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Interview with Tamta Mikeladze
In this video, researcher and human rights activist Tamta Mikeladze discusses Abkhaz-Russian relations and the increasing pressure from Moscow upon Sukhumi. Mikeladze believes that Abkhaz society is fighting Russia’s annexation policy, and that Georgia currently has a good opportunity to strengthen its peace policy and conflict resolution efforts.
Full text of the interview:
— Greetings, friends. We are recording another interview as part of the Go Group Media aაnd Jamnews project related to the Georgian-Abkhaz context. Our guest today is Tamta Mikeladze, co-founder of the Center for Social Justice. Hello, Tamta. Thank you for agreeing to this interview. You are actively working on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict: publishing research, writing articles, and participating in informal dialogue. How would you assess the current state of Georgian-Abkhaz relations and negotiations, both within the official Geneva Discussions format and in informal dialogues?
— Hello. Thank you for your interest and, in general, for the work that Jamnews is doing in promoting peace policies in the South Caucasus. At the core of your question is a complex and multi-layered issue. Since the 2008 war, the paradigm regarding conflicts has completely changed. The war, occupation, Russia’s declaration of Abkhazia’s independence, and subsequent attempts at recognition have significantly strengthened Georgia’s policies of non-recognition and de-occupation, which have led to rather weak efforts in conflict transformation. Peace policy lost its political significance, which was even reflected in political discourse.
The Georgian government, through programs in healthcare and education, primarily addresses the humanitarian needs of people living in Abkhazia. But conflict resolution also has political potential, which, if utilized, could help overcome the alienation between communities and offer local societies or elites an alternative. Unfortunately, this factor has been overlooked, and today the dominant paradigm remains de-occupation and non-recognition. Even regarding a format like the Geneva Discussions, it is difficult to say that it is aimed at conflict transformation or peacebuilding. While it does ensure the implementation of ceasefire policies as a mechanism and addresses some humanitarian issues, it lacks a mandate for conflict resolution and transformation, as well as the necessary tools and methods for this task.
Since the August war, the isolation, distancing, and alienation of our societies from each other have intensified — especially among younger generations who have little experience with the conflict and have not personally suffered from its traumas. They primarily perceive the history of conflicts through Russia’s perspective and foreign policy narratives. So when discussing conflicts, I believe it is crucial to consider their multi-dimensional nature. We often emphasize that conflicts have several layers:
At different stages of history, the relevance and importance of certain dimensions of conflict-related alienation and tension have varied. But overall, there should be intervention at all levels — both in terms of countering annexation and de-occupation and in advancing and strengthening Georgia’s Europeanization process. Naturally, efforts should also be made toward conflict transformation to identify common interests, set an agenda, and create specific opportunities and resources.
It must be acknowledged that the war in Ukraine has brought both new opportunities and new traumas — not only the Ukrainian war but also the Second Karabakh War and, in general, military escalation in the region. In the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, interesting processes are taking place in Abkhazia. On the one hand, it has become clear that the future is no longer as predictable as before. Previously, Abkhazians had at least a relatively stable status quo — they understood what guarantees they had and what compromises they could make with Russia. In other words, there was some clarity in their relations with Russia. But now Abkhazians realize that their future is uncertain.
On one hand, it is unknown how the war in Ukraine will end, how it will affect Russia, and how the war’s consequences will ultimately alter Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. On the other hand, Abkhazians now see that after the war in Ukraine, Russia will intensify its annexation policy in Abkhazia. Economic sanctions and Russia’s expulsion from global markets have led to a growing interest from the Russian oligarchic economic system in peripheral markets. Over the past year, Russia has visibly increased its efforts to take control of strategically important resources and assets in Abkhazia, a move opposed by the local society and a significant part of the Abkhaz political elite.
— My next question is about this exactly. As a result of Russia’s policies in Abkhazia, anti-Russian sentiment has grown — this is especially evident in the media and on social networks. Issues such as dual citizenship, privatization, and land purchases — on all these topics, Abkhaz society is resisting Russia’s push to pass laws. Right now, for example, the “apartment law” is a big deal in Abkhaz society. However, it would be a mistake to assume that anti-Russian sentiments will automatically translate into pro-Georgian sentiments, as is sometimes mistakenly perceived in Georgia. That said, this situation does provide an opportunity to improve Georgian-Abkhaz relations and, in doing so, help Abkhazia break away from Russia’s orbit. What is your perspective on this?
— When I mentioned the emergence of difficulties, uncertainty, and a sense of insecurity, I was referring precisely to the weakening of Russia’s influence in the region and its aggressive drive to dominate markets as a result. Russia has, so to speak, lost credibility in the eyes of Abkhaz society — incidentally, this can also be said about Armenian society, especially after the Karabakh war, when Russia failed to fulfill its implicit obligation to protect Armenia. The war in Ukraine also played a role; like a game without rules, it is brutal and ruthless, and the way it has been persecuted is striking. Just look at the high risks Russia has imposed on the Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
— … and the Abkhaz side sees all of this, as news about it spreads on social media.
— Of course, the Abkhaz side sees it. So trust is declining, and the sense of security is disappearing. This creates opportunities for Georgia, which can offer additional security guarantees to the Abkhaz people. The active process of Europeanization that is underway in Georgia is a historic opportunity for us. We may become part of a new wave of expansion. Europeanization can be achieved in the areas of security and conflict transformation. It is possible to demonstrate to Abkhaz society the benefits and security guarantees that future EU membership would bring them, as well as the opportunities for identifying common interests and alternatives.
— I’d like to talk about the work of your center. You actively participate in informal dialogue and publish materials on this topic. As one of the co-founders of the Center for Social Justice, how do you view peace policy, particularly in relation to our conflicts?
— For us, the very idea of peace is important. In my view, the idea of peace is a radical political idea that implies not only the absence of war and the limitation of violence but also the transformation of systems, institutions, and societies. Our core belief is that conflicts and alienation are caused by structural injustice and inequality within the system, society, and reality — be it political, economic, or cultural — as well as the hierarchies, asymmetries, and lack of democratic practices that stem from them.
The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict has a multi-faceted explanation. In part, it is rooted in Georgian nationalism and Abkhaz nationalism, both of which were formed during the Soviet period. These were sterile forms of nationalism, based on a logic that assumed an ethnic hierarchy, which in turn reinforced ethnic identity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, manifestations of ethnic nationalism intensified and became dominant. As we declared independence, we did not know how to build a society and were unprepared for it.
The processes of that time were radical and emotional. They were based less on agreements and discussions. For regions like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it was unclear what their place in the future state would be. The Tbilisi elite at the time did not engage with them on how power, resources, and other matters would be distributed. For many years, we were a weak state, unable to handle even internal crises. Throughout different periods, major mistakes were made by authoritarian regimes and authorities, which contributed to the politicization of conflicts and territorial issues, leading to serious consequences.
Regarding peace policy, it is fundamentally important to delve into the historical structural causes underlying injustice and alienation. This is precisely why we consider it a radical political idea — because it implies eliminating injustice and inequality. It must be acknowledged that Georgia has many conflicts. There is an acute political crisis, a political conflict. An invisible economic conflict is also apparent — poverty is very high, economic inequality severe; there are stark differences in living standards between regions.
We see a fragmented society with ethnic and religious divisions, even micro-conflicts in municipalities and villages where ethnic and religious minorities live side-by-side. In other words, we are dealing with crises of various kinds. That is why we believe that peacebuilding is both a process and a goal — one that requires a fundamental transformation of the system and society to eliminate the risks of alienation, isolation, violence, and confrontation. Naturally, in this process, democratic culture and democratic practices are crucial. It is democratic deliberation, agreements, compromises, dialogue, listening, and solidarity that can overcome alienation within society.
We truly believe that creating a democratic, socially just, and equal policy in Georgia — on this side of the dividing line — will lead to a transformation of our own society. This transformation would rethink the experiences of the 1990s and prepare us to speak to divided societies in a fair and sincere way. And it would offer these societies far more appealing alternatives based on prosperity, democracy, social justice, equality, and multiculturalism. Our conflicts are ethnopolitical. However, if we compare what Georgian nationalism was in the past and what it is now, it is clear that it has softened significantly. Its radical ethnic content has become much milder, though it still retains problematic forms. Today in Georgia, we observe ethno-religious nationalism, where ethnic Georgians of Orthodox Christian faith are considered first-class citizens, followed in a hierarchy by other ethnic and religious groups.
We must seriously reflect on who “we” are — who is building this country and its unity. If we fail to construct the country based on hybrid, multicultural ideas, then our system will not appear attractive to Abkhaz and Ossetian societies. The country should not be founded on sterile ethno-religious principles, where religious and ethnic minorities face problems. Today, we are a country that refuses to build a mosque for Georgian Muslims in Batumi; where ethnic minorities cannot use their language in public services; where access to education for ethnic minorities is half of what it is for the ethnic majority; where political representation of ethnic minorities is very low, even in municipalities where they form a majority. These and many similar challenges lie before us — not to mention rising and persistent poverty.
So we have more than enough shortcomings. That is why, in our view, the idea of peace implies fundamental transformations in society, creating a new political culture that will pave the way for dialogue with Abkhaz and Ossetian societies.
Another important issue, directly related to conflicts, is this: If we look at conflicts from both geopolitical and ethnopolitical perspectives, it becomes clear that in recent years, especially after the 2008 war, only the foreign policy perspective has dominated. We are left with fewer and fewer resources to respond to the ethnopolitical aspects of the conflict — to restore trust, build dialogue, and develop an agenda based on shared interests for divided communities.
We believe it important to think about common interests, to listen attentively and sensitively to what Abkhaz and Ossetian societies want. We do not consider them puppets in the hands of others, without their own identity, memory, or interests. We want to find out what they fear, expect, and what their interests are, in order to understand how to respond to this in the future.
— In one of the center’s statements, you advise the European Union and other Western actors involved in Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian negotiations (although these negotiations have become infrequent) to support a direct status-neutral dialogue between the parties. What is a “direct status-neutral dialogue” and how can it be pulled off?
— Today one of the main problems in conflict transformation is precisely that the government and political parties do not see its political value. A peace policy is needed to establish connections and restore trust with the Abkhaz and Ossetians — when de-occupation occurs, these connections will be useful to ensure that the conflict does not arise again. But politicians do not see the potential in this and do not understand that conflict transformation and creating an agenda based on common interests and dialogue can make a significant political contribution to the final resolution of conflict.
In times of historical upheavals, during important historical moments, dialogue between Sukhum(i) and Tbilisi at the grassroots level could have and has had enormous political potential. So the first problem is to start looking at conflict transformation from a depoliticized, humanitarian perspective. The second issue is that we view the regions primarily from the perspective of non-recognition and de-occupation, which is why we lack channels and platforms through which we could communicate directly with the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides.
It is about a dialogue between political elites, where legal, humanitarian, social, and other important issues would be discussed, not related to territories and status — i.e., status-neutral issues. Such a dialogue would help reach certain agreements, which would create some trust. Our region is vulnerable in terms of security, and the risk of escalation is constant. For example, when we meet with the Abkhaz in the framework of informal dialogue, I see that, on the one hand, they are very closely following events in Tbilisi and sometimes learn about what is happening here before we do, but on the other hand, their perceptions are quite hypertrophied. Even superficial statements (such as the shouts of “Sukhum(i)! Sukhum(i)!” during the March protests in Tbilisi) cause them to fear that someone will attack them, and their security will again be at risk.
We must be attentive to these fears. These anxieties can easily be abused within society — precisely because these issues are not discussed, as there is no dialogue between the sides that could create certain expectations, trust, and connections. Of course, all this has a strong impact on our already vulnerable security. In general, there is no understanding of how important conflict transformation is. In Tbilisi, the Abkhaz side is generally perceived as a puppet and it is believed that dialogue with them is pointless.
On the other hand, we no longer have channels for dialogue that would create expectations and restore trust. The formats of informal civil society dialogue cannot replace official dialogue. Yes, these formats are also important, but they are limited. Pressure on Abkhaz society to force participation in such a dialogue is increasing, and it should not be considered an alternative in any way. This is one of the more important points — there must be space where political actors can discuss pressing issues for people and reach agreements.
— Regarding the issues we have touched upon that need to be resolved… How pronounced is the political readiness in Georgian and Abkhaz societies, and among the political classes in Abkhazia and here? You participate in informal dialogue. In Abkhazian politics, for example, there are now figures who oppose dialogue with the Georgian side. This topic is also hushed up on our side, and transformation and conflict negotiations rarely become topics of daily discussion. Georgian politicians, if they do remember them, do so only on special occasions. In your opinion, is there any readiness for this?
— Unfortunately, after the August war there has been almost no opportunity for dialogue. This process between Tbilisi and Sukhum(i) is frozen. Even on less politicized but very important issues for local communities, there is no substantive discussion between Tbilisi and Sukhum(i). This is, of course, very difficult, as it complicates even the solution of small socio-legal issues, which directly affects the legal status of local residents, their well-being, and development opportunities.
It is still unclear where to find the resources for dialogue. As for Tbilisi and our authorities, it must be said that after the war in Ukraine, there have been significant changes in the foreign policy direction, a sharp pivot that is damaging the process of Europeanization. Extremely brazen statements regarding the European Union and its representatives are being heard, there is a noticeable weakening of diplomatic work with the EU, and obvious delays and shortcomings have been observed in the process of implementing the 12 EU recommendations, which provide historic opportunities not only for us but also for the people living in conflict regions.
Tbilisi has a lot to do in order to use the new opportunities to its advantage. Instead there are clear signs of warming relations with Russia, which are reflected even in rhetoric — in political language, the Georgian authorities no longer call Russia “the enemy” — air travel has been restored, trade relations with Russia have expanded, and there is uncontrolled migration of Russian citizens, which creates anxiety in society.
Georgian Dream responds to public discontent in a politically incorrect and unbalanced way. Youth with anti-Russian sentiments are called miscreants, marginals, and radicals. When they talk about Europeanization at all, the authorities do so rather dismissively. And although they sometimes mention the excessive influence of Russia, the clear tendency of warming and concessions on their part is still noticeable. Moreover, they are doing nothing regarding conflicts.
The authorities should consider what alternatives can be offered at this historical moment — such as updated rules for addressing travel documents, which, in the context of the new wave of isolation following the EU resolution, would create new opportunities for Abkhaz citizens to travel abroad and access education. However, instead of this, they impose taboos on such topics in state policy, and as a result, nothing changes.
— What should the Georgian side propose in terms of de-isolation?
— When discussing de-isolation, it is important for society and the political class to understand that de-isolation is a way to reduce and weaken Russia’s annexation of these regions. The policy of non-recognition, which was also a policy of isolation, had some justification for why, after the declaration of independence, our authorities and state institutions had to halt a process with a legitimate goal. But at some point, it became clear that Tbilisi no longer needed to fear recognition, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine or the decisions made by the European Court, which legally formalized Russia’s actions and decisions concerning these regions.
We continue this policy out of inertia, but we don’t think about the fact that the full isolation of these regions, the degree of their economic, political, military, financial, legal, and cultural dependence on Russia, has significantly increased, and this works against everyone — both against the Abkhaz people and against Georgian society and the state. De-isolation, in my view, means emancipation and humaneness. I believe that the Abkhaz are our fellow citizens, and their development, security, well-being, and rights concern me just as much as the rights of any other citizen of Georgia.
But apart from the emancipated, legal, and civil meanings, it also has political significance. It was precisely constant isolation and enclosure that led to dependency on Russia, under which the Abkhaz now smart. We, as a more responsible and strong actor, supported by important international institutions and ready to make a greater contribution to conflict transformation, are not using these opportunities. This is the harsh reality.
Your question was about ways to de-isolate. One of them, in our view, is related to the issue of movement. Changing the current travel regime is important for all groups affected by the conflict. There is a visible trend of closing off and strengthening the dividing lines, which has severe consequences for residents of Gali or our citizens living in Akhalgori. In the case of Abkhazia, the problem is compounded by the fact that the Abkhaz cannot travel to other countries, access education, or participate in cultural or economic life. Ultimately, this leads to deep alienation and isolation from the European and Western world in general.
— ...which also bolsters Russia’s influence, the only place in the world they can reach.
— Exactly. So resolving the issues of movement, restoring necessary contacts, and establishing communication is the first thing that can be done. This aligns with the common interests of many social groups affected by the conflict. If Tbilisi takes bold steps in this direction, substantial progress could be made.
Within the framework of informal dialogue, we have also discussed how Abkhaz passports could be recognized as travel documents, with which Abkhaz people could at least travel to some countries, significantly easing their isolation. This is not about legal recognition of the documents, but simply about practical recognition of them as travel documents, but not as identity cards or proof of citizenship. We are also considering internet freedom, which is particularly relevant after the war in Ukraine. In Russia a military dictatorship is effectively being formed, and there is very aggressive control over freedom of expression and access to resources and platforms. In Abkhazia, there are already internet outages, so one of the important ideas is, for example, to offer alternative access to the internet.
— From the Georgian side?
— From the Georgian side or from the EU side, which would allow them to receive information from independent internet resources. This solution would help resolve the issue of small financial transactions…
— The subject of transactions…
— Such transactions already occur because there are business ties, family relationships — this is especially felt by the residents of Gali, who have to go through a difficult process to send money. There are many such important ideas in various fields, such as healthcare or environmental protection. All of them would make a positive contribution to Georgian-Abkhaz relations.
— For this, political will is needed.
— Unfortunately, there is no political will.
— The issue of movement in Abkhazia has become even more complicated after the sanctions that the Western world imposed on Russia due to the war in Ukraine. On one hand, these sanctions are absolutely justified in light of the aggression Russia is carrying out against a sovereign country, but on the other hand, Abkhaz and Ossetian societies were also affected. What can we offer them? What should the Georgian state do to mitigate the negative impact of Russian sanctions on the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides?
— For many years, Georgia has raised the issue on the international level about the illegality of the passports issued by Russia in Abkhazia, a serious problem because passports were one of the tools of Russia’s annexation policy even before the August war. Although active lobbying on the issue may not have been conducted at the time, these efforts led to the adoption of a resolution that reflected Georgia’s context. In the end, from the perspective of the Abkhaz, this resolution deepened their isolation policy and took it to a new level.
Some efforts are now being made so that at least for people who are actively participating in dialogue from Abkhazia and are involved in civic activities, exceptions can be made for visa issuance, allowing them to visit Schengen zone countries. But I believe this is not enough. The Abkhaz society and elite need to form their own vision to see new opportunities and understand what alternatives exist other than Russian annexation. In principle, the Abkhaz talk directly about annexation, colonization, and the imposition of onerous conditions…
— They even organize demonstrations…
— In the latest high-profile cases about apartments, the Sukhumi airport, and the sanatorium “Bichvinta,” they openly use this language, although, in my opinion, they simply do not see that there are other possibilities and alternatives that could at least balance the excessive dependence on Russia. Mr. Bzhania, in his recent statements about the airport or apartments, openly said that “refusal may cost us the reduction of Russian budgetary support, and we will no longer be able to pay pensions and salaries to civil servants.”
— Regarding the Bichvinta case, he also said that he “gave his word” at the meeting in Sochi…
— They have support from Russia, but there is no alternative to it. In order to change something, first and foremost, a vision of these alternatives must be created in Tbilisi, together with the European Union. I am convinced that in order to create a vision of these alternatives, we can productively use pro-European development, the processes of Europeanization and democratization, and, most importantly, the unique European experience of peace policy accumulated by the European Union.
— The information policy regarding communication between the Georgian side and Abkhazia has some peculiarities—perhaps certain opportunities for Abkhaz people already exist, but information about them simply doesn’t reach Abkhaz society. Do you think that Georgian information policy needs changing? I mean the authorities, Georgian media, and NGOs. Since you are involved in these issues, perhaps you know if any such information campaign is being carried out?
— I think the problem is not in the news channels. The real problem is that we have nothing to say to Abkhaz society — I’m referring primarily to the political class. The authorities repeat traditional mantras that are not used for conflict transformation and are not suitable for it. From time to time, they make some ambiguous statements or announce unclear ideas about economic projects. As for opposition parties, their programs do not make it clear what their views are on the conflict regions, what changes they propose, or what strategy they have.
What’s more, especially after Ukraine, there are loud statements like “we will get Abkhazia back” or “together we will succeed.” I recall how Mikhail Saakashvili once said he planned to build a large airport in Sukhumi and even become its chief architect. Such statements cause misunderstanding. So, I think the main problem is that our political class has nothing to say to the Abkhaz. Our politicians are not working on finding alternatives or ways to identify common interests, on the basis of which a program or strategy could be developed to satisfy those common interests. The main problem lies precisely herein.
The Georgian side explains this approach as a result of problems within the Abkhaz elite, claiming that during negotiations they act immaturely, refuse to compromise, and are mere puppets, saying only what Russia wants. However, we see that Abkhaz society, especially its political and civic elite, has been fighting for many years to protect its interests and stop Russian annexation. Today Abkhaz society is trying, completely on its own, to stop Russian annexation.
For example, they managed for a long time to prevent the adoption of a law on foreign agents, which would have been devastating for Abkhaz civil society, which, it must be acknowledged, is very interesting, democratic, and active. Civil activists are fighting against the alienation of apartments, resources, and are demonstrating remarkable self-organization. And in this, they are completely alone…
— They are also opposing the privatization of the energy sector…
— Yes. The problem is not that we don’t have Russian-language television to convey information to the Abkhaz and Ossetians, but that there is no strategic vision, no clear definition of tasks or discourses. For discussions on peace policy and conflict transformation, a new language is needed. Yes, we need to work actively on de-occupation and think about effective integration into the new security system, but we also need to develop a different language for communication with Abkhaz and Ossetian societies. It is impossible to find common interests and set an agenda without active communication.
Take, for example, our documents on peace policy. The engagement strategy adopted in 2010 was not revised for a long time, and no substantial changes were made to it. It was planned to do so now, but after the start of the war in Ukraine, it was said that it would be difficult to modify the document at this time, and this is understandable. But the fact remains that for a long period, neither the paradigm nor the general vision changed, if we do not consider the extremely important experience of Paata Zakareishvili and some programmatic, more project-based initiatives.
It’s interesting that, in drafting documents and concepts for peace policy, Tbilisi does not engage with Abkhaz civil society. It’s impossible to work on conflict transformation and not talk to the other side, not understand their ideas, perspectives, grievances, and expectations… This means offering initiatives in one direction only. Although issues regarding conflicts and territorial integrity are often politically instrumentalized, it is evident that among all policy directions, there is no weaker, more vague, or priority-lacking area than peace policy.
— If we hypothetically assume that steps are taken, the EU working with both the Georgian and Abkhaz sides on various formal or informal platforms, what would Russia’s reaction be? For example, if the Abkhaz passport is recognized by Georgia as a document that verifies identity and Abkhaz people are able to travel to Turkey or Armenia through Georgia, which would certainly reduce Russian influence and foster the integration of Abkhaz people into Georgian space, how would Russia react? I don’t think it would go their way.
— Of course, this decision carries risks — Russia may block something, issue an ultimatum, and so on. But, first of all, this kind of thinking should have begun much earlier. One could argue that it’s already too late, because the fact that Georgia has focused solely on the policy of non-recognition for a long time led to a loss of vision and frameworks for conflict transformation as such, and an understanding of what should be done regarding the conflict regions. This deepened the situation and increased the alienation between the two communities, between the two fields.
So, there would be a reaction, but one must take into account that Russia is fully focused on war-related matters at the moment. This should be taken advantage of, for example as Moldova has done, which is now making extremely important decisions. It has not only accelerated and strengthened its integration with the European Union but also changed its foreign policy vectors, it announced its withdrawal from the CIS, passed a law limiting the activities of pro-Russian parties in Moldova, and so on. Even Armenia, which after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, suffered significant human, economic, and military losses, is holding active negotiations with the EU at the American level (together with Azerbaijan) and mobilizing certain European resources in the border demarcation process.
— And thus distancing itself from the Russian sphere…
— Exactly. This is also visible at the societal level. The results of quantitative research show how political moods in Armenian society have changed. That is, states weaker than us, much more dependent on Russia, with more vulnerable societies, are using the historical context and changes to advance their own interests. Neither Armenia nor Moldova has such strong pro-European and anti-Russian sentiments as Georgia. As for Georgia, it does not make bold nor even minor decisions, which would create new potential and opportunities. So, in my opinion, it is excessive to view Russia as a completely invincible, insurmountable threat that completely paralyzes Tbilisi and stifles any attempts to plan even small projects. The evidence of this are the examples we’ve already discussed.
— Thank you very much for the interview.
— And thank you.
