Will Georgia apologize for the war in Abkhazia?

Bidzina Ivanishvili is ready to repent to the Ossetians for the war initiated in 2008 and to conduct a “Nuremberg trial” for this crime against Mikheil Saakashvili and his National Movement party. But is Bidzina prepared to make epentance for Georgian aggression against Abkhazia in 1992-93? The editor of Chegemskaya Pravda, Inal Khashig, discussed this and the internal political crisis in Abkhazia with historian and political scientist Astamur Tania in the latest episode of the program “Conversation.”

Full text of the interview:

Inal Khashig: Hello! This is Chegemskaya Pravda. Today we will discuss both internal politics and external challenges we are currently facing. In the studio we have our regular political expert, Astamur Tania. A recent protocol has become a focal point of internal political issues, sparking a clash between the government and the opposition. This adds to the existing situation, and, of course, we cannot avoid discussing the current crisis.

“The crisis in relations with Russia is not a new situation.”

“We entered an alliance to protect our territory and ensure national survival. In return, we provided our territory for the placement of Russian military bases.”

Astamur Tania: When I read this document, I had doubts about its authenticity. This concerns both the style and content. It may have been drafted based on some discussions, and it’s unclear who might consider it authentic. However, if it were possible to verify whether this is indeed the case, it would be important. Documents like this don’t simply emerge from the Russian presidential administration without reason.

In any case, it became a trigger for an information campaign from both the opposition and the government. The crisis in relations with Russia is nothing new. But, in my opinion, calling it a crisis is an exaggeration. We can speak of a crisis only if it truly affects the core of our relations. The issues that periodically concern our society, such as housing and apartments, have been on the agenda for over ten years. As for the allied relations between Abkhazia and Russia, they have not changed. The reaction of Abkhazian society stems from long-standing concerns that have become part of our discourse.

We are told that this is a birth trauma, but in reality, it’s not. For a long time we’ve been losing control over our territory and economy. Currently, the threat of losing our identity and culture is not abstract. Unfortunately, demographic and language issues in Abkhazia are not being resolved. If they were addressed, perhaps the attitude of society would be different. It is important for frank conversations between Abkhazian and Russian colleagues to occur more frequently.

Our cooperation with Russia has asymmetrical aspects, and portraying Abkhazia as a freeloader relying on Russia is wrong. It’s important to remember our history after the war. The Abkhazians are a stubborn people. We entered an alliance to protect our territory and ensure national survival. In return, we provided our territory for the placement of Russian military bases. We are part of the ruble zone, and we share a common socio-economic space.

These things need to be explained to our Russian colleagues, as it’s sometimes hard to see the problems of a small nation from the perspective of a large state. It’s desirable to reach a consensus on this issue so that we can openly discuss our problems. When people now try to add a geopolitical context to the situation, as if Abkhazia is shifting its orientation from Russia to the West, it’s laughable. Even if an agent of the West or the CIA ends up leading Abkhazia, they won’t be able to change basic factors.

Abkhazia would only fall out of Russia’s geopolitical sphere if Russia itself made that decision. Everyone in Abkhazia understands that this would pose a huge challenge to the preservation of our state. Therefore any attempts to portray the situation as a struggle between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces are merely efforts by local elites to gain a competitive edge over their rivals.

Inal Khashig: Even if no one believes in this discourse, it still becomes an element of the internal political game. We’ve gone through similar stages before when internal enemies became rivals against one another. And while this happened within one large state, it wasn’t just outsiders causing trouble — neighbors and even our fellow countrymen, Abkhazians, were involved.

It’s important to step out of this information space, which has recently been filled with such narratives. Right now, it creates the impression that barricades are forming across Abkhazia: on one side Russia, on the other side the West. This picture is far from reality. Instead, we lack discussions about reforms, governance systems, economic transformations, and other pressing issues.

“NGOs are not an influential political force in Abkhazia.”

“The ‘Our Pitsunda’ movement is also a rather weak organization, in my opinion.”

Astamur Tania: It would be strange if the government started talking about reforms right before the election — it’s hard to believe. It’s an old tradition to promise reforms right before coming to power. As for the opposition bloc and NGOs, they have their own issues with the bloc, and that’s no coincidence. NGOs are not an influential political force in Abkhazia. They are more part of the expert community. While there have been cases where representatives from the civil sector entered parliament, none of these organizations have pushed a Western agenda; they are focused on Abkhazian issues and reforms.

Regarding the “Our Pitsunda” movement, in my opinion it’s also a relatively weak organization. “Our Pitsunda” had a period when they held public actions, but the organization hasn’t progressed. It seems that some are trying to make it appear as something more, suggesting Western influence. As for the attack on the activist and journalist, we should wait for the results of the investigation. Of course, it’s a dirty method, but rushing to conclusions is unnecessary. The investigation shouldn’t turn into excessive propaganda. Let’s wait for the outcome.

Our society should have a zero-tolerance attitude toward such actions, especially since Abkhazian society is small. You may have noticed that when there’s debate in Abkhazia, it often involves our traditions — people tend to speak in terms of historical precedents. This tradition is related, first, to giving the person a chance to realize their mistake and correct it, and second, to prevent it from turning into personal enmity. The influence of the media space on Abkhazian society is overestimated; it certainly exists, but all our media figures still meet at weddings and funerals.

This places certain obligations on our behavior. Regardless of the outcome of the political situation, people here remain connected through familial and neighborly ties; they are not planning to leave. Our society is characterized by strong horizontal connections. Attempts at atomization and the introduction of rigid, alien relationships pose a serious threat. I would like to emphasize once again that the discussed protocol reflects questions of government legitimacy.

If the government had spent the last five years addressing our demographic, linguistic, and cultural issues, preserving and enhancing our heritage, they might have been able to resolve some of the issues on the agenda. But now there is talk of possible sanctions or repression from Russia — why portray Russia in a distorted light? Secondly, using Russia to gain a competitive advantage is dangerous because Russia might not delve into the situation for long, and the consequences would be negative for everyone.

We must clearly understand our “red lines” that should not be crossed. First and foremost, there must be no violence, neither before nor during the election, as this could lead to uncontrollable consequences. We need to be careful with our words. Unfortunately, if we were millions in number, we might have a different political culture and we could avoid street clashes.

Inal Khashig: When discussing pre-election rhetoric in Georgia, attention should be paid to Ivanishvili’s statement. As the ideological leader of the Georgian Dream party, he announced his intention to apologize to the Ossetian people for the 2008 war. He also promised to conduct a sort of “Nuremberg trial” over Mikheil Saakashvili and his party, implying a search for those responsible for this conflict. Although he didn’t mention Abkhazia, it’s logical to assume that similar steps might follow.

“Symbolic gestures, such as acknowledging responsibility, are important for fostering dialogue.”

“For fostering dialogue and resolving the conflict, ‘Georgian Dream’ is a more suitable partner for Abkhazia.”

Astamur Tania: From the perspective of pre-election rhetoric, this is a rather risky step, so one could see sincerity in the statement. But in Georgia, such remarks are often used to create an enemy image, focusing on Russian occupation. Ivanishvili’s statement is being used in competitive political struggle, and it could lead to a resurgence of past conflicts. Symbolic gestures, such as acknowledging responsibility, are important for fostering dialogue.

When a society is ready to recognize its mistakes, it opens opportunities to correct them and demonstrates maturity. I hope that after the October election, there will be a chance to continue moving in this direction. Issues like resuming the official negotiation process and how to coexist and resolve problems will become relevant. For fostering dialogue and resolving the conflict, Georgian Dream is a more suitable partner for Abkhazia.

If opposing forces come to power, even if they don’t have violence against Abkhazia and Ossetia in mind, they will remain trapped by their own propagandistic pre-election discourse for a long time. Their rhetoric could delay problem-solving and lead to further escalation. What could this result in? Possibly a worsening situation or even a recurrence of conflicts. It’s hard to predict, and I think even Georgian politicians themselves cannot give an accurate forecast right now.

Nonetheless, I believe this is a step that inspires hope. I hope that after the October election, there will be an opportunity to move in this direction. Of course, questions will arise about resuming official negotiations, what to do with the law on occupied territories, how we can coexist, and how to solve these issues.

Inal Khashig: Georgian Dream, and Ivanishvili in particular, have outlined their general vision for South Ossetia and Abkhazia ⁠— the main message is that any existing conflict should only be resolved through peaceful means. The opposition, however, despite having several factions, does not have such a clear position.

Astamur Tania: They don’t have a peace agenda. Even Georgian Dream lacks a comprehensive agenda. Although Georgian Dream has taken this peace agenda as part of its public program, they talk only about the opposite. The opposition merely expresses the reverse, which could delay solving problems that might otherwise be resolved. Of course, the situation doesn’t allow for a quick resolution of state-level relations, and I am skeptical about that. But there are a number of issues that could be addressed by both sides, which would change the overall atmosphere and improve the relationship climate. This is quite possible to achieve.

Inal Khashig: The Abkhazian side, too, should probably voice its position beyond merely expressing support.

“Russia, in its dialogue with Abkhazia, recognizes its independence. Abkhazia is a state, not a quasi-state formation.”

Astamur Tania: It is critical here to follow the principle of ‘do no harm.’ Abkhazia does not have the ability to directly influence processes in Georgia, but our officials must be cautious so that their words are not used in internal political struggles. In any case, we will need to build relationships with whoever wins. For our part, we need to maintain a certain distance. There is an attempt to portray Abkhazia as a kind of stumbling block, a tool in Russia’s hands that Georgian authorities constantly run into, which ultimately does not benefit our relations.”

Abkhazia, though a small entity with limited economic, political, and military capabilities, still exercises its independence. Society can quickly mobilize and demonstrate solidarity. Therefore, the Abkhazian factor cannot be ignored. In its dialogue with Abkhazia, Russia recognizes its independence. Abkhazia is a state, not a quasi-state formation. While it may not be perfect, it is the result of our own efforts. This is important to keep in mind when discussing conflict resolution — Abkhazia cannot be left out of the equation.

Inal Khashig: On this positive note, I will conclude the program. I hope our internal political process remains controlled and does not go beyond certain limits. I would like to see a development agenda in the context of the upcoming presidential election, and I hope that the positive statements from Georgian Dream regarding Abkhazia will continue. I remind you that you can watch us on the Chegemskaya Pravda YouTube channel, read us on the website, and leave comments on my Telegram channel. Today our guest was Astamur Tania. Thank you for being a somewhat calming presence in our turbulent situation.

Astamur Tania: Thank you all, stay healthy, goodbye!

Will Georgia apologize for the war with Abkhazia?