republic, in a broader sense, to Caucasian and all-Russian culture is important.

So, I think this vector will probably be the only one. And the problem lies only in how to make this vector, I repeat, the only one, perhaps more effective, to give it more substance so that the republic can develop. The key word is development, so that it doesn’t remain in a situation of constantly overcoming the consequences of war and so on, so that there are some impulses, and these impulses will be given if the different society, Abkhaz society, manages to negotiate not on the principle of I don’t want this, you see, this scoundrel, but together, with joint efforts, they will work out some compromise figures that will satisfy both society itself and Russia as well. And then, I think, things will move forwar