Elections in Georgia

Author: Izida Chania

This article was originally published on the “Echo of the Caucasus” website. The text and terminologyare reproduced without changes. All rights belong to “Echo of the Caucasus.” Original publication date: October 28, 2024.

This past weekend parliamentary elections were held in Georgia. In Abkhazia, there was interest in observing them, although, of course, no official statements were made. Certain remarks and behaviors by the leadership suggested that the Abkhaz authorities are admirers of the Georgian Dream party. Whether the closure of the state border with Georgia on October 23 was related to their political sympathies, or merely an effort to maintain an image of the Georgian opposition as an adversary, is hard to say, given the absence of statistical data on the electoral preferences of Georgian citizens living in Abkhazia’s border zone.

In any case, the population of Abkhazia’s Gali district likely had little impact on the election results in their country of citizenship. Before October 23, just over two thousand residents of Abkhazia with Georgian citizenship crossed into Georgia — obviously a drop in the bucket.

I view the elections in Georgia through the lens of Abkhazia, as I understand that no matter how much internal disagreement there may be among Georgians, or how divided Georgian society is, their stance on Abkhazia differs very little. Therefore, I cannot say that I sympathized with any political force, but I had no doubt that the pro-government forces would win. They won by a narrow margin (if we trust the CEC data), which signifies a deep divide within society. This is typical for modern elections, and there’s nothing surprising about it.

Why did the pro-government party win in Georgia?

The administrative advantage is a given. Underestimating its importance would simply be naive. Judging from various accounts, there was a full range of tactics: voter bribery, ballot-stuffing, data falsification, “leasing” of documents, conflicts at polling stations, and the expulsion of journalists accredited for the elections.

I want to point out that the proportional election system, which is frequently discussed in our society, does not solve the problem of fair elections and imposes no restrictions on using administrative resources or voter bribery. The Georgian opposition did not receive support even from the “opposition” president. They failed to unite, develop a clear and publicly understandable program, and alienated the electorate with aggressive statements about Abkhazia and South Ossetia (no one wants war on either side), and with a level of tolerance that alarmed traditional Georgian society.

Moreover, the pro-government party played both sides: it did not abandon the European path but also did not reject cooperation with Russia. The “Dreamers” emphasized peace (even overdoing it regarding South Ossetia, which caused widespread dissatisfaction) and raised their supporters’ hopes with vague promises about a peaceful solution to the “territorial integrity” issue. These promises were so ambiguous that Georgia and Abkhazia interpreted them differently. In Abkhazia, there were assumptions about some form of confederate arrangement, while in Georgia, people believed that Russia would help Georgia reintegrate Abkhazia. Even Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements were interpreted differently by each side.

But there are lessons to be learned here. One doesn’t always need to repeat the same mistakes but can look at neighboring experiences. Even if we assume that the elections were rigged, half of the electorate chose a multipolar approach for a small country and preferred traditional Caucasian values. Most Georgians don’t travel to Europe often, and sanctions hardly scare them. Additionally, direct pressure from the West has erased the impact of a decade of economic support for Georgia. Strangely enough, respect for one’s national interests and traditions is more important to the electorate than to the politicians they elect.

As for economic investments, average citizens are unlikely to feel their effects. So this time, the “bull in the china shop” was not Russia, which, on the contrary, resumed air travel (the Georgian opposition’s protests against this seemed very strange and unwise), reinstated visa-free travel, and offered new economic prospects — a transport route through Abkhazia.

A large number of Georgians live in Russia, and the opposition’s and the West’s aggressive rhetoric was quite out of place here. I’d like to remind you that in 2023, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili stated that Tbilisi refrains from imposing economic sanctions on Russia because the sanctions would cause significant harm to the one million Georgian citizens living in Russia. Also, the ruling party hinted that negotiations are underway, and that the “issue of territorial integrity” would be resolved peacefully, for which they need a constitutional majority in parliament. One way or another, the ruling party looked more convincing to the Georgian electorate than the fragmented opposition, which threatened military action. Yet Georgian Dream still did not achieve a constitutional majority.

What can Abkhazia expect from the elections in Georgia?

Probably an intensification of the negotiation process with Russia as a mediator. A departure from the Geneva discussions. And I think Georgia should not expect that Russia will trade Abkhazia for goodwill and new economic opportunities. It is more likely that some kind of union will be created, but not the Georgian-Abkhazian-Ossetian one that Georgia envisions (I think Russia won’t make that mistake again), but rather a broader political formation that includes other countries — something not quite like the USSR, but somewhat resembling the CIS. And here, Lavrov’s words help us. He has stated that Moscow is ready to help Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia normalize relations, provided that the countries themselves are interested. I’ll even quote him:

“The current Georgian leadership simply assesses the past honestly. They’ve even stated, ‘We want historical reconciliation.’ And in what form, in what way this reconciliation might happen — it’s up to the countries themselves to decide: both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They are neighbors with Georgia, so some form of contact is inevitable. If there is interest from all sides in normalizing these relations and reaching non-aggression agreements… In the case of mutual interest, we will be ready to assist.“

There are no fantasies here, just clear messages  —’contacts are inevitable’ and ‘a non-aggression pact.’ It seems there is already a ‘normalization of relations’ plan somewhere, and possibly, consultations have taken place.

Ivanishvili is interested in ‘pragmatic cooperation,’ which would open a transport route through Abkhazia. Of course, each side has its own agenda, but in the current situation these are small steps for Georgia and Abkhazia, while for Russia it is an opportunity to break the economic blockade. This is why Russian oligarchs in our country have become more active, trying to buy the nation outright with the help of the current leadership.

As for anti-Russian sentiments that made headlines in Abkhazia and beyond, this was merely a monitoring of public opinion within Abkhazia. It allowed the Kremlin to confirm that anti-Russian sentiment is a myth, and it doesn’t matter much who leads Abkhazia. It remains pro-Russian, and Moscow has no cause for concern.

Thus, the Abkhaz opposition has a chance that there will be no official pressure from the Kremlin on the opposition during the 2025 presidential elections. No, the main task remains: taking into account Georgia’s negative experience, they need to unite, formulate a clear and understandable program for society, identify a leader acceptable to all parties, and minimize the use of administrative resources. And time is running out. That’s why the current government is rushing with the presidential elections, and it’s possible that an early election will be announced in November. I have no idea on what grounds this will be done or who will be compromised this time.